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“The pride of youth is still upon you; late have you
become young: but he who would become a child
must surmount even his youth.” [..] And there
was spoken to me for the last time: “O Zarathustra,
your fruits are ripe, but you are not ripe for your fruits!”
Friedrich Nietzsche.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Pt. 2 (22) The Stillest Hour.
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Abstract
Vulnerability bulletins and feeds report hundreds of vulnerabilities a month
that a system administrator or a Chief Information Officer working for an
organisation has to take care of. Because of the load of work, vulnerability
prioritisation is a must in any complex-enough organisation. Currently, the
industry employs the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS in short)
as a metric to prioritise vulnerability risk. However, the CVSS base score
is a technical measure of severity, not of risk. By using a severity measure
to estimate risk, current practices assume that every vulnerability is charac-
terised by the same exploitation likelihood, and that vulnerability risk can
be assessed through a technical analysis of the vulnerability.
In this Thesis we argue that this is not the case, and that the economic
forces that drive the attacker are a key factor in understanding vulnerability
risk. In particular, we argue that attacker’s rationality and the economic
infrastructure supporting cybercrime’s activities play a major role in deter-
mining which vulnerabilities will the attackers massively exploit, and there-
fore which vulnerabilities will represent a (substantially higher than the rest)
risk. Our ultimate goal is to show that ‘risk-based’ vulnerability manage-
ment policies, as opposed to currently employed ‘criticality-based’ ones, are
possible and can outperform current practices in terms of patching efficiency
without losing in effectiveness (i.e. reduction of risk in the wild).
To this aim we perform an extensive data-collection work on vulnerabil-
ities, proof-of-concept exploits, exploits traded in the cybercrime markets,
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and exploits detected in the wild. We further collaborated with Symantec
to collect actual records of attacks in the wild delivered against about 1M
machines worldwide. A good part of our data-collection efforts has been also
dedicated in infiltrating and analysing the cybercrime markets.
We used this data collection to evaluate two ‘running hypotheses’ un-
derlying our main thesis: vulnerability risk is influenced by the attacker’s
rationality, and the underground markets are credible sources of risk that
provide technically proficient attack tools, are mature and sound from an
economic perspective. We then put this in practice and evaluate the effec-
tiveness of criticality-based and risk-based vulnerability management policies
(based on the aforementioned findings) in mitigating real attacks in the wild.
We compare the policies in terms of the ‘risk reduction’ they entail, i.e. the
gap between ‘risk’ addressed by the policy and residual risk. Our results
show that risk-based policies entail a significantly higher risk reduction than
criticality-based ones, and thwart the majority of risk in the wild by ad-
dressing only a small fraction of the patching work prescribed by current
practices.
Keywords
Vulnerability Management, Attacker model, Attacker Economics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The management of IT security is becoming a more and more prevalent
challenge as system complexity increases. The evolving nature of IT systems
further complicates the scenario: on the one side the increasing complexity
of software often translates in more software flaws and vulnerabilities to fix
[89], and on the other system threats continuously evolve, changing the risk
outlook as new vulnerabilities and attack vectors emerge [58, 19]. For this
reason, to measure the risk associated with a software vulnerability becomes
a central point in any strategy for system security management. This is
also reflected in the recent development, both in academia and industry, of
software risk measures [83, 68, 124] and vulnerability management strategies
[79, 40, 95] that are now adopted as a standard-de-facto worldwide [123].
However, the nature of the risk associated with these vulnerabilities re-
mains largely unexplored. Risk is typically defined as the product of the
impact or severity of an event, and its likelihood. While technical measures
of vulnerability impact and exposure have been defined in the past [79, 68],
a precise notion of likelihood of exploit remains to be found [30, 124]. On
the other hand, this is crucial to a meaningful definition of vulnerability risk:
attacks against two measurably similar vulnerabilities from a technical per-
spective (e.g. both allowing remote code execution via freed memory reuse)
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are not necessarily similarly distributed in the wild. A meaningful risk es-
timation should indeed assign a higher risk score to the most frequently
attacked vulnerability. Yet, this is not reflected in current practices and re-
search [108, 68, 124, 79, 83]: current approaches focus mainly on a technical
assessment of the exposure of the system to the vulnerability, and likelihood
measures are often derived from the technical assessment itself [83, 30]. On
the other hand, hackers’ and cybercriminals’ attitudes toward cyber attacks
are known to go well beyond the mere technical matters: the attacker may be
motivated by political or social reasons [115], as well as economic ones [58].
Attackers with different motivations and technological or infrastructural ca-
pabilities can be expected to generate attacks with different risk profiles both
in terms of technical sophistication and distribution in the wild. This opens a
set of interesting questions on the decision process of the attacker: how does
the attacker choose which vulnerabilities to (massively) exploit? According
to what process does the engineering of a new exploit translate into the final
risk suffered by the user? It is not clear how current attacker models, often
used to prove the security of a communication or cryptographic protocol [44],
can be used to define the notion of vulnerability risk: attackers are usually
thought of as very powerful (e.g. can access all systems and have complete
information about the target) [2], but whether this is representative of the
current status of cyber attacks remains an open issue [58, 73, 25].
In contrast, in this Thesis we develop the notion of the ‘economic at-
tacker’ that is utility-oriented and work-averse (i.e. perceives work effort as
a disutility), and that relies on a technological infrastructure for cyberat-
tacks that he can access from the cybercrime markets [58]. We argue that
the economic nature and capabilities of an attacker are an important driver
for technological and operational risk. In particular, in this Thesis we show
that vulnerability risk is largely influenced by the attacker’s rationality in
deciding which vulnerabilities to exploit, and by the economic environment
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the attacker operates in. By accounting for these factors, we define a novel
attacker model that, when factored in the risk assessment, allows us to iden-
tify vulnerability patching strategies that are significantly more efficient than
current best practices.
The remainder of this Chapter unfolds as follows: in Section 1.1 we give
a more detailed introduction on current practices for vulnerability manage-
ment and we outline the inefficiency problem that they entail. In Section
1.2 we define our research problem, and in Section 1.3 we outline the main
contributions of this Thesis work. Finally, Section 1.4 presents an outline of
this manuscript’s organisation.
1.1 Risk Management and the Inefficiency Problem
When it comes to risk mitigation best practices, stating a rule that defines
what represents ‘unacceptable risk’ is probably the most immediate approach.
A ‘rule’ usually sets a critical threshold over some technical dimension [78].
The chosen technical dimension(s) correspond to a point estimate of some
expected property of the component. The underlying assumption here is
that the considered point estimate has a certain descriptive power relative to
the distribution. By setting a rule that covers a wide fraction of the proba-
bility distribution of ‘bad events’, one hopes to achieve almost full coverage
against possible hazards. However, in computer security this ‘point estimate’
is difficult to obtain given the wide diversity of systems and technologies in-
volved in the assessment, and the disparate nature and resources available to
developers, system administrators, attackers, and system stakeholders [78].
A clear example of this problem emerges from an overview of how vul-
nerability management currently works: organizations that want a security
clearance to operate in certain fields (e.g. in the financial sector) or that sim-
ply need guidance to prevent and mitigate security incidents are obliged to
5
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comply to security standards (e.g. PCI-DSS for credit card security [127]) or
protocols and best practices (e.g. the NIST SCAP Protocol [95]) to manage
the security of their IT systems. These standards and best practices prescribe
a ‘criticality-based’ vulnerability management i.e. based on a measure of how
technically severe the vulnerability is. We define criticality-based policies in
the following way:
Definition. Criticality-based policies for vulnerability management de-
fine a critical level of the technical measure of a vulnerability above which
patching is required.
Being a technical measure, the defined ‘rule’ is to be applied equally re-
gardless of the organisation’s security needs and resources. While this ‘tech-
nical assessment’ has the advantage of being easily manageable by the issuing
institution of the certification (as it does not change among organisations),
the organisation may suffer from substantial inefficiencies in implementing
the rule as prescribed: Is the rule actually fit to the threat types the or-
ganisation faces? How can the organisation measure how effective and apt
the ‘rule’ is for them? Can the organisation do any better while remaining
within the limits for compliance? Unfortunately, a technical measure is not
suitable to answer any of these questions because it can not reflect, by def-
inition, other elements that are proper to the organisation and its specific
threat model and operative environment. In other words, organisations are
left operating over their vulnerabilities without a way to estimate the risk
they are subject to and to evaluate which mitigation strategy works better
in their context.
This is particularly undesirable as vulnerability management can be very
expensive and risky from a business continuity perspective: in today’s highly
connected and diverse operative environments, it is difficult to foresee what
effects a change upstream may have down the network. For this reason
extensive testing is often needed before deploying a patch over a system
6
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(e.g. providing a service) or set of systems (e.g. interfacing with the service).
With hundreds of vulnerabilities to manage per year [122, 114], this operation
can become very expensive and fraught with organisational problems: which
vulnerability(-ies) should the organisation start from? What is the actual
return in terms of additional security gained from the investment? Is it worth
the time and the money it requires? This effect is clearly visible in the recent
2015 Verizon report on PCI Compliance, where the vulnerability management
and testing requirements (i.e. requirements 5,6 and 11) are among the least
met by companies [123]. It is therefore clear that vulnerability prioritisation
becomes central to any vulnerability management process. This is in turn
representative of a more general issue, that is ‘to measure’ how better off the
organisation is if a certain mitigation action is taken sooner than another.
Yet, without a characterisation of ‘vulnerability risk’ it is currently not clear
how to obtain this measure.
Every vulnerability management product available on the market (provid-
ing also tools supporting compliance to a number of standards) is essentially
based on a ‘red-yellow-green’ assessment of vulnerability severity: a simple
computation of the number of vulnerabilities present on the system and their
technical severity. This approach is also employed by the scientific literature
[108, 83, 30, 103].
The main problem with this ‘criticality-based’ approach is that it implic-
itly assumes that a vulnerability’s technical severity level can be considered
a proxy for vulnerability risk. Whilst it is certainly true that a critical vul-
nerability will sooner or later need to be fixed, it is not necessarily true that
less critical vulnerabilities will pose a lower immediate risk. Even within the
same ‘criticality level’ different vulnerabilities may pose different risk (e.g.
because of some known and publicly available proof-of-concept exploit). In
this logic, to immediately fix ‘higher criticality’ vulnerabilities may cause
‘high risk’ vulnerabilities to remain untouched longer than necessary, while
7
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the workload remains bloated with unnecessary work over severe but low-
risk vulnerabilities. This can be clearly very inefficient and, possibly more
importantly, will not necessarily benefit the overall security profile of the
organisation - if not worsen it as more resources are put in fixing low-risk
vulnerabilities rather than in other mitigation actions.
1.2 Research Problem
The inefficiency issue outlined above opens a series of challenges to the com-
munity on how to measure how better off an organisation’s overall security
is after a mitigating action has been taken. The following excerpt is taken
from a recent report by the Ponemon institute [92]:
The majority of security professionals [..] aren’t sure how
to distil this information [on security risk] into metrics that
are understandable, relevant and actionable to senior busi-
ness leadership. [..] Finding meaningful ways to successfully
bridge this communication gap is critical to broader adoption
of risk-based security programs. .
Indeed, one can use metrics such as attack surfaces [68] to estimate the
overall exposure to potential security threats, but can not obtain an esti-
mate in terms of diminished risk to communicate to the business’ decision
maker or to employ to engineer a better security plan. Being able to measure
vulnerability risk can also be beneficial when communicating with auditors
for compliance, that have to verify the soundness of the implementation of
security requirements for the standard certification. Currently, to justify an
unmet requirement the organisation has to produce lengthy (and expensive)
documentation justifying the decision in relation to the organisation’s in-
frastructure and existing countermeasures [127]. With a sound measure for
8
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risk the lengthy and expensive documentation could be ideally synthesised
as follows: ‘I haven’t yet fully pursued this requirement because its fulfilment
entails for me only a 1% reduction in risk, which is negligible when compared
to the 90% reduction of this other mitigation action.’
In order to make such statements possible, one has to shift from a purely
technical decision model (i.e. current criticality-based policies) to a risk-
driven one whereby impact and exploitation likelihood are both accounted
for. We define risk-based vulnerability management policies as follows:
Definition. Risk-based policies for vulnerability management define a
measure for vulnerability risk based on vulnerability severity and likelihood
of exploitation.
Our research goal is therefore to show that risk-based vulnerability man-
agement policies are possible, and that the economic nature of the attacker
and his/her rationality are determinant factors in designing more effective
vulnerability management practices.
1.3 Thesis Contribution
The principal contribution of this thesis is that we demonstrate that vulner-
ability risk hugely varies among vulnerabilities, and that the rational and
economic nature of the attacker and of the environment he/she operates in
are of major importance in creating this gap. To demonstrate that this is
the case, in this Thesis we:
1. Present a unique set of datasets comprising vulnerabilities, exploits,
exploits traded in the black markets, attacks in the wild, and data on
black market operations. The collection of these datasets required a full
year of ethnographic research (to identify and infiltrate the cybercrime
markets) and planning to meet the requirements needed to have access to
9
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real attack data provided by Symantec. This data is used orthogonally
to validate each claim and conclusion made in this Thesis.
2. Show that the attacker is rational in choosing which exploits to engineer
and massively deploys in the wild, and that this generates a skewed
distribution of risk for the final user.
3. The economic activities of the attacker operating in the underground
markets characterise a foremost source of risk for the final user. We
demonstrate that these markets are economically and technologically
sound and conclude that they are not a temporary phenomenon.
4. The attacker’s rational nature and economic environment can be ex-
ploited to design better vulnerability management strategies based on
the notion of vulnerability risk. These strategies offer great advantages
in terms of patching efficiency over current best practices.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This Thesis unfolds as follows. In the next Chapter we outline the objectives
of this Thesis and provide a detailed discussion of the methods employed
for hypothesis testing. Chapter 3 frames the problem this Thesis addresses
by discussing related works on vulnerabilities, exploits and attackers, and
by identifying open problems currently not addressed in the literature. The
discussion then moves to introducing our datasets, with a focus on the data
collection methodology (Chapter 4). A high-level overview of our data is
given in Chapter 5. The core of this dissertation unfolds in Chapter 6, where
we discuss and test attacker rationality and economics as an enabler for
risk-based vulnerability management. Chapter 7 tests the effectiveness of
risk-based policies and evaluates their advantages over criticality-based ones.
10
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Finally, Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 conclude this dissertation by discussing
limitations and future research venues and conclusions respectively.
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Chapter 2
Reserach Objectives and Methods
2.1 Are Risk-based Policies Possible?
The current practice on vulnerability management is based on the conser-
vative notion that, if a vulnerability is there, sooner or later an attacker
will exploit it. This is an inheritance from more traditional aspects of secu-
rity, such as cryptography, where the existence of one flaw in the protocol
is enough to invalidate it [44]. For example, Bruce Schneier famously stated
in 2005 that “Security is only as strong as the weakest link” [2]. Similarly,
Williams and Chuvakin, domain experts for PCI-DSS compliance (the stan-
dard for credit card management security), state “Don’t spend a huge amount
of time and effort prioritizing [vulnerability] risks, since in the end they all
need to be fixed” [127]. Somewhat ironically, Chuvakin himself will later ac-
knowledge the importance of the risk prioritisation problem [7]. Still, the
general consensus is that if a vulnerability is there and is technically critical,
it must be fixed with high priority.
The implicit assumption here is that all vulnerabilities of the same crit-
icality entail the same risk level, i.e. that attacks are uniformly distributed
over similar vulnerabilities. In this scenario, a criticality-based policy stating
a criticality level for mandatory patching is a good solution and one that
can be hardly improved: because all vulnerabilities are equally likely to be
13
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ultimately exploited, removing only one vulnerability would leave the system
at the same level of risk, irrespective of which vulnerability is fixed.
Yet, this may not be the case in practice. In recent years, the figure of the
attacker moved from the ‘curious hacker’ or ‘script-kiddie’ to the ‘organised
cyber criminal’ that can rely on a pre-existent organisational and technologi-
cal infrastructure to deliver attacks. The main consequence of this evolution
is that attacks are nowadays ‘commoditized’ [58] through underground mar-
kets where the technology producers sell the exploitation technology to a
multitude of buyers that are users of the technology. Therefore, the attacker
tends now to be a rational economic actor operating in a market.
The main intuition in this direction is that the rational attacker’s level
of interest in attacking a vulnerability should be a function of the expected
‘return-on-investment’ from the exploitation. We think of the vulnerability
exploitation process as a two-phase process whereby the exploit first needs to
be engineered, and then either deployed in the wild or sold to other attackers
operating in the cybercrime markets [4, 58]. We make two key observations
on this regard:
1. Engineering phase: Vulnerabilities get fixed in ‘chunks’ by the vendor
with the release of a new software version [38]. Each software version
often addresses tens of vulnerabilities. The attacker has therefore, for
each software version, tens of vulnerabilities to potentially exploit. Yet,
because a software version is vulnerable to all these vulnerabilities, the
rational attacker will only need to exploit (a sufficiently powerful) one:
exploiting two or more vulnerabilities will not increase the number of
successful attacks that can be launched, because all users of that soft-
ware version are equally vulnerable until the next upgrade, when no user
will be vulnerable to any of those vulnerabilities. It makes therefore no
economic sense for the attacker to exploit more than one vulnerability
per software version. For this same reason, the attacker that aims at
14
Chapter 2 2.1. Are Risk-based Policies Possible?
a mass exploitation of final users will need to engineer a new exploit
only when a sufficiently high number of users will have switched to a
new software version. We therefore hypothesise that few vulnerabilities
are high return vulnerabilities, and that therefore only few vulnerabil-
ities will be massively exploited by the attacker, generating a skewed
distribution in risk for the final user.
2. Commercialisation phase: Vulnerability exploits are reportedly traded
in the underground black markets [4, 58]. Because these markets enable
mass exploitation of final users [58], we argue that these exploits are
engineered following the rationale described above. As in any market,
there is a 1:n distribution rate of technology, i.e. one vendor sells a tech-
nological solution to n users of the technology. In a criminal market,
this translates in one vulnerability exploit being used to massively gen-
erate attacks by the n buyers of that exploit. We therefore hypothesise
that the cybercrime underground markets can represent a significant
multiplier factor in the final risk for the user.
A ‘risk-based’ approach to vulnerability management seems therefore more
sensible than the classic criticality-based approach whereby all similar vulner-
abilities represent equal risk. Importantly, in this scenario a criticality-based
approach to vulnerability mitigation may be largely suboptimal as it may
require to address a number of vulnerabilities that could otherwise be safely
ignored or postponed in the patching schedule. This defines the main thesis
of this dissertation:
Thesis. Risk-based vulnerability management policies are possible and
can significantly improve the efficiency of current vulnerability mitigation
practices.
The discussion above outlines two key enabler factors to risk-based vul-
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nerability management policies: attacker rationality, and functioning (and
stable) cybercrime markets. Both these conditions need to be verified be-
fore proceeding with testing our Thesis: were the attackers not rational, or
the markets not sound, any measured effect of risk-based policies may be
a temporary (or casual) one. We formulate three running hypotheses, that
are presented in the remainder of this Chapter alongside the relative testing
methodology. Table 2.1 provides a birds-eye view of this setting.
2.2 The attacker is rational and work-averse
Our first hypothesis aims at establishing that the attacker acts rationally.
Rationality is a widely-accepted underlying assumption in the broad fields of
economics and information security economics [118, 32], whereby economic
actors are driven by a utility maximization function, i.e. each actor tries to
maximise his/her own gain from the execution of certain actions.
In the case of the cyber attacker, his/her goal is to maximise the return
from the execution of an attack. Because finding and exploiting vulnera-
bilities is a time-consuming and therefore costly process [81], the rational
attacker will choose to exploit a vulnerability only if this represents a high
enough gain in terms of increased attack capability with respect to his/her
current capabilities. In other words, the attacker will develop a new exploit
only if the expected returns from the exploitation of the new vulnerability
are lower than the cost of developing and deploying the new attack.
In particular we observe that the exploitation of multiple vulnerabilities
does not necessarily imply a more ample pool of potential victims for the
attacker. To contain testing, deployment and costumer support costs, soft-
ware vendors patch vulnerabilities in bulks [38] by releasing a new software
version. Therefore, to attack a certain software version j the attacker can
choose among n vulnerabilities vj,i ∈ Nj, with Nj the set of vulnerabilities
16
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affecting version j and its cardinality n often much greater than 1.
The by-product of this process is that every user that is vulnerable to a
certain vulnerability vj,i is also vulnerable to the remaining n − 1 vulnera-
bilities for that software version. In this scenario, the attacker that aims at
attacking that set of vulnerable users can do so by exploiting one vulnera-
bility only of the available n1. As a consequence, for each software version
the rational attacker will tend to exploit at most one vulnerability, and leave
n − 1 vulnerabilities unexploited. Extending this to the overall picture, we
formulate the following hypothesis on attacker’s rationality:
Hypothesis 1 The attacker ignores most vulnerabilities and massively de-
ploys exploits for a subset only.
If Hyp 1 holds attackers’ rationality implies that attacks are not uniformly
distributed among vulnerabilities. A criticality-based approach to vulnera-
bility management may therefore be not optimal.
Hypothesis testing
To test Hypothesis 1, we identify two constraints that the attacker has to
respect to be ‘work-averse’. Our first observation is that the work-averse
attacker needs to exploit only one vulnerability per software version, as ex-
ploiting more would not result in an increased volume of final infections. This
is because the user of a certain software version will be equally vulnerable to
all vulnerabilities affecting that version. If the overall picture of attacks in
the wild does not respect this constraint, than we can not conclude that the
attacker acts rationally as a work-averse actor. We therefore hypothesise the
following:
1Clearly, not all these n vulnerabilities are necessarily technically comparable. Some vulnerabilities
(e.g. Cross-Site-Scripting vulnerabilities) are less powerful than others (e.g. Buffer Overflows). Similarly,
the exploitation of different vulnerabilities may carry different costs for the attacker (for example, some
countermeasures deployed at the system level make memory exploitation harder).
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Hypothesis 1a The attacker will massively use only one exploit per soft-
ware version.
Then, because patching rates on the side of the user are often slow [69], we
expect the work-averse attacker to wait a considerable amount of time before
massively deploying a new exploit, as an old one should provide a satisfactory
level of infections. If not, then again the attacker would arguably be doing
more work than what optimally prescribed by his/her rationality.
Hypothesis 1b The fraction of attacks driven by a particular vulnerability
will decrease slowly in time.
Update rates and software types. From Hyp. 1a and 1b we argue that the
average user behaviour in updating a system determines the rate at which
the efficacy of an exploit declines. However, not all software is updated
at the same pace both on the vendor side (that is slower in developing the
patches ([105]) and the users’ side (that may be more likely to apply available
patches for a software type than for another ([69])). Lately, some software
(e.g. internet browsers) started adopting a ‘quick development cycle’ ([86])
that quickly patches vulnerabilities and sends automatic updates to the users.
The attacker behaviour may change with respect to the software type. For
example, users may seldom update their Java plugin, whereas they run the
latest version of the Internet Explorer browser.
Corollary to Hyp. 1b The attacker waits a longer period of time to in-
troduce an exploit for software types under a slow update cycle than for
others.
This corollary will serve as a robustness check to the Hypotheses above,
as their acceptance would be incoherent with the rejection of this Corollary.
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2.3 The underground is a sustainable market economy
Our second hypothesis investigates the economic sustainability of cybercrime
markets. The typical agency problems any market has to address [48] are,
in the cybercrime markets case, particularly prominent: the criminal, and
largely anonymous and virtual nature of these markets make contract com-
pleteness and enforcement hard to achieve. Market operation can be dif-
ficult in these conditions. Identifying bad agents and disincentivize unfair
behaviour (e.g. in terms of moral hazard) become in this setting central
mechanisms of a functioning market [56]. These mechanisms have however
been shown to be at best poorly addressed in the cybercrime IRC-based mar-
kets [63], where information asymmetry problems effectively push all ‘good
agents’ out of market. On the contrary, we argue that current forum-based
cybercrime markets [130, 82] can enforce mechanisms that are effective in
mitigating or solving these issues. We formulate the following Hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The underground markets are sound from an economic per-
spective.
If Hyp. 2 holds, we conclude that the markets are not a transient source
of risk for the final user and are therefore key and permanent enablers of the
‘risk-based’ approach to vulnerability mitigation we propose.
As anticipated, a most prominent issue in a market for criminals is the
agency problem, whereby a principal commissions a work to an agent via an
enforceable contract. The setting of a criminal virtual community is partic-
ularly interesting in this respect as market participants can only stipulate
incomplete contracts, as contract enforcement can not be guaranteed by a
controlling authority. Moreover, a buyer interested in a good has access to
only a limited amount of information to decide whether a particular attack
technology fits his needs, or simply if this technology works. Market partici-
pants operate therefore in a bounded rationality setting where uncertainties
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on the trustworthiness of the seller and the quality of the traded good need
be addressed in order for the market to be sustainable.
We therefore formulate two propositions following Hypothesis 2, address-
ing respectively the existence of market mechanisms to mitigate trade un-
certainties, and the overall quality of the traded goods. Finally, to test
Hypothesis 2 we develop a two-stage model of the underground markets were
we formally show that the mechanisms tested under proposition 1, and the
product quality shown under proposition 2 allow for a sustainable cybercrime
market environment that encourages fair trading and discourages scammers
from participating.
2.3.1 Proposition 1: The underground markets are mature
Recent literature reports how attackers are now en-masse operating in under-
ground markets. This may represent a multiplicative factor for vulnerability
risk as the same exploit may be distributed to multiple attackers. This opens
the question whether these markets are really functioning, or are just a tran-
sient phenomenon. If this is not the case, then this multiplicative effect
would be a permanent factor favouring risk-based policies over criticality-
based policies.
Market design is a problem of great interest in economics, as a successful
market necessarily involves an equilibrium of forces that on one side en-
courages ‘traders’, and on the other discourages “cheaters”. In particular, a
market where everybody cheats is not a sustainable market and is doomed
to fail because nobody would eventually initiate a trade (or, equivalently, all
sellers will eventually exit). Cybercrime markets represent therefore a fas-
cinating case study: they are run by criminals (who are not trustworthy by
definition), are typically run on-line, and are to a degree anonymous. How
can anonymous criminals trust other anonymous criminals in delivering the
promised service or good after the payment has been issued? And even if
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the buyer gets ‘something’, how can she be sure that what she thinks she is
buying is effectively what she will end up with? If a trade goes sour, a buyer
cannot call the police to apprehend the scammer.
Florencio et al. [63] showed that IRC cybercrime markets (Markets run
through Internet Relay Chats) may be no different from the notorious mar-
ket for lemons captured by Akerlof [13], where effectively the asymmetry of
information between the seller and the buyer is such that “bad sellers” are
incentivized in participating in the market to the point that it makes no sense
for the “good sellers” to remain active. In Akerlof’s case, a “bad seller” is a
seller that trades ‘lemons’ (a defective car that is advertised as a good one).
If the customer can not assess the quality of the car before buying it (e.g.
because she knows little about cars), then she will buy the cheapest she can
find on the market. Since ‘lemons’ are cheaper than good cars, ‘good sellers’
are ultimately forced out of the market. In Florencio et al.’s case, a ‘lemon’
was a credit card number with (allegedly) a certain amount of money ready
to be used by the buyer. As shown in Akerlof’s work, discerning ‘good sellers’
from ‘bad sellers’ is therefore a critical point of a market design. Florencio
et al. clearly demonstrated that it is virtually impossible to do so in the IRC
cybercrime markets. On the other hand, recent reports show that cybercrime
tools and infrastructure seem to work [112, 58]. Following these observations,
we formulate the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 The underground markets evolved from a scam-for-scammer
model to a mature state whereby fair trade is possible and incentivised by the
enforced trading mechanisms.
If Prop. 1 holds, we conclude that the underground markets can be a
sustainable operating environment for the rational attacker. The ‘multiplier
effect’ in attack volume, enabled by marketed vulnerabilities (as opposed to
little known ones), will make technically identical vulnerabilities different in
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terms of final risk to the user depending on whether they are traded in the
markets or not.
Testing Proposition 1 Forum markets In order to understand whether cy-
bercrime markets evolved to a mature state, we compare two forum under-
ground markets: one that failed and one that is still active. We label these
markets Carders.de and HackMarket.ru. Carders.de (which failed) specialized
mostly in credit cards, while HackMarket.ru (still active) specializes mostly
in cyber-crime tools, albeit some transactions are also about monetary goods
(e.g. credentials for Skype accounts). We give a more precise description of
both markets in Chapter 4.
Both Carders.de and HackMarket.ru are forum-based markets. They have
administrators, moderators, users’ registration procedures, reputation mech-
anisms and so on. The major difference with Alibaba, eBay, or Craiglist is
that they mostly advertise ‘illegal’ goods.
At first, notice that even legitimated forum markets are rife with scams.
After 20 years since eBay’s foundation, many frauds reported by FBI’s 2013
Internet Crime Reports [50] rely on legitimate forum markets to perform
scams: good old lemons are advertised and sold via eBay [50, pag. 8]; bogus
real estates are sold via Craiglist; failed delivery or payment of goods are
common places; etc.
To create ‘safe trading places’ where only experienced and trustworthy
users participate, forum-based markets have created a number of mecha-
nisms aimed at distinguishing ‘good’ and ‘bad’ users. A system to effectively
manage reputation is a key issue in the trust of an on-line market place.
For example, eBay filed its own reputation based mechanisms for patenting
in 2000 [97] and at the beginning of 2015 has almost 200 patents listed on
Google’s patent with the keyword ‘user reputation”.
The forum mechanisms in legal on-line markets have provided a ‘satisfy-
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ing’, in the sense of Simon [109], protection to legitimate users to make those
markets thrive. For example, Melnik and Alm showed that reputation does
matter in sales [80]; Resnick and Zeckhauser showed that buyers and sellers
actively and deliberatively provide positive or negative ratings, with positive
ratings being the majority [98].
From a legal perspective, reputation mechanisms only provide partial cov-
erage. Law scholars have discussed the issue at length (see e.g. [33, 14] for
some of the earliest papers). However, if the reputation mechanism fails, and
a ‘lemon’ is sold via eBay, a customer can always resort to the FBI Inter-
net Crime Center which will pass the complain to the local prosecutor [50,
pag. 18]. Similar protections are available to customers in other countries.
Such last resort is not available to victims of trades gone sour in criminal
forums.
Therefore, illegal markets must either make the reputation mechanism
more robust or compensate for the failure of the mechanism with prosecution
procedures. Absence or failure of these additional enforcement mechanisms
would intuitively re-create the same conditions that Floreˆncio et al. [63]
identified for the IRC markets: information asymmetry would favour ‘ripping’
behaviour and eventually bring the market to fail.
We formulate a number of hypotheses from the description of Carders.de’s
and HackMarket.ru’s regulatory mechanisms (reputation being just one of
them). The goal is to compare the two markets on the same regulatory
ground and see if newer and still active markets solved the regulatory prob-
lems present in the failed ones.
Effectiveness of reputation mechanism If the reputation mechanism works,
known scammers should have the lowest reputation among all user.
Proposition 1a Banned users have on average lower reputation than nor-
mal users.
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If Proposition 1a is true, it is evidence that the regulatory mechanism for
reputation is effectively enforced, and provides to forum users an instrument
to evaluate traders’ historical trustworthiness. If the data does not support
this, “reputation” in the forum is not a good ex-ante indicator of a users’
trustworthiness.
Fora may present a hierarchy of roles or status groups that each user can
‘escalate’ to. In a functioning system the status should be reflected in the
reputation rating.
Proposition 1b Users with a higher status should on average have a higher
reputation than lower status users.
If Hypotheses 1a and 1b do not hold, it may as well be because moderators
left a part of the market to its own and concentrated all regulatory efforts
on the higher market tiers. For example, in the Carders.de market, there are
three Tiers of traders and the first Tier may just represent noise in the data.
To check this possibility, we can restrict Hyp1a to hold only for users that
are higher in the hierarchy.
Proposition 1c Banned users who happened to have a higher status have a
lower reputation than other users with the same status.
If even Hyp. 1c does not hold, we conclude that the reputation mechanisms
even after controlling for market alleged ‘status’ provide no meaningful way
for the forum users to distinguish between “bad traders” and “good traders”.
Enforcement of rules Reputation may fail to provide effective information,
but the hard-wired categories of the forum users (the ones under the direct
control of the administrators) may provide a better indicator of quality. Nor-
mally, access to the higher market tiers should be subject to some rules. The
market is reliable if such rules are consistently enforced.
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To see whether this regulation is enforced we can test the following Propo-
sition:
Proposition 1d The ex-ante rules for assigning a user to a category are
enforced.
Once transactions fail, Carders.de and HackMarket.ru users cannot turn to
legitimate law enforcement agencies for a redress. Therefore, the forum must
have some alternative rules to manage trades gone sour.
Proposition 1e There are ex-post rules for enforcing trades contemplating
compensation or banning violators.
Market existence An obvious, but important question to ask is whether
the market actually exists. In other words, whether actual transactions take
place (took place for Carders.de). Indeed, the role of the forum boards is
to provide a platform for sellers and buyers to advertise their merchandise.
The actual finalization of the trade usually happens through the exchange of
private messages between the trading parties [52, 63].
Proposition 1f Users finalize their contracts in the private messages mar-
ket.
If Hyp 1f holds, than the exchange of private messages would be a good
proxy for us to measure the successfulness of ‘normal’ users and ‘rippers’
in closing trades. To check whether ‘normal users’ are significantly more
successful than ‘rippers’ we test the following Proposition:
Proposition 1g Normal users receive more trade offers than known rippers
do.
For Carders.de, where we have access to the whole forum, a suitable proxy
is counting the number of times a forum user initiates a trade with another
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forum user i.e. the number of unsolicited incoming private messages a user
receives. The proportion of private messages that are trade-initiation can
be calculated to answer the previous Proposition. For HackMarket.ru such
analysis must be qualitative as downloading the whole forum would reveal
our presence.
We would expect the results for Hyp. 1g to be coherent with the results
obtained so far for the forum. In other words, if the reputation mechanism
works, the tier system is properly enforced, and the exchange of private
messages is used to conclude the trading process, then we would expect
normal users to conclude more trades than rippers do. This is because the
consistent enforcement of the forum rules would give market participants an
instrument to discern rippers from normal users. Otherwise, if the evidence
gathered so far suggests a systematic failure in the market regulation, then
we would expect rippers to be indistinguishable from normal users because
the user cannot do better than randomly picking a seller from the whole
population.
2.3.2 Proposition 2: The technology traded in the underground
is effective
Besides a mature economic setting to operate upon, a successful market needs
goods to be exchanged. Traded goods can be of any nature, but for the econ-
omy to be sustainable the goods have to deliver the advertised functionality
(or buyers will simply stop buying products). From the perspective of a cy-
bercriminal operating in the black markets, the good must deliver the attack
as promised by the vendor.
Recent industry reports [122, 113] and scientific studies [58] reported on
the attack capacity of the infrastructure provided by the underground mar-
kets; some studies estimate the fraction of attacks that can be traced back to
attack tools traded in the underground [93], but no study empirically and ex-
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plicitly evaluates their effectiveness. We aim at filling this gap by formulating
and testing the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 The tools bought and used by the attackers are well engi-
neered products that are effective when deployed in the wild.
If we find evidence supporting Hyp. 2 we conclude that the cybercrime
markets distribute effective attack technology to multiple attackers that ul-
timately deploy those attacks.
Testing Proposition 2 We will directly test for Proposition 2 by testing the
effectiveness and resiliency of tools traded in the cybercrime markets against
evolving system configurations. These test are run in a laboratory built for
this purposes at the University of Trento, the MalwareLab.
2.4 Risk-based Policies are Possible
Hypotheses 1 and 2 postulate the feasibility of risk-based policies. In par-
ticular, Hyp. 1 postulates that ‘high return’ vulnerabilities will carry higher
risk for the final user than most vulnerabilities. Hyp. 2 postulates that the
underground markets act (and will keep on acting) as ‘risk amplifiers’. We
therefore formulate the following concluding hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 It is possible to construct risk-based policies that, levereging
the economic nature of the attacker, can greatly improve over criticality-based
policies.
In particular, due to the multiplicative effect we predict from Hyp. 2, we
expect risk-based policies that account for the presence of a vulnerability in
the black markets to be the most effective ones. We therefore formulate the
following corollary to Hyp. 3:
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Corollary to Hyp. 3 Risk-based policies accounting for cybercrime
markets are the most effective in reducing risk for the final user.
Hypothesis testing
We evaluate the effectiveness of risk-based policies as opposed to that of
criticality-based policies by developing a case control study accounting for
vulnerabilities, exploits in the wild, and cybercrime activities and actors (as
established with Hypotheses 1-2). In particular, we evaluate policy effective-
ness by measuring the risk reduction it entails: risk reduction is a relative
measure of the leftover risk after a certain patching decision is taken. To
accept Hypothesis 3, we further provide an application example whereby
we compare workloads and benefits in terms of foiled attacks in the wild of
risk-based and criticality based policies.
Table 2.1 summarises this Section’s discussion.
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2.5 Research methodology and scope of work
This thesis’ contribution is grounded on empirical research. Empirical re-
search methodologies are usually divided in two main categories: qualitative
and quantitative research methodologies [128].
• Qualitative research aims at studying the phenomenon of interest in its
natural setting, usually in order to understand why something happens
rather than trying to assess how or how frequently does it happen.
• Quantitative research aims at measuring some quantity of interest [74].
The goal is usually to compare these measures among groups that the
researcher can control (as in an experiment) or observe and control a
posteriori (as in a case control study) in order to evaluate a certain
hypothesis of interest.
In this Thesis we employ both approaches. In particular, we employ a case
study to (qualitatively) study the cybercrime markets, and a case control
study to (quantitatively) study vulnerability risk.
• Case studies are concerned with understanding one particular setting of
interest over well-specified dimensions [74]. Case studies are often used
for exploratory and descriptive purposes [99], whereby the researcher
aims at both deriving a ‘big picture’ perspective over the phenomenon of
interest, and at deriving the fundamental ‘building blocks’ necessary to
describe it. If the case is general enough, or it fits exactly the boundaries
of the research (i.e. is representative of the analysed problem), a case
study can also be employed for explanatory purposes [102]. From an
exploratory and descriptive analysis is also possible to derive models
for the analysis that use the qualitative results of the study to build
and validate a model of the phenomenon of interest. Our case study
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is focused on one particularly active underground market that features,
among its participants, the main cybercrime players and products often
cited in the media [8, 87] and the literature [58, 75].
• A case control study is typically run over field data, i.e. data collected
through some pre-existent collection mechanism, or through interviews
[41]. A case control study looks at existing data to derive, through
the implementation of proper controls, conclusions on the correlation
between an observation and an ‘explanatory variable’ (i.e. a certain hy-
pothesis on why an effect can be measured in the data). Case control
studies have notably been employed to initially link smoking and carci-
noma of the lung [45], and use of seat belts and likelihood of death in a
car accident [49]. As exemplified by these two examples, a case control
study is typically run when an experiment can not be run for practical
or ethical reasons: one can not randomly assign patients to a twenty-
year smoking period, and measure whether they get cancer down the
line. Similarly, we can not ask participants to stay vulnerable and then
measure who gets their bank accounts emptied. We therefore rely on
field data collected by Symantec and use a case control study to derive
our conclusions.
Data gathering. The initial part of this work has been dedicated entirely
to gather data on vulnerabilities, exploits, and black markets. In particu-
lar, we collected data from public datasets such as the National Vulnera-
bility Database (NVD) for the ‘universe of vulnerabilities’ and the Exploit
Database (Exploit-db) for proof-of-concept exploits (i.e. exploits that demon-
strate the exploitability of a vulnerability). We further collected three addi-
tional datasets that are not fully or directly available in the public sphere.
EKITS is a dataset reporting vulnerabilities traded in the black markets. It is
built over Contagio’s Exploit Pack table [11], that we however substantially
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expanded by integrating it with data on more than 90 Exploit kits and 100
unique vulnerabilities for a total of about 900 records. SYM and WINE are
a collection of exploited vulnerabilities (SYM) and records of attacks against
vulnerabilities (WINE) reported by Symantec through their Worldwide In-
telligence Network Environment Data Sharing Programme [46]. WINE is
available to use for researchers pursuing projects selected by Symantec.
As per the cybercrime markets, we collected data on two case studies: one
for a failed underground market, whose database eventually leaked through
underground channels, and a second for an active market, that we infiltrated.
These two case studies allow us to perform two analyses:
1. By comparing the two markets over a set of hypotheses on the effective-
ness of their regulatory mechanisms, we can highlight the differences
between an old and failed market and a new and active one. We per-
form this analysis through a mixture of quantitative and qualitative
analysis of the two markets.
2. By thoroughly analysing the active market we first describe its trade
operations, and how issues such as information asymmetry [13] (typi-
cal of any principal-agent problem were contracts are incomplete [48])
are addressed. Based on this analysis, we build a model of the under-
ground market activities and show that the mechanism we observe is
economically sound.
We provide a more thorough outline of these datasets and their collection
methodology in Chapter 4.
Case-control studies. Vulnerability data is fraught with reporting and con-
trol problems: time-of-disclosure and time-of-patch is filled with “noise of
unknown size” [105] and data on software versions and vendors is biased
by limitations inherent to the disclosure process [38]. Unfortunately these
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limitations are often ignored in literature [38], and generate hard to inter-
pret conclusions (notable examples are [20, 108]). We propose the use of
case control studies as a statistically sound way to measure different ‘fea-
tures’ of vulnerability data. Although case-control studies are certainly not
novel [45, 49], their use in information security is entirely novel. In our
case, case-control studies represent an easily reproducible way to evaluate
the effectiveness of vulnerability management policies by estimating the Risk
Reduction they entail. Because case-control studies run on hindsight data to
estimate correlations valid in foresight, their application can be extended to
any operative environment that collects historical data on received attacks.
This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
Scope of work. Our data collection and research methodology requires some
further consideration on the scope of this Thesis’ work. In particular, field
data adds realism to the analysis but limits the ‘generality’ of one’s conclu-
sions as it is often hard to extend results to other settings. Most attacks are
delivered in an untargeted manner through web attacks [58, 93, 28], spam
[64] and social engineering [26]. In this Thesis we focus on the ‘general at-
tacker’ that ‘massively deploys attacks in the wild against the population
of users’. We make no claim on target attacks or the so-called APTs (Ad-
vanced Persistent Threats) that aim at a particular system of a particular
organisation. For this reason we distinguish between dedicated and average
attackers. A general model for the former type of attacker may be hard to
design mainly because the attacker’s motivation and target can be hard to
predicted a-priori [62], and there is little data available to investigate this
threat [28]. Consequently, evaluating the risk represented by a dedicated
attacker is a rather pointless task as this is strongly case-dependent.
Case control studies represent a strong aid toward the internal and ex-
ternal validity of one’s conclusions. Yet, they are not quite as powerful as
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a (controlled) experiment setting is [128]. In particular, because in a case
control study not all aspects of the ‘experiment’ are under the control of the
researcher (e.g. data is collected elsewhere through an only partially known
process), it is hard to build ‘causal links’ between an hypothesis and an ob-
servation. Rather, a case control study is limited to highlight the correlation
(as opposed to causation) between the two.
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Chapter 3
Measuring Vulnerabilities, Exploits,
and Attackers
3.1 Software Vulnerabilities and Measures
One of the first large-scale studies on the life-cycle of a vulnerability has been
conducted in 2004 by Arora et al. [20], where they evaluated how different
vulnerability disclosure policies impact the velocity of patch and exploit ar-
rival. They find that patching response time largely depends on vendor size,
and that public disclosure of the vulnerability increases both the rapidity of
the patching action and the arrival of the first exploit. This approach has
recently been expanded by Shahzad et al. [108], who used data from pub-
lic vulnerability sources [9, 10] to estimate vendor’s performances by eval-
uating the average severity of the disclosed vulnerabilities and the average
time between patch release and vulnerability disclosure. Unfortunately, the
complexities of the vulnerability disclosure process [81, 105, 38] make these
comparison hardly significant and representative of the real performance of
the vendor. For example, certain vendors may have more ‘hackers’ or ‘secu-
rity researchers’ interested in finding critical vulnerabilities in their software
than the ‘average vendor’ . Moreover, real patching and disclosure times
are ‘obscured’ by the disclosure process itself and therefore, to say it in the
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words of the authors of NIST’s NVD dataset, “the computation of patch
times and exploit times would contain errors of unknown size.” [9, 105]. For
this same reason, the identification of so-called zero-day vulnerabilities (i.e.
vulnerabilities exploited in the wild before being disclosed to the vendor)
can be tricky. [108], by comparing exploit dates on OSVDB with disclosure
dates on NVD, find that about 88% of vulnerabilities have a zero-day ex-
ploits. A figure in sharp contrast with this estimation is given by [28] who,
by analysing records of attacks in the wild provided by Symantec, find that
only a handful of vulnerabilities have an exploit in the wild before the date of
disclosure. The vulnerability discovery process has been extensively studied
in literature. ‘Vulnerability Discovery Models’ (VDMs) aim at modelling the
overall number of vulnerabilities that will affect a certain software at a given
point in time. Alhazmi et al. propose an exhaustive analysis of the main
VDMs proposed in literature [15]. While numerous case studies are provided,
including Operating Systems [16] and server software [129], the applicability
of VDM remains uncertain [86].
3.1.1 The Common Vulnerability Scoring System
On top of the difficulties represented by estimating vulnerability and exploit
disclosure and patch availability, remains the more general problem of ‘mea-
suring’ the criticality of a vulnerability. The Common Vulnerability Scoring
System (CVSS) [79], at its second version at the time of writing, is the
standard-de-facto vulnerability metric used in the industry1. A CVSS score
is assigned to each disclosed vulnerability, identified by a CVE-ID (Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures IDentifier). The CVSS score has been designed
to give a readily available and standardised measure of the potential impact
of a vulnerability over a system. Unfortunately its usage often deviates from
its definition, and is often employed as a risk metric instead.Although CVSS
1The release of CVSS v3 is scheduled to happen in June 2015
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resembles the form of a risk metric (Score = likelihood× impact), the char-
acterisation of the ‘likelihood’ variable is not clear in the CVSS case [30].
This is also reflected in the words of one of the authors of the CVSS score:
“CVSS does not, and never has, made the claim that base score is significantly
correlated with exploit probability” [100].
The CVSS framework considers three separate metrics: the base metric,
the temporal metric, and the environmental metric. The first characterises
the technical details of the vulnerability. The second captures characteristics
that may vary with time, such as the existence of a patch, a known exploit,
or of a workaround for the vulnerability. The third considers additional envi-
ronmental factors to tailor the final estimation to the particular environment
subject of the analysis. However the Temporal and Environmental metrics
are not normally assigned to a vulnerability at the time of disclosure. Rather,
the assessment along these metrics has to be carried within the vulnerable
organization. Moreover, standards and common practices explicitly indicate
the base score to be used for the assessment of the vulnerability [40, 95]. For
this reason, we will limit this discussion to the latter.
The CVSS base score is divided in two submetrics: Exploitability and
Impact. The former characterises the ‘easiness’ of exploitation of the vulner-
ability by measuring the complexity of its exploitation, how ‘remote’ from the
system the attacker can be to deliver the exploit, and whether the attacker
has to be authenticated on the system. From its composition it is easy to see
why ‘Exploitability’ is often regarded as ‘likelihood of exploitation’: the eas-
iness of exploit is interpreted as a proxy for likelihood of exploit. Although
this claim has already been questioned [30], it is often implied in literature
[108, 83, 38]. The CVSS ‘Impact’ metric provides an estimation of the impact
of the vulnerability exploitation on the vulnerable system in terms of poten-
tial loss in Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of the data. Table 3.1
reports a summary description of the CVSS base score submetrics.
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Table 3.1: Summary table of CVSS base score metrics and submetrics.
Impact Exploitability
SubMetric Description SubMetric Description
Conf. Loss in data confidentiality Access Vector Where can the attacker at-
tack from (e.g. remotely)
Integ. Loss in data integrity Access Complexity Whether the successful ex-
ploitation depends on fac-
tors outside the attacker’s
control.
Avail. Loss in service availability Authentication Whether the attacker needs
to be logged in the system.
3.1.2 Vulnerability and patch management
Recent studies showed that several months pass between the release of a vul-
nerability patch and its application on the software [84]. In the literature,
users’ failure to take basic security measures has often been attributed to
the incomplete model users have of cybersecurity threats [125, 37]. In an
enterprise setting, patch management becomes critical as the application of
software patches may break untested functionalities or dependencies, as well
as causing downtimes that can affect system productivity [107, 54]. The
trade-offs associated with patch management have often been pointed out in
the literature [107, 36, 34]. Among these, Serra et al. [107] recently sug-
gested a Pareto-optimal approach to vulnerability patching in enterprises,
that merges attack graphs and vulnerability measures to maximise vulnera-
bility coverage and system functionality. Similarly, Okhravi et al. [88] study
the optimal amount of pre-patching testing that should be carried out in
order to guarantee the best response time to the vulnerability disclosure and
the best possible system uptime. Differently, Chen et al. [36] address the vul-
nerability patching trade-off from a slightly different perspective, and suggest
that rather than diminishing the attack surface of the system or network [68]
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by applying software patches, it may be possible to obtain a similar result
through software diversity. The rationale is that, because vulnerability ex-
ploits and malware are platform-specific, system diversity will substantially
increase the cost of traversing the attack graph for the attacker. In fact, an
exploit shellcode or a piece of malware engineered to work on a specific plat-
form (e.g. Windows 7, service pack 1), will not necessarily work on similar
but not identical platforms (e.g. Win 7, SP 2) even if the vulnerability is
still there. Differentiating the platform type entirely adds an additional layer
of complexity as an attack against a Windows platform must be completely
re-engineered to work on a Linux or MacOS or *nix platform [110, 106].
The economics of vulnerability patching have also been considered in the
literature, both in terms of patching efficiency [31] and from a game-theoretic
perspective [35, 34]. Additionally, Gordon and Loeb [55] showed that the
most economically viable patching solution may be one that leaves the most
valuable assets vulnerable. This depends on the distribution of patching
costs over assets. These economic aspects are especially interesting as the
decision to patch a vulnerability has several consequences that are not limited
to emerging technical issues or difficulties; on the contrary, in the literature
has been shown that the decision to patch or not patch a vulnerability has
externality effects lowering the general level of security due to the decentral-
isation of the patching decision [27], can affect stock prices [117], and can
cause damage to non-vulnerable users (either because they have already ap-
plied the patch, or because they are not vulnerable - i.e. they don’t have
the vulnerable appliance installed on the system). These externalities have
also been considered in the developing the new version of the Common Vul-
nerability Scoring System (v3) that, with the inclusion of the Scope metric,
effectively measures whether the effect of a vulnerability resides on a different
‘system’ than the vulnerability itself [116].
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3.2 Security Actors and Threats
To the aim of this thesis, we identify three main players relevant in the
security management scenario: the software developer, the defender, and the
attacker.
The software developer is the player who develops the software and typ-
ically has to maintain it by deploying software patches. The software in-
terested by the security process can be either an open source software or a
closed source software. The main difference between the two models is that
open source code can be audited (and is written) by the user and developer
community, while in closed source software this is not possible. In both cases
vulnerability patching is an expensive process [71], and vendor performance
may vary. A number of studies tried to identify ‘good’ and ‘bad’ software
vendors that respond quicker to the vulnerability disclosure [108, 20]. The
organisational and reputation costs attached to the patching and disclosure
of a vulnerability are often high2, and different disclosure and mitigation
policies may emerge for different software vendors. For example, to contain
costs of both type CISCO Systems discloses only ‘high severity vulnerabili-
ties’ in their security advisories, while remaining vulnerabilities are disclosed
through less prominent channels [5]. Accounting for this, no significant differ-
ence in patching behaviour between open and closed source software vendors
is found [105], as otherwise often implied [108, 21].
The defender is the actor that has to deploy the patches to defend against
the attacker and maintain the service continuity of the system or network.
Patch deployment is a critical moment in system maintenance that sees on
the one hand a better overall system security, and on the other the risk of ‘ser-
2While exact figures on the cost of patching are hard to find and may vary significantly between
software developers, a representative of a major European player estimated, in a private conversation
with the author, that only acknowledging that a bug exists in the code costs for them about 100 US $,
let alone verifying whether the bug represents a security threat, fixing it and testing and deploying the
patch.
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vice disruption’ as the deployed patch may ‘break’ some functionality critical
to the normal operation of the system [36]. For this reason, the criticality
of the patch deployment process increases with the number of vulnerabilities
to fix. Deploying all available patches immediately is usually not feasible
in practice [36, 107] for technical and organisational reasons3, and available
data shows that indeed patching waiting times on users machines can vary
widely [84]. Vulnerabilities to patch are therefore ordered in a queue, usually
following a measure of vulnerability severity [95, 40]. A number of interna-
tional standards and best practices exist to aid the system administrator in
this process. Two notable examples are the NIST SCAP protocol [95], the
software security management guidelines proposed by the NIST, and PCI-
DSS [40], arguably the most applied international standard used for securing
credit card transactions. On top of this exist a plethora of industry tools
by Symantec, Rapid7, Qualys etc. that aim at helping the system admin-
istrator to prioritize patching work. All these approaches (standards, best
practices, or commercial solutions) have a common denominator: the use of
the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS in short) as a metric for
vulnerability risk.
The hacker is the actor that finds and exploits the vulnerability. The
term ‘hacker’ originally identified ‘curious’ and technologically-oriented ac-
tors whose main goal was to understand the inner functionalities of a piece
of technology, a software, or a process [115, 120]. More recently, this ‘re-
verse engineering’ capability has been put in use by cyber-criminals to exploit
software design and implementation flaws to modify the normal operational
functionalities of the ‘hacked’ object (being that a telephone, a software, or a
human answering a phone call or reading an email) to their advantage. The
figure of the hacker remains however split in two main categories: white hats
3These include testing all the patches and their dependencies to assure that system and service func-
tionality will not be affected, distributing the patch to the organisation’s vulnerable systems, and ad-
dressing potential issues that may arise after the update
41
3.3. Markets for Vulnerabilities Chapter 3
and black hats. The former are hackers that find vulnerabilities in software,
write ‘proof-of-concept’ exploits, and ultimately disclose the vulnerability
either directly to the vendor or to some third-party organisation such as
iDefense or the Zero-Day Initiative. The white-hat has traditionally been
a ‘free-lancer’, i.e. a security researcher that looks independently at soft-
ware vulnerabilities and tries to sell them to the interested party [81]. The
white-hat hacker is however often faced with the inherent difficulties of the
vulnerability disclosure process, which may make the effort itself of disclosing
the vulnerability not worth it. As noted by Miller [81], the vendor is often
unhappy with the disclosure, and sometimes the hacker can face legal action.
Recently the professional figure of the white-hat hacker changed to that of a
‘corporate white-hat’, i.e. a white hat that is now contracted by a corpora-
tion to find vulnerabilities in software (not necessarily of its own production).
One notable example of this is Google’s Project Zero [6], a project run by
Google where hired white-hat hackers look for vulnerabilities in software, in-
cluding Google’s competitors’ such as Microsoft and Apple. Similarly, the
figure of the black-hat hacker has also gained momentum: black-hat hackers
moved from the solitary, self-employed figure of the cybercriminal to more
organised underground activities where the hacking is aided by a multitude
of technical and infrastructural resources [58]. The figure of the black-hat
has also been explored from a social standpoint [65, 120, 115].
3.3 Markets for Vulnerabilities
The importance of a clear understanding of the economic incentives and
mechanisms standing behind the information security process have been out-
lined several times in literature [53, 17, 121, 90, 55]. New markets for in-
formation security have recently been proposed: for example, auction-based
markets for vulnerability disclosure [90] have been suggested in the past, and
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bug bounty programs [51] are nowadays becoming more and more popular.
These initiatives partially address the problems attached to vulnerability
mining and disclosure that Miller outlined in 2007 at WEIS [81]. As also
outlined by Van Eeten et al. [121], market for malware and vulnerabilities
offer sometimes perverse incentives that can undermine the security property
they are supposed to enforce. For example, Asghari et al. [24] showed that
the market incentives behind the release of cryptographic certificates (e.g.
used to encrypt and sign the content retrieved from a web server) make more
convenient to adopt bad security practices when releasing a certificate, or
to hide entirely the compromise of a Certification Authority (as it already
happened several times in the past [104]). Similarly, software vendors may
have market incentives that go in the opposite direction of vulnerability dis-
closure [3, 117] and patching [55]; this, in turn, may discourage the security
researcher from disclosing the vulnerability to the vendor in the first place,
and may encourage instead the selling of the vulnerability to criminals. The
debate on the best vulnerability disclosure strategy has been a prolonged
one [20, 91, 23, 39], and is still not completely sedated [12]. Vulnerability
disclosure may affect the reputation of the vendor, and indeed in the litera-
ture have been reported significant effects of vulnerability disclosure on the
market value of the firm [117]. On top of this, the hacker who wants to sell
the information about the vulnerability to the vendor has to ‘prove’ that
the vulnerability exists without revealing too much information (otherwise
he/she effectively gives the vulnerability away). Moreover, the issue of fair
vulnerability pricing remains: how to evaluate the market price of a vulner-
ability? Bug bounty programs are now run by many major players in the
IT industry, including Google, Microsoft and Facebook. A bug bounty pro-
gram effectively encourages the disclosure of the vulnerability to the vendor
by fixing vulnerability prices ahead of the disclosure, for different types of
vulnerabilities. The security researcher can therefore assess beforehand the
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value of his/her finding [1], and knowns that the disclosure will not result in
legal action against him/her.
A perhaps more controversial portion of the market for vulnerabilities is
dedicated to vulnerability and exploit trading between private researchers or
agencies (the sellers), and governments (the buyers). Existing reports outline
prices in the order of the hundred thousands dollars [4], much higher than the
tens-of-thousands figures proposed by Google. These numbers have however
been disputed by agencies selling malware and cyber-attacks to governments,
such as France’s Vupen and Italy’s HackingTeam. The pricing of hacking
tools and the value of the cybercrime markets have been often at the centre
of discussion, and figures vary again widely. McAffee and Presided Obama
report the cost of cybercrime markets to be around one trillion dollars (about
6% of the United States GDP in 20144), while other figures are much more
modest [19].
One of the issues that generates such wild estimations is that cybercrime
markets are yet not very well understood. The trading dynamics of these
markets, their operability and technological/economic (in)efficiencies are not
fully comprehended. Cybercrime markets have recently been shown to be
fraught with information asymmetry problems that make the trading in the
markets effectively unsustainable [63]. Yet, empirical evidence from numer-
ous studies shows that the attack tools traded in these markets do work
[112, 18, 58, 26, 122], and the losses caused by cybercrime are real [57]. How
can these observations be reconciled with the understanding that cybercrime
markets cannot work? The explanation is that current markets are run under
a different structure than IRC markets: rather than anonymous, free-to-join,
unregulated communities of criminals, modern cybercrime markets are run
as virtual forums [75, 18, 130, 82]. Forums provide an easy way for the com-
munity administrators to control the flow of users into the community and
4http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp
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to enforce, through moderation, a number of rules that can be aimed - in
a coherent market design structure - at mitigating the issues of information
asymmetry [130]. The existence of operative cybercrime markets has indeed
been reported in the literature [58, 82], and numerous studies analyzed the
technical details behind the infection processes [93, 75] and the creation of
botnets [111, 59]. A similar line of research also gave insights on the mechan-
ics of spam [72] and diffusion of attacks [42]. Still, a precise understanding
of the inner economic workings of these markets is not present in literature.
3.4 Attacker model and risk
Part of the problem that (not) understanding the economics of the attacker
entails is that estimating the threat represented by the attacker is is a diffi-
cult exercise. The attacker model generally (explicitly or implicitly) accepted
when planning security action is that of the all-powerful all-knowing attacker,
an inheritance from cryptography [44]. In fairness, other attacker models ex-
ist, such as the ‘Honest but curious’ attacker that rather than acting outright
maliciously, exploits the opportunity he/she might have of exfiltrating infor-
mation from some channel. This model could be for example applied to the
recent Snowden case, where an insider effectively used his access rights cor-
rectly until the ‘last operation’ was executed. The overall picture however
does not change: the attacker can and will exploit any vulnerability on the
system [2]. Somewhat in contrast, [93] showed that about two thirds of web
attacks are generated automatically as opposed to being engineered for that
specific attack. Moreover, the most popular cyber-criminal tools used to gen-
erate these attacks [112] feature in the order of 10-15 exploits [75]. It appears
therefore that the majority of attacks may be skewed toward certain vulner-
abilities only, and that assuming that the attacker can and will pursue all
and every vulnerability in the system is, in most cases, unrealistic. Indeed, in
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the literature evidence exists that attackers prefer certain vulnerabilities over
others [85], and that most vulnerabilities remain simply unexploited [114].
The disparity between the current perception of the attacker and the trends
shown in the data challenges the (conservative) intuition that ‘one vulnera-
bility is too many’. Yet, this philosophy is at the root of any standard or
best practice for vulnerability and risk mitigation [40, 95], that requires ac-
tion to be taken over effectively almost any vulnerability. This perception
leads to ‘naive’ risk metrics whereby the risk is calculated as the sum of the
vulnerabilities CVSS scores multiplied by the number of vulnerabilities with
that criticality level [83]. More elaborated metrics of exposure to attacks
exist [67, 124]; still, the substance remains the same: count the number of
vulnerabilities in the system and use some criticality score such as CVSS
to estimate the impact and the likelihood of an attack to happen. None of
these methodologies account for the strong skew in attacker preferences con-
sistently present in historical attack data [85, 114], and substantially rely on
the ‘allmighty attacker’ model5.
5 The overestimation of the attacker capabilities (and/or willingness to attack) is a common problem
in security, that sometimes leads to important (and unfounded) consequences [73].
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Chapter 4
Data Collection
4.1 Vulnerabilities and Attacks in the Wild
In this Chapter we provide a comprehensive description of our datasets and
the respective collection methodologies. Table 4.2, at the end of this Chapter,
provides a summary of our collection efforts.
The universe of vulnerabilities. The National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
is NIST’s database for disclosed vulnerabilities. It reports a list of disclosed
vulnerabilities that have been confirmed by software vendors, identified by
the universal identifier ‘CVE-ID’ (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
ID). Along with a description of the CVE, the dataset reports the vulnerable
software and relevant software versions, and the CVSS base score associated
with the vulnerability. Additional details on the technical properties of the
vulnerability are also reported in NVD via the CVSS vector that specifies
the value for each CVSS metric.
Data collection methodology: This dataset is publicly available at http:
//nist.nvd.gov.
The “white hat” exploits market. White-hat hackers report vulnerabilities to
vendor and release proof-of-concept (PoC) exploitation code to demonstrate
47
4.1. Vulnerabilities and Attacks in the Wild Chapter 4
the existence of the vulnerability. Datasets that report disclosed PoCs are
the Exploit database (EDB) and the OpenSourced Vulnerability DataBase
(OSVDB). Both these datasets cooperate with the Metasploit framework to
gather data on exploits. However, it is important to note that, if an exploit
is featured in EDB or OSVDB, it is not evidence that some company or indi-
vidual actually reported to have suffered the exploitation in the wild. It only
means some proof-of-concept exploitation code is known to exist. Moreover,
proof-of-concept exploitation code may be hardly capable of crashing the
vulnerable application, rather than allowing the attacker to actually exploit
the vulnerability.
Data collection methodology: This dataset is publicly available at http:
//www.exploit-db.com. However, the archival version of the dataset does
not directly refer to the CVE-ID of the vulnerability affected by the proof-
of-concept exploit. In order to obtain this data, we built a Python script
that collects the correct CVE-ID based on the exploit ID reported in the
downloaded dataset.
The black markets for exploits. The EKITS dataset is a collection of vul-
nerabilities whose exploits are traded in the black markets and are bundled
exploit kits (widely used attack tools in the underground [58]). Among the
exploit kits considered for our study, we have the “most popular” ones as
reported by Symantec in 2011 [112]. After a long process of ethnographic
research, EKITS comprises almost 900 entries and 103 unique CVEs traded
in the black market. Vulnerabilities included in the EKITS dataset affect
only client-side and consumer applications running on Windows.
Data collection methodology: EKITS is partially based on Contagio’s Ex-
ploit Pack Table, from where we got the names of the most popular exploit
kits and some CVE entries. We expanded this list in both the list of exploit
kits available in the markets, and the list of vulnerabilities bundled in the kits.
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To do so, after much ‘ethnographic research’ we infiltrated the black markets
and monitored the tools and vulnerabilities advertised there. A more precise
description of the infiltration process is given in Section 4.2. To keep the list
of vulnerabilities updated we created a web parser (in Python) that, hidden
behind a TOR proxy, would scrape daily the main market page for new en-
tries matching several (Cyrillic) keywords such as “связк*” (kit), “отстук”
(the term commonly used to describe exploit success rates), “цен*” (russian
for ‘price’), and many others. The script’s goal was to identify potentially
interesting discussion topics in the forum markets. The integration of this
data in EKITS was manual. This was a necessary step to perform given the
impossibility of reliably parse Cyrillic text that often involves technical slang
or abbreviated terms / typing errors.
Exploits in the wild. Obtaining reliable data on exploits in the wild is chal-
lenging. Companies are not prone to release data on the cyber-attacks they
suffered from, for obvious commercial and reputation reasons. To the best
of our knowledge, no reliable or reputable source for attacks against corpo-
rations exists yet. On the contrary, more reliable data can be found for non-
targeted attacks. Symantec keeps two public datasets of signatures for local
and network threats: the AttackSignature1 and ThreatExplorer2 datasets.
These datasets contain all the entries identified as viruses or network threats
by Symantec’s commercial products at a given moment. Our SYM database
is directly derived from these sources. However, it must be pointed out that
this dataset is, by construction, limited to threats that Symantec identifies.
These therefore mainly include threats directed against home systems, which
are not, in general, victims of targeted attacks.
Data collection methodology: this dataset is publicly available on Syman-
1http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/
2http://www.symantec.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
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tec’s Security Response website. However, the dataset is largely unstruc-
tured with respect to the vulnerability information we are interested into,
as it only reports a general description of the detected attack signature. In
order to assess whether we could meaningfully use the dataset to collect ex-
ploited vulnerabilities, we sustained an extensive exchange with Symantec
representatives to understand the nature of the available data and whether
a reported CVE could be considered the CVE affected by a certain attack
signature. From our exchange resulted that Symantec’s effort in reporting a
CVE in their attack signature description has substantially improved after
2009, with the initiation of their data sharing program WINE. Furthermore,
we got assured that the reported CVE are always relevant to the affected
signature. Because of the unstructured nature of this dataset, we built two
independent parsers (the second one has been written by Dr. V.H. Nguyen)
and checked that the result was the same. We are therefore confident that
our data collection and interpretation is complete and correct with respect
to Symantec’s data creation process.
Records of attacks in the wild. Symantec runs a data sharing program,
the Worldwide Intelligence Network Environment, or WINE in short3. The
intrusion-prevention telemetry dataset within WINE provides information
about network-based attacks detected by Symantec’s products. WINE is in-
dexed by attack signature IDs, unique identifiers for an attack detected by
the firm’s security solutions, which can be linked to the affected CVE, if any,
through Symantec’s Security Response4 dataset (i.e. SYM). Data for the
experiments reported in this thesis is referenced and available for sharing at
Symantec Research Labs under the WINE Experiment ID WINE-2012-008.
Data collection methodology: in order to have access to the WINE dataset
3https://www.symantec.com/about/profile/universityresearch/sharing.jsp
4https://www.symantec.com/security_response/
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Table 4.1: Summary of our datasets
DB Content #Entries
NVD CVEs vulnerabilities 49.624
EDB Publicly exploited CVEs 8.189
SYM CVEs exploited in the wild 1.289
EKITS CVEs in the black market 103
WINE Records of attacks in the wild 75.000.000
researchers have to write a research proposal that is subject to Symantec’s
internal review process. We wrote and got our proposal accepted in May
2012. Access to the WINE platform is possible only in loco over at Syman-
tec Research Labs. It was therefore necessary to extensively prepare the
experiment before moving to the other side of the ocean to perform the data
collection. Given the extension of the WINE dataset this preparation phase
lasted several months during which frequent calls and e-mail exchange with
Symantec where necessary to make sure the experiment design was correct.
To complete the design phase we used the database schema of WINE and a
VM provided by Symantec.
Table 4.1 summarizes the content of each dataset and the collection method-
ology. The datasets are available for the scientific community upon request.
4.2 The Underground Markets
From September 2011 to November 2011 we performed an informal analysis
with security experts working in the cybercrime domain to identify the most
prominent markets in the underground. These resulted to be all run in Rus-
sian, with a few exceptions only. The results of that analysis identified one
market in particular, HackMarket.ru5, that was very active and where the ma-
5HackMarket.ru is a fictional name we attribute to the market to not hinder future research.
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jor players of the cybercrime community allegedly operate. In November 2011
we infiltrated HackMarket.ru and observed that there we could find for trade
all the attack tools and malware pieces reported as ‘most prominent in the
underground’ by multiple industry reports [112, 26, 111, 77, 70, 76], as well as
the most influential malware authors such as Paunch [8] and others. We kept
monitored other markets as well, but those revealed to be not top-of-the-class
markets, where few tools where actually advertised and where interested cos-
tumers were much less active when compared to HackMarket.ru. We therefore
keep HackMarket.ru as our case study of an underground market. The parser
written to build the EKITS dataset was originally designed to monitor Hack-
Market.ru as well as the other markets, but for the aforementioned reasons it
is now built around HackMarket.ru exclusively.
4.2.1 Markets description
Carders.de In 2010 an online underground market for credit cards and other
illegal goods, Carders.de, have been exposed by a hacking team named “inj3ct0r”
and leaked, at the time, through underground channels (i.e. a Google search
wouldn’t help) [82]. We obtained the original dataset through side channels.
We have no means to assess whether the dataset was manipulated. Direct
comparison with other releases of the dump show no difference. The leaked
package contains a Structured Query Language (SQL) dump of the database,
a copy of the Owned and Exp0sed Issue no. 1 (documenting the leak) and an
added text file containing all private messages on the forum. By examining
the added notes Owned and Exp0sed Issue no. 1 we were able to create a
replica of the original Carders.de forum. This allows us to explore market op-
erations, evaluate the reputation mechanisms that were implemented at that
time, and go through users’ posting history and dates. The data consists of
forum posts and private message records spanning 12 months from 1 May,
2009 to May 1, 2010 containing a total of 215.328 records.
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HackMarket.ru HackMarket.ru is a market for exploits, botnets and malware.
It is also one of the main markets that introduced exploit-as-a-service [58]
in the cyberthreat scenario, as we find there the main players and products
that the industry reports be driving the majority of reported web-attacks
[113]. Indirect evidence of this markets’ efficacy is the recent burst in cy-
berattacks driven by means of tools, services and infrastructures traded or
rented in these markets [58, 111, 18]. HackMarket.ru appeared in 2009 in the
Russian underground. Differently from Carders.de, HackMarket.ru has a flat
trading structure, whereby traders all participate in the same marketplace.
In contrast to other hacker fora studied in the literature [65], it is not public.
HackMarket.ru is run in Russian, and very little interaction happens in En-
glish. The trading sections in this market are, like in Carders.de, organised
by ‘topic of interest’. The virus-related area of the market is by far the most
popular one, with tens of thousands of posts at the time of writing. Other
goods of interest for the marketeers of HackMarket.ru are ‘Internet traffic’
(i.e. redirectable user connections for spam or infection purposes), stolen ac-
cess credentials, access to infected servers, spam, bank accounts, credit cards
and other compromised financial services. To access the market the forum
administrators perform a background check on the participant, that has to
provide additional profiles that provably belong to him/herself on other un-
derground communities. We joined this community in 2011 and remained
undercover since. For HackMarket.ru we do not have an SQL dump of the
market, but we will provide instead first-hand evidence that the problems
we highlighted for Carders.de are not present here. We index our qualitative
analysis by referencing internal archived references taken from HackMarket.ru
in the format [ID n], with ID being an internal code we use to classify the
evidence and n being the document number.
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4.2.2 Infiltrating HackMarket.ru
To infiltrate HackMarket.ru has proven to be a far from simple task. We
infiltrated HackMarket.ru twice, as our first account was banned from the
market. The two operations have been characterised by very different prob-
lems we had to address. The first time, the real issue has been to identify
a significant and interesting market to infiltrate. Choosing HackMarket.ru
as a market representative for cybercrime operations was possible only after
much ethnological research on several other underground communities. Not
speaking Russian and lacking of scientific guidance from the literature (where
data analysis involving underground markets is performed over leaked data
rather than data collected first-hand) made things worse in this respect. This
research effort lasted about three months. Once found and selected Hack-
Market.ru, the first obstacle was to have access to the communities without
exposing the University or myself to future possible hazards. The obvious
solution to this has been to access the communities only behind the TOR
network. In order to first access the markets we registered an email address
with a Russian domain and compiled a ‘user description’ in correct Russian,
with the help of a colleague, Anton Philippov. This was enough to have our
first access to the community granted. This however lasted a few months
only, after which we were banned from accessing the forum. This ban and
the additional segregation of the community that followed was motivated by
the arrest of one prominent member of the market community: Paunch, the
author of the infamous Black Hole exploit kit6.
To re-enter the community proved to be substantially harder than in our
first try. The community closed the entrance to anybody who was not explic-
itly selected by the forum administrators. We often tried to re-subscribe with
several different (fictitious) identities, but systematically failed7. The effort
6http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/12/meet-paunch-the-accused-author-of-the-blackhole-exploit-kit/
7The author, not trusting free proxy services in Moscow, exploited a personal trip to Russia to use a
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required to re-access the markets lasted several months, and was partially
performed with the help of Stanislav Dashevskyi. We employed a bottom-up
approach: the idea was to study the low-end markets as a means to access
the high-end market we were (re-) aiming for. We infiltrated several of those
and, with the help of Stanislav, built a profile for each community, trying
to outline those that are the most tied with HackMarket.ru. Research over
these communities was aimed at outlining the social, linguistic, and technical
characteristic of a ‘typical’ market participant in these communities. Lever-
aging this understanding, we built a user profile on one market community
we selected for its apparent closeness to HackMarket.ru. This process lasted
about 6 months. We then applied to access HackMarket.ru again and gave
as a credential our participation in the other community. This attempt was
successful. We are now ‘mild participators’ in the community, in order to
avoid running in the same problem again were other prominent members of
the community arrested.
Saint Petersbourg IP address to attempt a new subscription, but with no success.
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Chapter 5
Data Exploration
In this Chapter we provide a first explorative description of our datasets.
In particular, in Section 5.1 we outline a map of vulnerabilities to see how
do our datasets overlap and how the CVSS score for vulnerability severity
is mapped over exploits in the wild and disclosed vulnerabilities. In Section
5.2 we look at our WINE data to explore how vulnerability exploitation (and
therefore vulnerability risk) is distributed among vulnerabilities.
5.1 A Map of Vulnerabilities
In the following we provide a first high-level view of the problem with criticality-
based vulnerability management practices that ultimately use the CVSS score
as an ordering metric for vulnerability mitigation. Figure 5.1 reports a Venn
diagram of our datasets. Area size is proportional to the number of vulnera-
bilities that belong to it; the color is an indication of the CVSS score. Red,
orange and cyan areas represent HIGH, MEDIUM and LOW score vulnerabilities
respectively. This map gives a first intuition of the problem with using the
CVSS base score as a ‘risk metric for exploitation’: the ‘red vulnerabilities’
located outside of SYM are ‘CVSS false positives’ (i.e. HIGH risk vulnera-
bilities that are not exploited); the ‘cyan vulnerabilities’ in SYM are instead
‘CVSS false negatives’ (i.e. LOW and MEDIUM risk vulnerabilities that are ex-
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Figure 5.1: Map of vulnerabilities per dataset. Overlapping areas represent common
vulnerabilities among the datasets, as identified by their CVE-ID. Area size is proportional
to the number of vulnerabilities. In red vulnerabilities with CV SS ≥ 9. Medium score
vulnerabilities (6 ≤ CV SS < 9) are orange; low score vulnerabilities are cyan and have
CV SS < 6. CVSS scores are extracted from the NVD database as indexed by the
respective CVE-ID. The two small rectangles outside of NVD are vulnerabilities whose
CVEs were not present in NVD at the time of sampling. These CVEs are now present in
NVD.
ploited). A relevant portion of CVSS-marked vulnerabilities seem therefore
to represent either false positive or false negatives.
5.1.1 CVSS score breakdown
In this Section we perform a breakdown of the CVSS Impact and Exploitabil-
ity subscores (see Table 3.1) in our datasets.
Breakdown of the Impact subscore
Figure 5.2 depicts a histogram distribution of the Impact subscore. The
distribution of the Impact score varies sensibly depending on the dataset.
For example, in EDB scores between six and seven characterize the great
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The histogram on the left represents the frequency distribution of the CVSS Impact values among the
datasets. The boxplot on the right reports the distribution of values around the median (represented by
a thick horizontal line). Outliers are represented by dots.
Figure 5.2: Histogram and boxplot of CVSS Impact subscores per dataset.
majority of vulnerabilities, while in SYM and EKITS most vulnerabilities
have Impact scores greater than nine. This is an effect of the different nature
of each dataset: for example, a low Impact vulnerability may be of too little
value to be worth the bounty by a security researcher, and therefore these may
be under-represented in EDB [81]; medium-score vulnerabilities may instead
represent the best trade-off in terms of market value and effort required to
discover or exploit. In the case of SYM and EKITS vulnerabilities, it is
unsurprising that these yield a higher Impact than the average vulnerability
or proof-of-concept exploit: these datasets feature vulnerabilities actually
chosen by attackers to deliver attacks, or to be bundled in tools designed to
remotely execute malware. The different distribution of the CVSS Impact
subscore among the datasets is apparent in the boxplot reported in Figure 5.2.
The distribution of Impact scores for NVD and EDB is clearly different from
(and lower than) that of EKITS and SYM.
To explain the gaps in the histogram in Figure 5.2, we decompose the
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distribution of Impact subscores for our datasets. In Table 5.1 we first report
the incidence of the existing CIA values in NVD. It is immediate to see that
only few values are actually relevant. For example there is only one vulner-
ability whose CIA impact is ‘PCP’ (i.e. partial impact on confidentiality,
complete on integrity and partial on availability). Availability almost always
assumes the same value of Integrity, apart from the case where there is no
impact on Confidentiality, and looks therefore of limited importance for a
descriptive discussion.
For the sake of readability, we exclude Availability from the analysis, and
proceed by looking at the two remaining Impact variables in the four datasets.
This inspection is reported in Table 5.2. Even with this aggregation on place
many possible values of the CIA assessment remain unused. ‘PP’ vulnera-
bilities characterize the majority of disclosed vulnerabilities (NVD) and vul-
nerabilities with a proof-of-concept exploit (EDB). Differently, in SYM and
EKITS most vulnerabilities score ‘CC’. This shift alone can be considered
responsible for the different distribution of scores depicted in Figure 5.2 and
underlines the difference in the type of impact for the vulnerabilities captured
by the different datasets.1
Breakdown of the Exploitability subscore
Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of the Exploitability subscore for each
dataset. Almost all vulnerabilities score between eight and ten, and from
the boxplot it is evident that the distribution of exploitability subscores is
1 Metrics to measure the impact of a vulnerability other than the CVSS CIA assessment could be
derived from environmental or infrastructural considerations on the vulnerable systems. Possible examples
of this are the criticality of the vulnerable system or software in the particular operative context of an
organisation, or the impact factor of the system or its components measured over a decay in performance
caused by the vulnerability [60]. While several possible metrics to measure vulnerability impact can be
devised, we refer here to CVSS’s CIA assessment as it is standardised in the industry, and general enough
to abstract away from case-specific assessments of vulnerability impact (e.g. using attack surfaces or
more case-specific metrics like performance decay indicators).
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Table 5.1: Incidence of values of CIA triad within NVD.
Confidentiality Integrity Availability Absolute no. Incidence
C C C 9972 20%
C C P 0 -
C C N 43 <1%
C P C 2 <1%
C P P 13 <1%
C P N 3 <1%
C N C 15 <1%
C N P 2 <1%
C N N 417 1%
P C C 5 <1%
P C P 1 <1%
P C N 0 -
P P C 22 -
P P P 17550 35%
P P N 1196 2%
P N C 9 <1%
P N P 110 <1%
P N N 5147 10%
N C C 64 <1%
N C P 1 <1%
N C N 43 <1%
N P C 17 <1%
N P P 465 1%
N P N 7714 16%
N N C 1769 4%
N N P 5003 10%
N N N 16 <1%
indistinguishable among the datasets. In other words, Exploitability can not
be used as a proxy for likelihood of exploitation in the wild. A similar result
(but only for proof-of-concept exploits) has also been reported in [30]).
In Table 5.3 we decompose the Exploitability subscores and find that most
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Table 5.2: Combinations of Confidentiality and Integrity values per dataset.
Confidentiality Integrity SYM EKITS EDB NVD
C C 51.61% 74.76% 18.11% 20.20%
C P 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.04%
C N 0.31% 0.97% 0.71% 0.87%
P C 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01%
P P 27.80% 16.50% 63.52% 37.83%
P N 7.83% 0.97% 5.61% 10.62%
N C 0.23% 0.00% 0.18% 0.22%
N P 4.39% 2.91% 5.07% 16.52%
N N 7.83% 3.88% 6.75% 13.69%
vulnerabilities in NVD do not require any authentication (Authentication =
(N)one, 95%), and are accessible from remote (Access Vector = (N)etwork,
87%).
Table 5.3: Exploitability Subfactors for each dataset.
metric value SYM EKITS EDB NVD
E
xp
lo
it
ab
ili
ty
Acc. Vec.
local 2.98% 0% 4.57% 13.07%
adj. 0.23% 0% 0.12% 0.35%
net 96.79% 100% 95.31% 86.58%
Acc. Com.
high 4.23% 4.85% 3.37% 4.70%
medium 38.53% 63.11% 25.49% 30.17%
low 57.24% 32.04% 71.14% 65.13%
Auth.
multiple 0% 0% 0.02% 0.05%
single 3.92% 0.97% 3.71% 5.30%
none 96.08% 99.03% 96.27% 94.65%
For this reason the CVSS Exploitability subscore resembles more a con-
stant than a variable, and can not therefore properly characterise the ‘likeli-
hood’ of the exploitation.
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of CVSS Exploitability subscores.
Table 5.4: Categories for vulnerability classification and respective number of vulnerabil-
ities and attacks recorded in WINE.
Category Sample of Software names No. Vulns. Attacks (Millions)
PLUGIN Acrobat reader, Flash Player 86 24.75
PROD Microsoft Office, Eudora 146 3.16
WINDOWS Windows XP, Vista 87 47.3
Internet Explorer Internet Explorer 55 0.55
Tot 374 75.76
5.2 The Heavy Tails of Vulnerability Exploitation
From Figure 5.1 it appears that only a small fraction of vulnerabilities is
exploited in the wild. This however has two limitations:
1. We are only looking at the boolean variable ‘Exploit exists’ (Yes or No),
without considering that volumes of attack per vulnerability may be
strongly skewed.
2. We are not accounting for the selection bias inherent in SYM, whereby
only vulnerabilities covered by Symantec’s commercial products are re-
ported.
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To address the first point we use data reported in WINE on attacks per
vulnerability. As to the second point, we take additional precautions in han-
dling the data. We inspected WINE’s vulnerabilities and, using software
names reported in NVD, we grouped them in eight software categories: In-
ternet Explorer, Plugins, Windows, Productivity, Other Operating Systems,
Server, Business Software, Development Software. Because WINE consists
largely of data from Symantec’s consumer security products, we may have a
self-selection problem in which certain software categories are not well rep-
resented in our sample. We therefore limit our analysis to the first four
categories, for which we consider our sample to be representative of exploits
in the wild: Internet Explorer, PLUGIN, WINDOWS and PROD(uctivity).
From a discussion with Symantec it emerges that also SERVER vulnera-
bilities can be considered well represented in SYM and WINE. We do not
consider those here for brevity but include them later in the analysis (Section
6.1). Note that distribution of attacks detected by Symantec may also be
an artefact of the data generation process for the WINE dataset. In partic-
ular, it may reflect Symantec’s detection rates rather than real frequency of
attacks. In particular, we find that WINE reports attacks against vulner-
abilities disclosed over a wide range of years, spanning from 1999 to 2012.
Because fewer users might be vulnerable to older vulnerabilities, the detec-
tion rate of these may be lower than the detection rate of more recent attacks.
Similarly, Symantec may be detecting mainly attacks against certain types
of attack vectors (e.g. a malformed file or a piece of javascript) received by
different applications. Our analysis mitigates this problem by a) controlling
by software type in order to group attacks whose attack vectors are similar;
b) considering only vulnerabilities disclosed in a limited time window (2009-
2012) as to minimize the variance in detection rates. Our analysis comprises
374 vulnerabilities and 75.7 Million attacks recorded from July 2009 to De-
cember 2012. Table 5.4 reports the identified categories and the number of
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Figure 5.4: Top row: histogram distribution of logarithmic exploitation volumes. Bottom
row: Lorentz curves for exploitation volumes in the different categories. p % of the
vulnerabilities are responsible for L(p)% of the attacks.
respective vulnerabilities in WINE.
In Figure 5.4 we report the histogram distribution of the (logarithmic)
attack volumes for each vulnerability by the category (top row) and the
respective Lorentz curve distribution (bottom row). The histogram distri-
bution clearly shows that for WINDOWS, PROD and Internet Explorer the
frequency of vulnerabilities with x attacks is inversely proportional to the
logarithm of x. In other words, a (very) small fraction of vulnerabilities is
responsible for orders of magnitude more attacks than the remaining vulner-
abilities.
A clear way to visualize this is through a Lorentz curve. A Lorentz curve
describes the p percentage of the population (of vulnerabilities) that are re-
sponsible for the L(p) percent of attacks. The diagonal represents an ‘equi-
librium state’ where each vulnerability is responsible for the same volume of
attacks. The further away the two curves are, the higher the ‘disparity’ in
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Table 5.5: p% of vulnerabilities responsible for L(p)% of attacks, reported by software
category.
Category Top p% vulns. L(p)% of attacks
20% 99.6%
WINDOWS 10% 96.5%
5% 91.3%
20% 99.5%
PROD 10% 98.3%
5% 94.4%
20% 97.1%
Internet Explorer 10% 91.3%
5% 68.2%
20% 46.9%
PLUGIN 10% 31%
5% 24%
the distribution of attacks per vulnerability. As depicted in Figure 5.4, for
WINDOWS, PROD and Internet Explorer the two curves are very markedly
apart, indicating that the great majority of vulnerabilities are responsible
for only a negligible fraction of the risk in the wild. Table 5.5 reports the
distribution of attacks recorded in the wild per vulnerability. We report the
top 20, 10 and 5 percent of vulnerabilities and the percentage of attacks in
the wild they are responsible for. The most extreme results are obtained
for WINDOWS and PROD, for which the top 5% vulnerabilities carry more
than 90% of the attacks and the top 10% the almost totality. ‘Milder’ re-
sults are obtained for Internet Explorer: the top 10% carries 90% of the
attacks, but the top 5% carries ‘only’ 68%, meaning that among the top 10%
vulnerabilities attacks are distributed more equally than in other categories.
The less extreme result is obtained for PLUGIN, where the distribution of
exploitation attempts seems more equally distributed among vulnerabilities.
With this last exception, we observe that a general rule for vulnerability
exploitation is that, within any software category, less than 10% of attacked
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vulnerabilities are responsible for more than 90% of the attacks.
This first, exploratory analysis of the distribution of attacks in the wild
is prima-facie evidence that vulnerability exploitation is not uniformly dis-
tributed among vulnerabilities, and consequently that certain vulnerabilities
may represent much higher risk for the final user than most others.
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Chapter 6
On the Feasibility of Risk-based
Vulnerability Management
From the Analyses in Section 5.1 and 5.2 it emerges that on the one hand the
attacker is not choosing vulnerabilities to exploit using the CVSS score, and
on the other that he/she tends to exploit a small fraction of vulnerabilities
only that, as a result, are responsible for the great majority of risk in the
wild. From a high-level perspective, these observations seem to support our
Thesis.
To further investigate this, in this Chapter we provide evidence supporting
the ‘enabling hypotheses’ outlined in Section 2.1. This Chapter unfolds as
follows: Section 6.1 presents the model of the Work-Averse Attacker, whereby
the attacker acts rationally when choosing which vulnerabilities to exploit.
Importantly, from the model the exploitation trends shown in Figure 5.4
emerge naturally. Our findings strongly support Hypothesis 1.
In Section 6.2 we investigate the maturity and economic and technological
sustainability of the cybercrime markets. The discussion starts in Section
6.2.1 where we investigate the maturity of cybercrime markets (Proposition
1). The analysis unfolds by comparing data on two underground markets,
Carders.de and HackMarket.ru, with respect to a common set of Hypotheses
testing their stability as economic entities. From our analysis we conclude
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that Proposition 1 is supported by the data.
To test Proposition 2, in Section 6.2.2 we test in our MalwareLab a set
of attacking tools leaked from the black markets. In particular, we test
their exploit reliability and resiliency against continuous software updates.
Our findings confirm that these tools are efficient and capable of successfully
exploiting vulnerabilities over configurations spanning several years.
Finally, in Section 6.2.3 we propose a two-stage model of the underground
markets whereby the seller that sells the exploit has strong incentives in
behaving fairly in order to maximise his/her profit function. By solving the
model we show that the underground markets are economically sound from
a trading perspective, and conclude therefore that Hypothesis 2 holds.
Each Section starts with a brief summary of the Hypotheses outlined in
Chapter 2.
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6.1 The Attacker is Rational and Work-Averse
Running Hypothesis Hypotheses Testing
Hyp. 1. The attacker ignores most
vulnerabilities and massively deploys
exploits for a subset only.
Hyp. 1a. The attacker will massively use only one
exploit per software version.
Hyp. 1b. The fraction of attacks driven by a par-
ticular vulnerability will decrease slowly in time.
Corollary to Hyp. 1b. The attacker waits a longer
period of time to introduce an exploit for software
types under a slow update cycle than for others.
The idea that an attacker may not be interested in exploiting ‘all’ vul-
nerabilities in the system emerges from a simple observation: in most cases,
he/she needs to attack only one (‘powerful’ enough) vulnerability among the
many that affect that particular software.1 In a broader sense, the expected
utility of an exploit for a vulnerability v at time t E[Ut,v] comes from the
revenue r the attacker can extract from the fraction n(t, v) ∈ [0, N ] of the
N systems in the wild the vulnerability allows him to attack at time t. The
revenue r an attacker can get from the system out of the exploitation of one
vulnerability may depend on two factors:
1. The potential value of the attacked system.
2. The impact I of the vulnerability on the system. For example, a vulner-
ability granting full administrative access is likely to allow the attacker
to extract more revenue from the attacked system.
We therefore model the extracted revenue per attacked system r(I(vi)) as
a function of the vulnerability impact. The cost c of the attack comprises the
cost of developing/buying the exploit and the cost of delivering the attack
by means, for example, of some attacking infrastructure ([18, 58]).
1We here refer to a ‘worse-averse’ agent as an agent that sees work effort as a disutility, i.e. as emerges
from the agent’s utility function.
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The expected utility of an exploit for a vulnerability v at time t is there-
fore:
E[Ut,v] = n(t, v)× r(I(v))− c(v) (6.1)
Note that limt→∞n(t, v) = 0 as users update their systems and the exploit
for v loses efficacy in the wild. When the efficacy of the old exploit drops too
low, the attacker will dedicate his/her resources (abandoning v)2 to look for
a new exploit v′.
Under the assumption that exploit development is costly and an attacker
is work averse, s/he will develop the exploit for a new vulnerability v′ after
some time t + δ > t if the expected value for v at t + δ is lower than the
expected value for v′ at t+ δ:
E[Ut+δ,v′∪V ]− E[Ut+δ,V ] > 0 (6.2)
where V is the set of vulnerabilities the attacker already exploits. The
boundary condition to choose v′ is therefore:
n(t+ δ, v′ ∪ V )× r(I(v′ ∪ V ))− c(v′) > E[Ut+δ,V ] (6.3)
By generalising Eq. 6.3 it is possible to obtain the decision condition for
the attacker over an arbitrary vulnerability vj
n(t+ δ, vj ∪ V )× n× r(I(vj ∪ V ))− c(vj) >
j−1∑
i=1
E[Ut+δ,vi] (6.4)
At this point, the attacker will introduce a new exploit for vj if:
c(vj) < n(t+ δ, vj ∪ V )× r(I(vj ∪ V ))−
j−1∑
i=1
E[Ut+δ,vi] (6.5)
2The vulnerability finding and exploit writing processes are very time consuming and require the
allocation of plenty of resources ([81, 18, 58]). While an attacker can always re-use old technology
(i.e. old exploits), maintaining a certain exploit operative requires maintenance costs in terms of both
technological resources and time. When not looking for a new exploit, we do not put any constraint on
how many exploits the attacker wants to use.
72
Chapter 6 6.1. The Attacker is Rational and Work-Averse
The cost for vj is therefore bounded by the revenue that can be extracted
from all pre-existing exploits the attacker may maintain. It is immediate
to see that the more previous exploits have been developed, the higher the
potential revenue from vj must be in order to overcome the cost constraint.
With
∑j−1
i=1 E[Ut+δ,vi∪V ] growing with the number of available exploits, the
upper-bound cost c(vj) for the new exploit tends to zero. The diminishing
return seen in Eq. 6.5 has two main consequences:
1. The attacker is able to afford a diminishing amount of exploits in time.
2. Assuming a direct relationship between exploit quality and cost of the
exploit ([81, 22]), the quality of the new exploits would tend to decrease
with the amount of exploits available to the attacker.
The cost constraint is positive and greater than zero only when n(t+δ, vj∪V )
is greater than
∑j−1
i=1 n(t+ δ, vi ∪ V ) because dn(t+ δ, vj ∪ V ) +
∑j−1
i=1 n(t+
δ, vi∪V )e ≤ N , so there is a cap on the total revenue that can be extracted.
In other words, the attacker will build a new reliable exploit only when the
overall revenue the attacker can extract from the old exploits drops because
of too few vulnerable systems in the wild (i.e. because users at large upgraded
their systems).
6.1.1 Data preparation
To build our dataset, we first reconstruct the history of attacks received by
every user in WINE. To evaluate the sequence of attacks against a certain
software, we then collect all the pairs < attack1, attack2 > of attacks that a
user received, and keep track of the time delay (measured in days) between
the two attacks. We then group the data by pairs of attacks and delta in
time, and count how many users have been affected by that sequence and
how many attacks of that type have been observed in the wild. Table 6.1
reports an excerpt from the dataset. Each row represents a succession of
73
6.1. The Attacker is Rational and Work-Averse Chapter 6
1st attack 2nd attack Delta days Affected machines Volume of attacks
a a 192 23544 58322
b c 11 6 6
b e 580 10 10
d f 861 389 432
e b 644 26 43
Table 6.1: Excerpt from our dataset. CVE-IDs are obfuscated as a, b, c, etc. Each <1st
attack, 2nd attack, delta> tuple is unique in the dataset. The column Affected
machines reports the number of unique machines receiving the second attack delta days
after 1st attack. The column Volume of attacks is constructed similarly but for the
number of received attacks.
attacks. The first column and the second column report respectively the
(censored) CVE-ID of the attacked vulnerability in the first and in the second
attack. The third column reports the number of unique systems in the WINE
platform affected at least once by that tuple; the fourth column reports the
overall number of attacks detected; the fifth the distance between the two
attacks expressed in days. Note that for anonymity reasons we aggregate the
attacks against each unique machine in WINE into an ensemble of identical
attacks. This does not represent a threat to the generality of our results as
we are here interested in measuring attacks at an aggregate level rather than
singularly for each user. The columns reporting the software affected by the
vulnerability, the latest affected software version and the software’s category
are here omitted for brevity.
Additional care must be taken when evaluating vulnerability timing data
[105]. In particular, because we are evaluating attackers’ attitude at develop-
ing new vulnerability exploits in time, we need to 1) identify vulnerabilities
that are disclosed at the same time and 2) eliminate subsequent attacks
targeting vulnerabilities that are very far away in time, as these say little
about the attackers’ exploit development process. For this reasons, we only
consider the tuples <1st attack, 2nd attack> respecting the following
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constraints:
1. The vulnerability exploited in the first attack was disclosed before or
at most 120 days after the vulnerability for the second attack. This ro-
bustly large interval has been chosen according to how the vulnerability
disclosure process works.
2. The second exploited vulnerability is less than three years older than
the first. We choose this time frame as it matches the length of the his-
toric records we have for each WINE user, given the three-year interval
covered by our sample.
In the first row of Table 6.1 the two subsequent attacks are against the
same vulnerability. The tuple < a, a > affected most machines and was
the vector of a high number of attacks in the sample. For example, we find
almost 60 thousand attacks against 23.5 thousand users that have received
a second attack against a 192 days (6months) after the first. The second
and third row report two instances where an attack on b has been followed
by an attack against two other vulnerabilities. The third and fourth rows
report other two combinations. We present our results for Internet Explorer,
PROD, PLUGIN and SERVER vulnerabilities. WINDOWS vulnerabilities
are excluded because updating windows versions often results in a new WINE
ID for the user, and therefore we are unable to trace a users’ attack history
throughout his/her Windows updates.
6.1.2 Analysis
We first give an overview of our dataset. Figure 6.1 shows a generalized
regression ([61]) of attacked systems (left) and volume of attacks (right) as a
function of time.3 The shaded areas represent the 95% confidence intervals
3 Regression generated by fitting to a generalized additive model (gam) of the form g(E(V olume)) =
s(Delta) where g() is the link function of the expected volume of attacks (E(V olume)) and s(Delta) is
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Figure 6.1: Regression of number of attacked machines (left) and volume of attacks (right)
as a function of time. Attacks against the same software are represented by the dashed
line; attacks against different software are represented by the solid line. Shaded areas
represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean.
around the fitted line. Subsequent attacks directed towards the same software
are represented by the dashed line. Subsequent attacks against different
software are represented by the solid line. We observe that the distribution
of attacked machines (left) follows closely the distribution of recorded attacks
(right). In this study we will consider only the number of affected machines,
an unspecified smoothing function of the time between attacks (Delta). Note that the prediction power
of our regression is likely very limited as it does not account for additional covariates of interest, such
as geographical location, source of attack, or user type. This is because we are here only interested in a
first, exploratory depiction of the relation between volume of attacks and time within our dataset. The
goal of this is to pinpoint possible macro-differences in the trends of attacked machines and volume of
attacks in time, not to predict future attack volumes. Thus, the model used should not be interpreted
as an estimator of future trends of attacks, as this likely requires a more fine-grained analysis accounting
for additional covariates. A more suitable model for this analysis could be of the form V olumet = β0 +
β1(GEOt)+β2(USERTY PEt)+β3(ATTSOURCEt)+β4(Deltat)+µt , where βi are model parameters to
be estimated, GEO,USERTY PE,ATTSOURCE,Delta are the independent variables of the regression,
and µt is the error term. Note that the model above likely suffers from some degree of heteroscedasticity,
as the variance in volumes of attacks (V ar(V olumet)) likely depends on the same variables as its expected
value (E(V olumet)). This may be problematic in the estimation as the independence assumption on the
error distribution, required for classic linear regression and generalised models, is not valid anymore [43].
Were any heteroscedastic effects present, adjustments to the model may be required in order to improve
the efficiency of the estimator [126]. We keep this analysis for future work.
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as this gives us a more direct measure of how many users are affected by
a certain attack. We keep a closer analysis of volume of attacks for future
work. We further observe that subsequent attacks against the same software
are more frequent than subsequent attacks against different software. This is
intuitive as the received attack depends on the software usage habits of the
user. For example, a user that uses his/her system to navigate the Internet
might be more prone in receiving attacks against Internet Explorer than
against Microsoft Office. Because of this we will focus in this study on
subsequent attacks against the same software. This will allow us to assess
the attacker’s attitude toward creating new exploits for the same software
platform. We further observe that the fitted curves do not have a clear
positive or negative slope as functions of time. This suggests that attacks are
only weakly correlated with time, and other factors (such as users’ patching
attitudes, or just technological chances) may explain the trend.
Hypothesis 1a. To check the veracity of Hyp. 1a we evaluate how many
users receive two attacks, after a certain δt, of either of these types:
1. A1=A(cve = cve′|δt & sw = sw′): Against the same vulnerability and
same software version.
2. A2=A(cve < cve′& vers 6= vers′|δt & sw = sw′): Against a new
vulnerability and a different software version.
3. A3=A(cve < cve′& vers = vers′|δt & sw = sw′): Against a new
vulnerability and same software version.
In accordance with Hyp. 1a the attacker should prefer to (a) attack the
same vulnerability multiple times, and (b) create a new exploit when he/she
wants to attack a new software version. Therefore, according to Hyp. 1a we
expect the following ordering in the data to be generally true: A3 < A2 <
A1. An exception may be represented by SERVER vulnerabilities: SERVER
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Figure 6.2: Targeted machines as a function of time for the three types of attack. A1 is
represented by a solid black line; A2 by a long-dashed red line; A3 by a dashed green line.
environments are typically better maintained than ‘consumer’ environments,
which may affect an attacker’s attitude toward developing new exploits. For
example, SERVER software is often protected by perimetric defences such as
firewalls or IDSs. This may require the attacker to engineer different attacks
for the same software version in order to escape the additional mitigating
controls in place. For this reason we expect the difference between A2 and
A3 to be narrower or reversed for the SERVER category.
Figure 6.2 reports a fitted regression of targeted machines as a function
of time by software category. As expected, A1 dominates in all software
types. The predicted order is valid for PLUGIN and PROD. For PROD
software we find no new attacks against different software versions, therefore
A2 = A3 = 0. This may be an effect of the typically low update rate of this
type of software and relatively short timeframe considered in our dataset
(3 years), or of a scarce attacker interest in this software type. Results for
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SERVER are mixed as discussed above: the difference between A2 and A3
is very narrow and A3 is higher than A2: attackers forge more exploits per
SERVER software version than for other types of software.
Internet Explorer. Internet Explorer is an interesting case in itself. Here,
contrary to our prediction, A3 is higher than A2. By further investigating the
data, we find that the reversed trend is explained by one single outlier tuple:
<CVE-2010-0806,CVE-2009-3672>. Both these CVEs refer to vulnerabili-
ties affecting Internet Explorer version 7. The two vulnerabilities have been
disclosed 98 days apart, 22 days short of our 120 days threshold. More in-
terestingly, these two vulnerabilities are very similar, as they both affect a
memory corruption bug in Internet Explorer 7 that allows for an heap-spray
attack that may result in arbitrary code execution4. Two observations are
particularly interesting to make:
1. Heap spray attacks are unreliable attacks that may result in a significant
drop in exploitation success. This is reflected in the “Access Complex-
ity=Medium” assessment assigned to both vulnerabilities by the CVSS
v2 framework. In our model, this is reflected in a lower n(v, t) value,
as the unreliable exploit may affect less machines than those that are
vulnerable.
2. The exploitation code found on Exploit-DB5 is essentially the same for
these two vulnerabilities. The code for CVE-2010-0806 is effectively a
rearrangement of the code for CVE-2009-3672, with different variable
names. In our model, this would indicate that the cost c(v) to build
an exploit for the second vulnerability is negligible, as most of the ex-
ploitation code can be re-used from the old vulnerability.
4CVE-2009-3672: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2009-3672
CVE-2010-0806: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-0806
5CVE-2009-3672: http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/16547/
CVE-2010-0806: http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/11683/
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Category Test Significance
Internet Explorer A2 < A1 ***
Internet Explorer A3 < A2 ***
PROD A2 < A1 ***
PROD A3 < A2 -
PLUGIN A2 < A1 ***
PLUGIN A3 < A2 ***
SERVER A2 < A1 ***
SERVER A3 < A2
Table 6.2: Results for Hypothesis 1a. Significance (***) is reported for p < 0.01.
Having two independent but unreliable exploits that affect the same software
version increases the chances of a successful attack, n(v, t). Because the
second exploit comes at a very low cost c(v), the attacker chooses to exploit
the second vulnerability as well as in this case the combination of the two
exploits yields, by setting c(v2) = 0:
c(v1) < [n(t+δ, v1∪V )+n(t+δ, v2∪V )]×R(I(v1∪V ))−
∑
i6={1,2}
E[Ut+δ,vi](6.6)
Eq. 6.6 shows that, at the cost of one exploit, the attacker gets the
combined fraction of successful attacks6 of both vulnerabilities. Moreover,
Internet Explorer is used by a significant fraction of Internet users7, therefore
n(t+ δ, v1) + n(t+ δ, v2) may be particularly interesting for the attacker.
Although this vulnerability is an exception in the data, the existence of
the second exploit for Internet Explorer 7 is coherent with our model and
ultimately supports our thesis that an attacker would build an exploit only
if the additional cost is balanced by an increased rate of successful attacks
over his/her current capability.
Table 6.2 reports the results of the analysis for Hyp. 1a with the exclusion
of the Internet Explorer outlier, as discussed above. Significance is given by
6Note that because v1 and v2 are vulnerabilities of the same type, then R(I(v1 ∪ V )) = R(I(v2 ∪ V )).
7http://www.w3counter.com/trends
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Figure 6.3: Fraction of systems receiving the same attack repeatedly in time (red, solid)
compared to those receiving a second attack against a different vulnerability (black,
dashed). The vertical line indicates the amount of days after the first attacks where it
becomes more likely to receive an attack against a new vulnerability rather than against
an old one.
a Wilcoxon paired test. All comparisons but SERVER accept the alternative
that A2 < A1 and A3 < A2. Overall, we find strong statistical evidence
supporting Hyp 1a.
Hypothesis 1b. We now check how the trends of attacks against a software
change with time. Hyp. 1b states that the exploitation of the same vulner-
ability persists in time and decreases slowly at a pace depending on users’
update behaviour. This is in contrast with other models in literature where
new exploits arrive very quickly after the date of disclosure, and attacks
increase following a steep curve ([20]).
Figure 6.3 reports the fraction of systems receiving, once an attack arrived,
a subsequent attack against the same vulnerability (red, solid) as opposed to
an attack against a different vulnerability (black, dashed). The x-axis reports
the elapsed time since the first attack, in days. As hypothesised, the rate at
which the same attack arrives decreases slowly with time and is still 20% after
almost three years (1000 days). Notably, the event of receiving an attack
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against a different vulnerability becomes more likely than its counterpart
only 800 days (or 2 years, see dotted vertical line in Figure 6.3) after the first
attack happens. This is interesting in itself as it indicates that attackers use
the same exploit for a long period of time before substituting it at scale with
a new one.
6.1.3 Robustness check
The distribution reported in Figure 6.3 depends on users’ patching attitudes.
In particular, according to the model presented here, software that is patched
more often should see a quicker arrival rate of new exploits in time. We expect
that software that is more rarely updated by users receives attacks against
new vulnerabilities with a larger delay than software that is updated more
often.
To the best of our knowledge there is no available data on the average
rate at which users update different software types. However, as previously
discussed, we expect SERVER software to be patched regularly ([95]), and
to be generally maintained better than consumer software. Therefore, we
expect the arrival of new exploits to be quicker for SERVER vulnerabili-
ties than for other software types. This would also be coherent with the
results in Table 6.2, as for SERVER A3 ≥ A2 (i.e. the attacker does not
wait for a new version to build a new exploit). We expect Internet Ex-
plorer to be fairly often updated as Microsoft releases patches every month
and automatically pushes it to the users via the Microsoft Update system.
PLUGIN software is traditionally seldom updated by the users, as only very
recently a few PLUGIN vendors started pushing update notifications. Still,
we expect PLUGIN exploits to arrive on average later in time than for other
categories. As discussed previously, we have no data on subsequent attacks
against PROD software affecting different vulnerabilities.
Figure 6.4 reports the distribution of days for the appearance of a new
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Figure 6.4: Distribution of average days between first exploit attempt and the appearance
of an attack attempting to exploit a different vulnerability in the respective category.
attack for each software in the respective category. The delay for the appear-
ance of a new exploit for PLUGIN software is the highest one (p = 0.02),
with a median arrival delay of 454 days since first exploit. New exploits
for Internet Explorer vulnerabilities arrive with a median delay of 214 days.
SERVER attacks are the quickest to arrive, with a median delay of 117 days,
but the difference with Internet Explorer is statistically significant for the al-
ternative “SERVER exploits arrive faster than for Internet Explorer” at the
10% confidence level (p = 0.08).
6.1.4 Discussion
In this Section we discussed the Model of the Work-Averse Attacker as a
new model to understand cyber threats. Our proposal is attacker-centric
and models the attacker as a resource-limited actor that has to choose which
vulnerabilities to exploit. We here only address the general case where the
attacker aims at the ‘mass of systems’ in the wild In the ‘general threat’
case, the cost constraints emerging from the model prevent the attacker from
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‘exploiting all vulnerabilities’ as otherwise currently assumed in academia
and industry alike. We supported our claims with evidence from attacks
recorded in the wild.
Evidence markedly points in the direction of the predictions our model
makes. In particular, we find that:
1. An attacker massively deploys only one exploit per software version.
The only exception we find is characterised by:
• A very low cost to create an additional exploit, where it is sufficient
to essentially copy and paste code from the old one, with little
modifications, to obtain the new one.
• An increased chance of delivering a successful attack.
2. The attacker deploys new exploits slowly in time; after three years the
same exploits still drive about 20% of the attacks.
3. The speed of arrival of new exploits only weakly correlates with time,
but shows a strong dependency on software patching rates.
Our findings suggest that the rationale behind vulnerability exploitation
could be leveraged by defenders to deploy more efficient security counter-
measures. For example, it is well known that software updates correspond to
an increased risk of service disruption (e.g. for incompatibility problems or
updated/deprecated libraries). However, if most of the risk for a particular
software version comes from a specific vulnerability, than countermeasures
other than patching may be more cost-efficient. For example, maintaining
network IDS signatures may be in this case a better option than updating
the software, because one IDS signature could get rid of the great majority
of risk that characterises that system while a software patch may ‘overdo it’
by fixing more vulnerabilities than necessary.
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Of course, the attacker may react to changing defenders’ behaviour: in
the game-theoretic view of the problem, the defender always moves first and
therefore the attacker can adapt his/her strategy to overcome the defenders’.
This is an unavoidable problem in security that is common to any threat
mitigation strategy.
A more precise and data-grounded understanding of the attacker poses
nonetheless a strategic advantage for the defender. For example, software
diversification and code differentiation has already been proposed as a possi-
ble alternative to vulnerability mitigation ([36, 66]). By diversifying software
the defender effectively decreases the fraction n(t, v) of systems the attacker
can compromise with one exploit. If the risk over a software version comes
from only one vulnerability, than a possible counter-strategy to the attack-
ers’ adaptive behaviour is to first patch the high risk vulnerability, and then
randomise the additional defences against the remaining vulnerabilities to
minimize the attacker’s chances of choosing the ‘right’ exploit to develop (as
the attacker’s multiple targets will likely choose a different set of vulnera-
bilities to patch). Diversifying defences may be in fact less onerous than
re-compiling code bases (when possible) ([66]) or maintaining extremely di-
verse operational environments ([36]).
Conclusion 1 From our analysis we find strong supporting evidence for Hy-
pothesis 1. We therefore conclude that the attacker is rational and will as a
result massively deploy exploits for only a subset of vulnerabilities.
85
6.2. The Underground is a Sustainable Market Economy Chapter 6
6.2 The Underground is a Sustainable Market Econ-
omy
Running Hypothesis Hypotheses Testing
Hyp. 2. The underground markets
are sound from an economic
perspective.
Hyp. 2. Test Prop. 1 and Prop. 2. Develop a two-
stage model of the underground markets to show that
the underlying economic mechanism is sound.
In this section we test Hypothesis 2 to demonstrate that the cybercrime
economy is sustainable from a market perspective. This section unfolds
as follows: first, we analyse the mechanisms that are available to market
participants to overcome market difficulties such as contract incompleteness
(Proposition 1). This analysis is given in Section 6.2.1. We then proceed with
analysing the quality of the technology traded in these markets (Proposition
2), in Section 6.2.2. Finally, we present in Section 6.2.3 a two-stage model of
the markets that show, accounting for the discussion given in Sections 6.2.1
and 6.2.2, the sustainability of the market (Hyp. 2).
6.2.1 The Underground Markets are Mature
To investigate Proposition 1, we analyse two different cybercrime markets,
Carders.de and HackMarket.ru, by comparing their regulating mechanisms
and the effect those have on market effectiveness. The analysis results for
HackMarket.ru are in sharp contrast with those of Carders.de and clearly
show prima-facie evidence that underground cybercrime communities can
be mature (and functioning) market .
The Carders.de market
This forum has a strict separation of trade related boards and non-trade re-
lated boards. Advertisement of (illegal) goods is permitted in the dedicated
trading section. Members in this section are also allowed to request specific
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Running Hypothesis Hypotheses Testing
Hyp. 2. The underground markets
are sound from an economic
perspective.
Prop. 1. The underground markets evolved from a
scam-for-scammer model to a mature state whereby
fair trade is possible and incentivised by the enforced
trading mechanisms.
• Prop. 1a. Banned users have on average
lower reputation than normal users.
• Prop. 1b. Users with a higher status should
on average have a higher reputation than
lower status users.
• Prop. 1c. Banned users who happened to
have a higher status have a lower reputation
than other users with the same status.
• Prop. 1d. The ex-ante rules for assigning a
user to a category are enforced.
• Prop. 1e. There are ex-post rules for en-
forcing trades contemplating compensation or
banning violators.
• Prop. 1f. Users finalize their contracts in
the private messages market.
• Prop. 1g. Normal users receive more trade
offers than known rippers do.
goods. The non-trade related boards serve the purpose of providing a discus-
sion forum for the members where they can share thoughts, ask questions,
publish tutorials and offer free goods on a specific subject. A third area
of the forum, of little interest here, is dedicated to discussion of technical
forum-related matters (e.g. maintenance). Carders.de allows both English
and German speaking members on their forum. Figure 6.5 shows a schema
of the two forum sections for English and German Speakers.
Since we are interested in the market characteristics of the forum, we
exclude from the analysis users who have never participated in the trading
sections. Further, the German-speaking part of the community is clearly the
most developed one: the English section has 8% of all market posts while
the remaining 92% are found in the German market. For this reason, we will
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Figure 6.5: Categories of the Carders.de forum. The German market comprises more
discussion sections and more market levels than the English market. Similarly, we found
most of the activity to happen in the German section of Carders.de.
focus on the German market.
Users that join the community for selling or buying products are active in
one of the market tiers within the forum. A user can advertise a product by
creating a topic in the designated board in which this specific product falls.
In this newly created thread, other users discuss the product, ask ques-
tions and when a user shows interest as a potential buyer they contact the
advertiser. According to the forum regulation, product trading should be
finalized via private messages between the two parties.
Member roles
An important part of our study is to distinguish between different types of
users. A user’s status in the forum is also reflected by its membership in
one of 12 user roles identified by the forum administrators. Table 6.3 shows
these roles with the category to which they belong. The entry rank Newbie
labels a newly registered user in the forum. After passing this role a newbie
gets the role of normal user. Further up in the hierarchy, the user becomes
a 2nd and 3rd tier user and have access to more specialized marketplaces. A
verified vendor sells goods that are verified by the administrative team and
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Table 6.3: Carders.de User roles
Role Forum Admins Other
Newbie ×
Normal user ×
2nd Tier user ×
3rd Tier user ×
Verified Vendor ×
Redaktion ×
Moderator ×
Global Moderator ×
Administrator ×
Scammers and banned ×
therefore ought to be more trusted by market participators. In contrast to
other forum roles, a verified vendor does not require to climb up the rank
ladder to achieve this entitlement.
Users with an administrative role manage, maintain and administer the
forum. Members of the ‘Redaktion’ are editors of the forum. They publish
news, events, regulation and other administrative information. The modera-
tors maintain the forum and enforce regulation.
Administrative users are also responsible for banning users who have been
reported for “ripping” other users in a transaction, or who have violated some
internal rules.
Another important distinction to make is among banned users, which may
have been excluded from the forum for a variety of reasons. Banned users are
usually assigned an (arbitrary) string tag that describes the reason of the ban.
By manual inspection we identified five categories of banned users: Rippers,
Double accounts, Spammers, Terms of Service violators and an additional
“Uncategorized” group for users banned without a reported reason. Table 6.4
shows the number of users for each group.
Each user in Carders.de can assign positive or negative reputation points
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Table 6.4: Carders.de number of users per identified group
User group no. users
Normal users 2468
Rippers 205
Double accounts 148
Spammers 42
ToS 5
Uncategorized 40
Total 2908
to other forum users. Higher reputation points should correspond to a higher
“crowd-sourced trustworthiness” for the user. In the data there is no historical
record of reputation points per users; we only have the reputation level at
the moment of the dump. This prevents us from studying the evolution of
a user’s reputation level with time. For our stated hypothesis this is not
necessary.
Carders.de’s Regulation
The administrators of Carders.de published the guiding rules of the commu-
nity in the regulation section. What follows is an overview of the regulatory
structure of the community that will be central to our analysis as it identi-
fies rules to access the trading areas of the forum and provides a principled
distinction between “good” and “bad” users.
The forum regulation distinguishes three different trading areas (namely
Tiers) in the forum, the access to which is constrained by increasingly selec-
tive sets of rules.
Tier 1 The lowest accessible tier is considered the public market on
Carders.de. Newly registered users on the forum (Newbies, above) are not
permitted to join the public market in Tier 1. the forum regulation state-
90
Chapter 6 6.2. The Underground is a Sustainable Market Economy
ment reports that users that have obtained the role of “normal user” can
access this area. Access rule: To become a normal user a newbie has to have
posted at least 5 messages on the board.
Tier 2 This market section is intended to be reserved to the ‘elite’ of the
forum. More restrictive rules limit access to higher tiers. Access rules: 1)
Only users with at least 150 posts are allowed in Tier 2. 2) Users must have
been registered to the forum for at least 4 months.
Tier 3 This tier is an invitation-only section of the market. Access rules:
1) The user has been selected by a team member of the forum to be granted
access to Tier 3. 2) Access to Tier 2 is required. This division clearly aims at
creating ‘elitist’ sub-communities within the forum where the most reliable
and active users participate. One would also assume that users of Tier 2 and
3 would be generally considered, in a working market, more trustworthy than
users with Tier 1 only access. We however exclude Tier 3 from our analysis
because it features only 5 users, including one administrator, and 17 posts.
It is a negligible part of the overall market.
Carders.de Analysis
A failure of reputation mechanisms
To test our hypotheses we analyze reputation values for users in the Carders.de
market. Figure 6.6 summarizes the distribution between banned and normal
users, possibly accounting for the respective tiers. The data is on a logarith-
mic scale. The distribution of outliers suggests that reputation points make
little sense with respect to user categories.
A Mann-Whitney unpaired test (chosen for its robustness to outliers and
non-normality assumption) with null hypothesis “The difference in reputation
between banned and normal users is zero” and alternative hypothesis “banned
users have higher reputation than normal users” rejects the null (p = 5.2e−
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Figure 6.6: From left to right: 1) Reputation levels for normal users and banned users
(whole market). 2) Users active in the tier 1 markets and tier 2 market. 3) Reputation of
banned and normal users in tier 2. Banned users showed consistently higher reputation
than normal users, even when considering only those active in the tier 2 market. The
reputation mechanism is ineffective in both market sections.
15). We conclude that banned users have on average higher reputation than
normal users. Proposition 1a is therefore rejected.
The Mann-Whitney test rejects the null “Tier 1 and Tier 2 users have
the same reputation distribution” and accepts the alternative “Tier 1 users
have a higher reputation than Tier 2 users” (p = 4.8e − 06). Hyp. 1b is
rejected as well: reputation levels do not reflect membership in a “higher
market level” and are effectively misleading.
Finally, we check whether reputation is at least a satisfactory indicator of
user trustworthiness in Tier 2. It is not: Tier 2’s normal users have on average
a lower reputation than banned users. Hyp. 1c is rejected (p = 4.9e− 16).
All evidence suggests that the reputation mechanism in the forum did
not work. We therefore exclude that reputation could have been a significant
and useful instrument in the hands of the user to identify trustworthy trading
partners. This also means that cheaters, or rippers, had no “fear” of having
reputation points decreased by a disgruntled costumer, as reputation itself
had no meaning whatsoever in the market. The only evidence is that it was
used by bad users to inflate their own ratings.
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Figure 6.7: Users in tier 2 with more and less than 150 posts at the moment of their first
post in tier 2. Most users had access to tier 2 before reaching the declared 150 posts thresh-
old. D=Double accounts; N=Normal Users; R=Rippers; S=Spammers; U=Unidentified
banned users.
A failure of regulations
Carders.de had no ex-post system of regulations (Hyp. 1e) and therefore we
concentrate on the presence of ex-ante enforcement rules (Hyp. 1d). To test
the validity of Proposition 1d we need to check each individual rule.
If rules are enforced in the first tier this would mean that no user with less
than 5 posts is able to participate in Tier 1. We find that more than 50%
of the users in Tier 1 accessed it before their fifth post in the community.
Despite this being a very simple and straightforward rule to automate, there
is no evidence of its implementation in the forum.
The first rule for access to Tier 2 states that users should have at least 150
posts before posting their first message in Tier 2. Figure 6.7 reports a break-
down of the posting history for each user category. The totality of users with
double accounts posts in Tier 2 before reaching the 150 post limit threshold.
This may suggest that users already familiar with the forum (e.g. previously
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Figure 6.8: Time Distribution of Posts for Users in Tier 2. Most of the posting activity of
users in Tier 2 happened well before they reached the required 4 months waiting period.
banned users) were accessing Tier 2 more quickly than others, possibly pur-
posely exploiting the lack of controls. In general, the great majority of users
in Tier 2 accessed it before the set limit of 150 posts.
Figure 6.8 shows a density plot of posts in Tier 2 along the months for
which a user is registered to the forum. This also supports the previous con-
clusion that users had access to Tier 2 immediately when registered. There-
fore we also reject Hyp. 1d.
Market existence . . . for rippers
Finally, we now measure the effects of these regulatory inefficiencies within
the market. We first verify Proposition 1f. Given the unstructured nature
of the data at hand, we proceed with a manual inspection of a sample of 50
randomly picked threads in the Private Message (PM) market and classify
them as “trade related” or “not trade related”. The goal is to understand
whether the ratio of Private Message threads aimed at finalizing a trade
supports Hyp. 1f or not.
Table 6.5 reports that almost 90% of the manually examined sample
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threads are trade related. 54% of the trade-related PM threads also con-
Table 6.5: Classification of 50 Private Message Threads in Carders.de
Type # Threads
Trade Initiated 43 86%
Trade Initiated & Concluded 27 54%
Almost all threads in the PM section of Carders.de are about finalizing trades and
more than half of them come to a close.
tained contact information between the parties (e.g. ICQ, Post Address and
PayPal) and led to a concluding contract between the two. The evidence
therefore supports Hyp. 1f: there has actually been a market.
We are now interested in seeing whether users that have been banned
for explicitly ripping other users are more or less successful than normal
users. Given the results we obtained so far, we expect the two types to be
indistinguishable: if there is no available tool to distinguish between ‘good’
and ‘bad’ users (as the evidence indicates up to here), then choosing with
whom to trade can be no better than randomly picking from the population of
traders. Figure 6.9 is a boxplot representation of initiated trades for Rippers
and Normal users in the forum. The two distributions overlap significantly.
A Mann-Whitney test accepts the null hypothesis “There is no difference
in the average number of received private messages for rippers and normal
users” (p = 0.98). As expected in light of the evidence so far, the systematic
failure of the forum mechanisms made rippers and normal users effectively
indistinguishable to the trade initiator.
The comparison with HackMarket.ru
In this section we provide an introductory overview of the HackMarket.rumar-
ket which is still an active and arguably well-functioning cybercrime market.
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Figure 6.9: Initiated trades for Ripper users and Normal users. There is no difference in
the number of trades the users of the two categories are involved in. Consistently with the
analysis so far, this indicates that market participants are not able to distinguish good
traders from bad traders.
A successful reputation mechanism
The forum regulation outlines seven user groups [DMN 5]. The following list
presents these groups in descending order of trustworthiness, i.e. those on
top of the list are the most reliable users in the community.
1. Admin.
2. Moderator.
3. Trustee: members of the community that “own important services, or
are moderators or administrators of other forums” [DMN 5].
4. Specialist: Users elected in this group are considered “advanced” users”
with a “high level of literacy”.
5. User: Normal users.
6. Rippers: users that have been reported and have been found guilty of
“scamming”. It is explicitly recommended “to have no deals (business,
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Figure 6.10: Boxplot representation of reputation distribution among categories. Repu-
tation levels are statistically higher for higher categories when compared to reputation
at lower categories. Only the categories Trustee and Specialist do not show statistical
difference; these two are elective categories to which belong users deemed noteworthy by
the administrator.
work) with users of this group” [DMN 5].
7. Banned: Users that have been precluded access to the forum.
Reputation points are attributed to users by other users after a positive or
negative interaction between the two [DMN 6]. Of course, such system is sub-
ject to abuse; for example, a user may want to lower his competitors’ reputa-
tion level to improve the competitiveness of their own business, or create fake
accounts on the market to provide “collective” negative feedback. This ad-
versarial behavior is limited by the mechanism’s implementation rules: “Only
users with more than 30 posts can change reputation. Only 5 +/- reputation
points per day can be assigned by any user to any other users.” [DMN 6].
This effectively places an upper bound in the number of reputation points
one may assign in a given day and decreases one’s influence over the overall
distribution of reputation points in the market.
Figure 6.10 reports a boxplot representation of the distribution of reputa-
tion scores among user categories. Categories are listed in ascending order.
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It is here clear that higher rankings are reflected in higher reputation levels
of the users. We run a Mann-Whitney unpaired test to check if the differ-
ence in reputation levels between categories is significant, and we find that
reputation levels significantly increase with higher categories. The only ex-
ception is for the Trustee and Specialist categories, for which no difference is
found (which is explained by the elective nature of these categories). While
this does not mean that higher reputation results in a higher ranking (as a
number of endogenous factors other than reputation may be related to the
inclusion in a user group - i.e. there is a self-selection problem), it does show
that the reputation mechanism is effectively enforced and results in coherent
distributions among users. For HackMarket.ru we accept Proposition 1a-1c.
Enforced ex-post regulations
Since there is no market hierarchy, Proposition 1d does not apply to Hack-
Market.ru. With regard to the ex-post type of regulations (Hyp 1e), users
can effectively report other users to the board of administrators when they
think they have been scammed. The administrators remark that “We ex-
pose [cheaters] with pleasure.” [ADM 6]. The exposure of a user in the list
of cheaters is a fairly refined process, that requires a report to be filed, an
investigation to be carried, and that allows the ‘alleged scammer’ the right
to defend himself before the decision by the moderators. The whole phase
takes place in a dedicated sub-community of the market, a sort of ‘court of
justice’ where the offended reports the (alleged, at this point) offender.
The reporting is to be filed according to a specific procedure established
in the market regulation, that includes the “name, contacts, a proof of the
fact (log, screenshot of correspondence, money transfers,..) and a link to
the user’s profile.” Following the filing, an actual ‘trial’ takes place. The
defendant has the obligation of replying to the accusation, as not doing so
within seven days from the filing results in the accuser automatically winning
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the case. The investigation can be carried both by moderators and admin-
istrators, while the final decision usually belongs to the administrator. The
community is also often active in the discussion, reporting further evidence
or personal experience with the accused, or helping in the investigations. An
example of regulation during a trial is reported in the following, where the
administrator is stating clearly the points of dispute:
Key issues, without which it would be impossible to objectively consider
[to put the accused in the] Black [list of scammers]:
1. Whether the transfer happened at all
2. Whether the transfer was cashed
3. Exactly who received/took off with the money. [DMN 1]
A key point is to understand how the punishment mechanism is applied in
practice. In particular, we are interested in understanding whether trials un-
fold with significant discussions, and whether the final decision is ultimately
enforced.
To this aim, in Table 6.6 we illustrate three example trials held in the
market, two of which ended with a user being ‘black listed’, and one where
the accused is acquitted and no punishment is imposed. We define ‘accuser’
the user that reports the complaint, and ‘defender’ the reported user.
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All three cases were filed by disgruntled clients who paid the sellers but did
not receive the goods. All trials above took place within an observation year.
In every case, the HackMarket.ru community joins in into the investigation,
either providing additional details on the current status of the users involved
in the case, or as witnesses with past experience in dealing with the accuser
or the defender. As expected, controversial cases take more time than easier
ones. In Table 6.6, the first case is quickly closed as simply the defender does
not show up in time. This complies with the forum regulation noted above.
The second case is the most controversial of the three, with the defender
aggressively participating in the discussion and providing more and more
(unsatisfactory) evidence of his innocence. The amount of evidence provided,
and the intricacy of the discussion require time for the administrator to come
to a verdict, which happens after a month. In the third case, the defender
was able to show that he never “cashed” the sent payment. The accuser stops
replying soon after that and the administrator closes the case.
Evidence is carefully analyzed by the forum administrator as the following
excerpt shows:
Judging from the screen from post #num, there is a transfer, and it was re-
ceived. Double-check that, you can verify online with Western. But I haven’t
seen proof of receipt. To get the answer for the third question, we need to
ask to whom the money was sent through Western. If I am not mistaken,
upon request of the sender they can provide full information.
Therefore, we will do as follows. Sender, i.e. #buyer nickname get all de-
tails and full information from Western, report here the result before Friday
#date.[DMN 1]
In some cases, the administrator tries to arbitrate the question as s/he
clearly values both buyer and seller: It would be great if you two [buyer and
seller] contact each other and sort this matter out. We only need to know
the details for the recipient, and it will immediately be clear who is at fault,
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even without [proceeding with] the Black [list]. [DMN 1]
On a qualitative note we observed what follows:
1. the defender always reports detailed information on the accused user
and on the case of complaint.;
2. many witnesses appear in ‘court’ giving opinions on the evolution of the
case, or providing supporting evidence for either the accuser and the
defender;
3. the moderators and the administrators are always present in each report,
and actively moderate the discussion;
4. when the defender does not show up within the time limit specified by
the administrator [DMN 6], the case always goes to the defender;
5. when the defender shows up, he/she always publishes evidence of his/her
case, being those screenshots of chats with the accuser or Webmoney
transaction logs;
6. some cases last several months, with all parties actively participating in
the discussion and new evidence being examined or asked for iteratively;
7. when the evidence provided by either of the defender or the accuser is
not conclusive, the case goes to the opponent or a ‘null’ is thrown (when
neither of the two is convincing, nobody wins);
8. users that end up being found guilty are always exposed in the list of
cheaters and/or are banned from the forum. The latter is a harsh pun-
ishment: in contrast to IRC markets,re-entry into the forum is neither
easy in effort nor short in time.
We therefore accept Proposition 1e for HackMarket.ru.
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Market existence
We have not direct access to the private conversation of participants in Hack-
Market.ru, but we collected exhaustive evidence on their private transactions
through the conversation logs reported in the trials. In every case reported,
the finalization of the contract and the transaction always happen through
some type of private communication, usually thought the ICQ chat messaging
system or Jabber.ru. We therefore accept Proposition 1f.
Participants initiating a trade also often declare to have performed a back-
ground check on the seller by either contacting the administrators or by
checking the official blacklist of the forum. One example of this is given in
[NTL 12]: “[The] admin [of the forum] confirmed me that you [the seller] are
not a rookie trader ”. Evidence for background checks such as this is frequent.
We therefore accept Proposition 1g.
Discussion
“Regulation” is the main advantage that a forum-based community has over
an IRC-based community: it provides the forum users with a set of rules and
mechanisms to assess the information they can collect on a particular trade.
The analyzed markets attempted to enforce this by providing a regulatory
mechanism for user reputation and access to “elite” market tiers. This may
be not sufficient for the user to have complete information on the transac-
tion; yet, it could provide her with some baseline information on her trading
partner, ruling out part of the information asymmetry problem identified for
other markets [63], and precisely by mitigating the adverse selection problem
[48]. For legitimate markets, reputation proved to be an effective mechanism
albeit not a definitive solution.
Table 6.7 reports the summary of Hypothesis testing for the two markets.
The organizational and structural differences of HackMarket.ru with respect
103
6.2. The Underground is a Sustainable Market Economy Chapter 6
to Carders.de is evident. In Carders.de, each of the regulation mechanisms
has been faultily implemented and the potential means for a user to assess
ex-ante a trade are pointless or even misleading. The systematic failure of the
regulatory mechanisms clearly led to a market were users had no incentives in
conducting fair transactions and had no means to distinguish “good traders”
from “bad traders”. We showed that there is in fact no difference in the
number of trades initiated with a ripper and trades initiated with a normal
user. This effect alone may have brought to the failure of the market, which
we show being effectively of the same nature of Floreˆncio et al.’s IRC market.
In HackMarket.ru the reputation and punishment mechanisms generate
meaningful information for the user:
1. Evidence supports the hypothesis that reputation points are meaning-
fully assigned to users and this arguably results in a useful tool for the
user to asses potential trading partners.
2. The punishment mechanism is a well-regulated one and direct evidence
suggests that ‘trials’ are conducted in a fair manner. This boost market
activity and incentivizes ‘honest’ behavior.
3. Users that have been found guilty are, if not banned, publicly exposed
and assigned to the ‘scammers’ group. This allows other users to clearly
assess a scammer’s trading history and make an informed decision with
whom to trade.
It appears that the punishment mechanism is enforced coherently with
the stated rules (e.g. the time frame for the defendant to show up is firmly
enforced). We find evidence that trials in the market involve an in-depth
discussion on the issue raised by the accuser, and witnesses are called to
support one’s claims. Importantly, evidence supporting the case of both
the defender and the accuser (e.g. transaction logs and previous exchanges
between the two parties) is always requested and analyzed. This shows that
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the forum administrators tend to take well-informed decisions. This is in
accordance with the overall reputation levels among categories (Figure 6.10).
The very fact that defendants do show up is a proof that they see a value
in preserving their reputation as users and do not just register with a new
account. The difficulties of the registration process makes dropping and re-
registering a costly and lengthy process.
Conclusion 2 From our analysis we therefore accept Proposition 1. We
conclude that the cybercrime markets evolved from an unsustainable model
to one where strong regulation and reputation mechanisms may allow market
participants to overcome the asymmetry problems inherent in this setting.
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6.2.2 The Technology Traded in the Underground is Effective
Running Hypothesis Hypotheses Testing
Hyp. 2 Prop. 2. The tools bought and used by the attack-
ers are well engineered products that are effective
when deployed in the wild, as tested in the Malware-
Lab against evolving software configurations.
To investigate Proposition 2 we test 10 exploit kits leaked from the un-
derground markets to investigate their efficacy in the wild. In particular we
test whether they are resilient to the changing operative environment in the
wild (i.e. updating software configurations), or if they are effective only for
small windows of time.
Exploit kits’ main purpose is to silently download and execute malware
on the victim machine by taking advantage of browser or plugin vulnerabili-
ties. Errors in applied programming interfaces or memory corruption based
vulnerabilities allow an exploit to inject a set of instructions (shellcode) into
the target process. Shellcode on its turn downloads an executable malware
on the victim’s hard drive and executes it. The executable installed on the
target system is completely independent from the exploit pack (see [58] for
some statistics on the pairings).
Figure 6.11 depicts the generic scenario of drive-by-download attack [58,
75]. A victim visits a compromised web site, from which he/she gets redi-
rected to the exploit kit page. Various ways of redirection are possible: an
<iframe> tag, a JavaScript based page redirect etc. The malicious web page
then returns an HTML document, containing exploits, which are usually hid-
den in an obfuscated JavaScript code. If at least one exploit succeeds, then
the victim gets infected. An exploitation is successful when the injected shell-
code successfully downloads and execute a malicious program on the victim
system.
These tools are advertised and traded in the black markets. An example
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Compromised
Web Site
1) Visit a compromized web site
2) Redirect to an exploit kit
Exploit Kit
3) Visit an exploit kit page
4) Return exploits
5) Download malware
Victim
Figure 6.11: Scheme of drive-by-download attack
of such advertisement is given in Figure 6.12. In this ad are reported the
vulnerabilities included in the kit and the expected success rate of about
20%. We find similar success rates to be declared in the advertisement of the
competition as well.
Design of the experiment
To evaluate exploit kit resiliency, we test exploit kits in a controlled en-
vironment, our MalwareLab. The core of our design is the generation of
“reasonable” home-system configurations to test against the infection mecha-
nism and capabilities of exploit kits. We test those configurations as running
on Windows XP, Windows Vista and Windows 7. Table 6.8 reports versions
and release dates of each operating system and service pack considered (from
here on, system). After an initial phase of application testing on the selected
systems, we fix the life-time of an operating system to be 6 years for com-
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Figure 6.12: Sample advertisment for a popular exploit kit in 2011- mid 2012, “Eleonore”.
patibility of software. Ysys indicates the working interval of each operating
system.
For our experiment we selected 10 exploit kits (see Table 6.9) out of the
34, leaked from the black markets, we gathered. Some of them proved to
be not fully-functional or impossible to be deployed (e.g. because of missing
functions). Out of those that were deployable and armed, we selected 10
according to the following criteria: (a) popularity of the exploit kit [112]; (b)
year of release; (c) unique functionality (e.g. only one of multiple versions of
the same kit family is selected).
Configuration selection
The automated installation of software configurations on each machine fol-
lowed the definition of a criteria to select software to be installed. As often
happens, this is subject to a number of assumptions that define the criteria
themselves. For our experiment to be realistic, we need to build configura-
tions that are reasonable to exist at a certain point in time. As an example,
we consider unlikely to have Firefox 12, released in April 2012, installed on
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Table 6.8: Operating systems and respective release date. Configurations are right-
censored with respect to the 6 years time window.
Op. system Service Pack Ysys
Windows Xp
None 2001 - 2007
1 2002 - 2008
2 2004 - 2010
3 2008 - 2013*
Windows Vista
None 2006 - 2012
1 2008 - 2013*
2 2008 - 2013*
Windows 7
None 2009 - 2013*
1 2011 - 2013*
the same machine with Adobe Flash 9, released 6 years earlier in June 2006.
We therefore fix a two-years window that defines which software can coexist.
The window is based on the month and year of release of a particular soft-
ware. Since our oldest exploit kit is from early 2007, we are testing software
only released in the interval (2005, 2013). Table 6.10 shows the software
versions we consider8.
The algorithm to generate each configuration iterates through all years
Yconf from 2006 to 2013, and chooses at random a version of each software
(including “no version”, meaning that that software is not installed for that
configuration) that satisfy YswRel ∈ [Yconf − 1, Yconf ]. For each Yconf we gen-
erate 30 random configurations. Given the construction of YswRel, we end up
with seven windows and therefore 210 configurations per system reported in
Table 6.8. However for compatibility reasons each system has a time win-
dow of 6 years starting one year before its release date. Because we want
to measure the resiliency of exploit kits, we keep the number of configura-
8We did not include Google Chrome as it was first released halfway through the timeline considered
in our experiment (2008). Introducing Chrome samples in 2008 would have changed the probability of
a particular software to be selected. In turn, this would make comparing time windows before and after
2008 statistically biased. We plan to include Chrome in future experiment designs.
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Table 6.9: List of tested exploit kits
# Name Version Release Year
1 Crimepack 3.1.3 2010
2 Eleonore 1.4.4mod 2011
3 Bleeding Life 2 2010
4 Elfiesta 1.8 2008*
5 Shaman’s Dream 2 2009*
6 Gpack UNK 2008
7 Seo UNK 2010
8 Mpack 0.86 2007*
9 Icepack platinum 2007
10 Adpack UNK 2007*
For some exploit kits we could not find the respective release advertisement on the black markets, and
therefore a precise date of release for the product cannot be assessed. For those (*) we approximate the
release date to the earliest mention of that exploit kit in underground discussion forums and security
reports. This identifies an upper bound of the release date.
tions per year constant (otherwise results would not be comparable between
different runs). This means that some systems are tested, overall, against
a lower number of configurations than others. For example, Windows XP
Service Pack 1 (2002-2008) will be tested only against configurations in the
time windows{[2006, 2008),[2007-2009))}9, which gives us 60 configurations.
Windows Vista with no Service Pack (2006-2012) will instead be tested, for
the same reason, with 180 configurations. This guarantees that each exploit
kit is tested for each system against the same number of configurations per
year.
The algorithm iterates through each configuration and runs it against the
available exploit kits. Figure 6.13 is a representation of an experiment run
for each system. At each iteration i, we select the configuration conf i. If
9Note that the last year of the time window is not included. For example, [2006,2008) includes
configurations from January 2006 to December 2007a.
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Table 6.10: Software versions included in the experiment.
Software Versions # of versions
Mozilla Firefox 1.5.0.2 - 17.0.1.0 122
Microsoft Internet Explorer 6-10 5
Adobe Flash 9.0.16.0-11.5.502.135 54
Adobe Reader 8.0.0-10.1.4 17
Java 1.5.0.7-7.10.0.0 49
Total 247
Overall 9 software versions were excluded from the experiment setup because the corresponding installa-
tion package was either not working or we could not find it on the web.
Yconfi ∈ Ysys, we automatically install the selected software on the virtual
machine using the “silent install” interface provided by the vendor or by the
msi installer. A configuration install is successful when all software in that
configuration is installed.
When the installation process ends, we take a “snapshot” of the virtual
machine. Every run for confi will restore and use this snapshot. The advan-
tages of this are twofold: at first we eliminate possible confounding factors
stemming from slightly different configurations, because only the exploit kit
changes; secondly, this is also faster than re-installing the configuration every
time, which would have considerably stretched the (already not short) com-
pletion time. When all exploit kits are tested, a new configuration is eligible
for selection.
Data collection
In the course of our experiment we keep track of (a) the successfulness of
the automated installation of a configuration on a victim machine (VICTIM)
at any given time; (b) the successfulness of infection attempts from exploit
kits. This data is stored in two separate tables, Configurations and Infections
respectively.
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d
Figure 6.13: Flowchart of an experimet run. This flowchart describes a full experiment
run for each system in Table 6.8. Configurations are generated in chronological order,
therefore if the first control on YSys fails, every other successive configuration would as
well and the experiment ends. Snapshots enable us to re-use an identical installation of a
configuration multiple times.
1. Configurations is needed to control for VICTIM configurations that
were not successfully installed; this way we can correctly attribute (un)successful
exploitation to the right set-ups. This is desirable when looking for infection
rates of single configurations or software.
2. Infections stores information on each particular configuration run
against an exploit kit. We set our infection mechanism to make a call to the
Malware Distribution Server (MDS) each time it is executed on the VICTIM
machine. A “call back” to the MDS can in fact only happen if the “malware”
is successfully executed on VICTIM. TheMDS stores the record in Infections,
alongside (snapshot_id, toolkit_name, toolkit_version, machine, IP, date,
successful). Exploit kits have an “administrative panel” reporting infection
rates [75]. However, we decide to implement our own mechanism because (a)
it allows us to have more control on the data in case of errors or unforeseen
circumstances; (b) exploit kits statistics may not be reliable (e.g. developers
might be incentivated in exaggerating infection rates).
To minimise detection [58], some exploit kits avoid attacking the same
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machine twice (i.e. delivering the attack the same IP). This behaviour is
enabled by an internal database controlled by the kit, independent from our
Infections table. In some cases, e.g. when the experiment run needs to
be resumed from a certain configuration, our Infections table may report
un-successful attacks of an exploit kit, when instead the exploit kit did not
deliberately deliver the attack in the first place. We therefore need to control
for this possibility by resetting the exploit kit statistics when needed.
Operational realization
In this Section we present the technical implementation of our experiment
design in its three key points: (1) virtualised system infrastructure; (2) au-
tomated execution; (3) operative data collection;
Virtualised System Infrastructure
When testing for malware, an isolated, virtualised infrastructure is desirable
[101]. We set up a five machine network that includes a Malware Distribu-
tion Server (MDS) and four machines hosting the Victim Virtual Machines
(VICTIMs). Initially, the setup also included an IDS and a network auditing
infrastructure to log the traffic; however, to eliminate possible confound-
ing factors caused by the network monitoring and auditing, we decided to
eliminate this part of the infrastructure from the design reported here. For
practical purposes (i.e. scripting), all machines are run on a linux-based
operating systems, upon which the virtualised infrastructure is installed.
The purpose of the MDS is to deliver the attacks. Because of the nature of
exploit kits, all we need to attack VICTIMs is an Apache Web-Server listening
on HTTP port 80 upon which the kits are deployed. As mentioned, we
implemented and armed the exploit kits with our own “malware”, Casper.exe
(our Ghost-in-the-browser [94]) to help us keep track of infected systems.
In order to make it compatible with all Windows versions we have linked
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it statically with the appropiate libraries (e.g. Winsock). Casper reads a
special configuration information file that we put on each victim machine
and send its content to a PHP script on the MDS by using the Winsock
API. This script (trojan.php) simply stores the received data along with the
VICTIM IP address and timestamp into the Infections table in our database.
Automated execution
We use VirtualBox to virtualise victim machines. In order to automate the
tests we take advantage of the tool that is shipped with VirtualBox called
VBoxManage. It is a command line tool that provides all the necessary
functions to start/stop virtual machines, create/delete snapshots and run
commands in the guest operating system. The main program, responsible
for running the experiment is a Python script that makes a sequence of calls
to VBoxMange via subprocess Python module.10
At each run, our scripts read configurations.csv, a file containing all the
generated configurations for that machine. The scripts iteratively install con-
figurations upon the VICTIM system. The mapping between software version
pointers in configurations.csv and the actual software to be installed is hard-
coded in the core of the implementation. The automated installation happens
via the silent install interface bundled in the installation packages distributed
by most software vendors. However, because of a lack of a “standard” inter-
face and the inconsistencies between different versions of the same software,
we could not deploy one-solution for all software. We used instead a “trial-
and-error” approach and online documentation to enumerate the arguments
to pass to the installers and map them with the right software versions. Each
configuration is then automatically and iteratively run against every exploit
10It should be noted that there is Python API for VirtualBox, that allows to run VirtualBox commands
directly from within the Python environment. We tried to use it during our first (failed) experiment, but
had to switch to VBoxManage, because Python VirtualBox API functions proved not to be very reliable
on our machines.
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kit on the MDS.
Despite the experiment being completely automated, we found that some
machines were failing at certain points in the run, most often while saving
snapshots or uploading files to the VICTIMs. We therefore implemented a
“resume functionality” that allows us to “save” the experiment at the latest
valid configuration, and in case of failure restore the run from that point.
To reset exploit kits statistics and guarantee the soundness of the statistics
collected in the Configuration and Infections tables, we have implemented a
PHP script that clears the records on delivered attacks the kit keeps. This
step was rather easy to accomplish: we used the code snippets responsible for
statistics reset in each exploit kit, and copy-pasted them into a single script.
We keep track of software installations on the VICTIM machines by means
of a second dedicated script. To build it, we manually checked where each
program puts its data on the file system at the installation. Because it was
impossible to look at every application installation directory we sampled a
subset of programs to check whether they always put data in the same place.
Then we wrote a batch file that checks for the presence of the corresponding
data directories after the alleged installation. The results of the batch file
inspection are then passed to a Python script on the host machine, sent to
the MDS, and stored in the Configurations table on our dataset.
To collect the infection data, when theMDS receives a call from a VICTIM
machine, theMDS adds a record in the Infections table, setting the successful
record to 0 (the default). When executed, Casper connects to the MDS via
a PHP page we set up (namely infection.php). This updates the successful
bit of the corresponding run record in Infections to 1.
Experiment results
The automatic installation procedure proved to be rather reliable. Figure
6.14 depicts a 100%-stacked barplot of configuration installs by software. As
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Figure 6.14: Stacked barplot of configuration installs by software. The installation pro-
cedure was successful the majority of the time, the only exception being Flash for which
we have a 20% detected failure rate.
one can see, Firefox and Java were practically always successfully deployed
on the machine. In contrast, 6% of Adobe Acrobat and 21% of Flash instal-
lations were reported to be not successfully completed. However, it proved
practically unfeasible to manually check failures of our detection mechanism
(e.g. the files for that software version on that configuration may be on a
different location). We cannot therefore assess the level of false negatives our
detection mechanism generates.
Figure 6.15 reports an overview of the infection rates of all exploit kits
in each time window. Intuitively, because the exploit kits are always the
same, the general rate of infection decreases with more up-to-date software.
Observationally, from 2005 up to 2009 the success rate of exploit kits seem not
to be affected by system evolution. A marked decrease in the performance
of our exploit kits starts only after 2010. This observation is confirmed
by looking at a break-up of volumes of infections per exploit kit per year,
depicted in Figure 6.16. Generally speaking, each exploit kit (apart from
Bleeding Life) seem to remain effective mainly within the first three time
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Figure 6.15: Infection rates per time window. Exploit kits obtain a peak of about 30%
successful infections and maintain this level for 3 years on average. Afterwards infection
rates drop significantly. Only after 8 years overall exploitation rate goes to zero.
windows, from 2005 to 2009. Eleonore, CrimePack and Shaman lead the
volume of infections in those years, with Eleonore peaking at more than 100
infections for 2006-2008, which amounts at about 50% of the configurations
for that window. Interestingly, a few exploit kits seem identical in terms
of performance. Seo, mPack, gPack, ElFiesta, AdPack, IcePack all perform
identically throughout the experiment. Most exploit kits’s efficacy drops in
the fourth time-window, were configurations spanning from 2008 to 2010 are
attacked. However, Bleeding Life is here an outliner, as its efficacy in infecting
these machines rises and tops in 2009-2011 to more than twice its infection
rates for 2005-2009. After 2011, however, its infection capabilities drop to
zero. In the last but one time window (2010-2012), the only still effective
exploit kits are Crimepack and Shaman. Overall three types of exploit kits
seem to emerge:
1. Lousy exploit kits. Some exploit kits in the markets seem to be identical
in terms of effectiveness in infecting machines. Not only they perform
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Figure 6.16: Number of configurations that each exploit kit was able to successfully attack
in each time window. Number of exploited configurations are reported on the Y-axis, and
time windows on the X-axis. We can identify three groups of exploit kits. Lousy kits
(mpack, Seo, ElFiesta, AdPack, IcePack, gPack) are rip-off of each other and perform
precisely the same and are consistently the worst. Long-term exploit kits (Crimepack,
Shaman) achieve higher exploitation rate and maintain non- zero exploitation rates for
up to 7 years. Time-specific exploit kits (Eleonore, Bleeding Life) achieve the highest
exploitation rates within a particular time frame but their success rate drops quickly
afterwards.
equally, but the identical trend throughout our experiment suggests that
the exploits they bundle are themselves identical. This may indicate
that some exploit kits may be rip-offs of others, or that an exploit kit
author may re-brand the same product.
2. Long-term exploit kits. From our results, a subset of exploit kits (in
our case Crimepack and Shaman) perform particularly well in terms of
resiliency. Crimepack and Shaman are the only two exploit kits that
remain active from 2005 to 2012, despite not being the most recent
exploit kits we deployed (see Table 6.9). For example, in the period 2008-
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2012 Shaman performs up to two times better than Eleonore, despite
being two years older. In other words, some exploit kits appear to be
designed and armed to affect a wider variety of systems in time than
the competition.
3. Time-specific exploit kits. As opposed to long-term exploit kits, some
kits seem to be extremely effective in short periods of time only to “die”
shortly after. Eleonore and Bleeding Life belong to this category. The
former achieves the highest amount of infection per time window in 2006-
2008, and drops then to the minimum within the next two years. The
latter is the only exploit kit capable of infecting “recent” machines, i.e.
those with configurations since 2009 on. Bleeding Life was in particular
clearly designed to attack machines around the period of the release of
the kit (2010).
Overall, we find that exploit kits are capable of delivering successful at-
tacks over a prolonged period of time. This supports our Proposition that
attack tools traded in the black markets are effective and well-engineered
pieces of software that represent a non-transient risk factor for the final user.
Conclusion 3 From our analysis, we accept Proposition 2. We conclude
that the goods traded in the underground are well-engineered and differenti-
ated attack tools that are capable of maintaining the infections over a signif-
icant period of time.
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6.2.3 The Markets are Sustainable
Running Hypothesis Hypotheses Testing
Hyp. 2. The underground markets
are sound from an economic
perspective.
Hyp. 2. Develop a two-stage model of the un-
derground markets to show that the underlying eco-
nomic mechanism is sound.
For this analysis we utilize qualitative case-study data obtained by infil-
trating HackMarket.ru to provide evidence regarding the nature of cognition
and bounded rationality in information rich communities engaged in trans-
action relationships. Our specific goal is to illustrate the emergent market
design in communities where contracts are incomplete by construction and
the only mechanism of enforcement is based on the shadow-of-the-future.
In particular, we identify three central points that are relevant for our
analysis11:
1. The markets are strongly regulated, have a coherent reputation mech-
anism and have trials in place to evaluate ‘ripping cases’ reported by
market participants. The trials effectively represent a punishing mech-
anism whereby the ripper is collectively punished by being effectively
exposed as such and listed in the ‘do not trade with these users’ list.
2. Buyers regularly leave positive and negative feedback on a seller’s prod-
uct by posting publicly on the forum their usage impressions. In this
way, buyers that ‘arrive second’ have additional information on the qual-
ity of traded good, and sellers that receive negative feedback will effec-
tively be out of market.
3. To encourage the first buyer in engaging in the trade (as he does not
have the cognitional advantages of the second buyer), the seller often
provides trial periods, demos and videos of the tool in action. This effort
11For conciseness, we do not report here the full record of evidence supporting these claims. Part of it
is outlined in Section 6.2.1. A future article version of this Section will contain the full set of evidence.
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on the side of the seller decreases the level of uncertainty for the first
buyer, effectively addressing part of the asymmetry between her (the
seller) and him (the buyer).
We build a two-phase cognition model whereby a seller and a buyer stipu-
late a contract A for the delivery of a technology. In particular, we consider
two independent and a-priori indistinguishable buyers, B1 and B2, that may
be interested in buying the tool. Because there is no guarantee that the ad-
vertised product is not a lemon, the buyer that goes second has an inherent
advantage over the first because he can leverage from the first buyer’s expe-
rience to decide whether A is good for him. Therefore, no buyer would be
willing to go first. We show how, to overcome this problem, the seller pro-
vides a cognitional advantage to the first buyer (e.g. by giving a trial of the
product). Because the seller’s goal is to extract maximum value from both
buyers, by ‘discounting’ the cost for B1 (by decreasing the cognitional effort
needed to decide that A is good for him) she (the seller) creates the conditions
whereby the profit piB1 for the first buyer equals that of the second buyer,
piB2. This solves the ‘trade entry’ problem whereby the first buyer would
always want to go second. We show that the condition piB1 = piB2 leads to
an equilibrium whereby the model solves. We will show that the moderating
activity described in Section 6.2.1 is central to establish the equilibrium. By
showing that the model is analytically tractable, we conclude that the market
mechanism is sound from an economic perspective.
A two period cognition model
We follow [119] and consider a contract to provide a technology denoted A,
which may or may not be suitable for a particular buyer. The specificity
of the market means that production of A is very costly and that its use is
extremely specialised. We will also see that the messaging board type ap-
proach to sales means that a single price is generally posted for this product.
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The very nature of the market, anonymous posts by cyber criminals on a
closed forum, means that enforcement of all contracts is incomplete and the
only punishment is via a credible removal of future transactions through a
multilateral punishment action or via the dissemination of information about
contractual arrangements that have not been fulfilled.
In our case we have a two period set-up, with ex-ante identical buyers
labelled B1 and B2 contracting from a single seller S. Buyers are ex-ante
identical and receive payoff v if the technology A is appropriate for their
requirements. Following the notation of [119] the probability that A is the
correct technology is denoted 1 − ρ. This outcome is independent for all
buyers, therefore each buyer has an independent probability ρ of receiving
the incorrect technology. Whilst buyers are ex-ante identical, cognition on
behalf of the seller for a specific buyer is not deemed to be transferable. In
the event that the technology A is not appropriate then the buyer suffers a
penalty ∆ ≤ v and as such receives only v−∆, rather than v. In the main we
will use the working assumption that if the technology is not appropriate then
∆ = v and in effect the buyer will receive no surplus from its deployment.
We view each buyer-seller interaction as being a separate experiment.
However, the degree of common knowledge gained in phase one is assumed
to permeate into phase two. For instance, buyers post feedback about the
efficacy of technology, for good or for bad and this feedback allows future
buyers to narrow down their choices. We can think of A as being the stan-
dard, or pro-forma, technology and A′, the technology suitable for the buyer,
is some bespoke arrangement. Therefore each buyer may or may not require
the standard arrangement of A and suffer a loss of utility if it turns out that
A is not appropriate. As such neither seller not buyer know precisely what
the buyers requirements are.
Buyers and sellers can engage in costly cognition to determine whether
A is the correct technology for them. For the first buyer, B1, the cost of
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discovering with probability b1, whether A is the appropriate technology for
them is denoted TB1 = TB(b1). We follow the standard assumptions in the
cognition literature and [119] in particular and assume that the cognition
costs originate at the origin, are strictly increasing and have a singularity at
unity. Hence, TB(0) = 0, T ′B(0) = 0, 0 < TB(z) < ∞,∀0 < z < 1 and
TB(1) = ∞, where z = {b1, b2}. For simplicity we assume that the second
buyer has an advantage over the first buyer in discovering if A is appropriate
by a fixed cost factor 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, therefore the cost of cognition for B2 is
TB2 = δTB(b2). Sellers can also engage in costly cognition by studying the
buyer and their own technology and can discover if A is suitable for a given
buyer independently with probability s that may or may not be revealed to
the buyer. Similarly to the buyer we assume that the cost of cognition is
denoted TS(s) and that TS(0) = 0, T ′S(0) = 0, 0 < TS(z) < ∞,∀0 < z < 1
and TS(1) =∞, however TB(z) need not equal TS(z) for a given z. We will
assume that TS is the same for the seller in both periods; whilst this appears
to be a limiting assumption our analysis will in general focus on cognition
by the seller with buyer B1. We assume that buyers will be indifferent from
being first or second if their respective pay-offs are the same.
For analytical tractability we will show that it is simpler to relax the
T ′B(0) = 0 assumption and place a constraint on the parameters of the func-
tion TB(z) to ensure that the optima of the function lies within 0 < z∗ < 1
range.
We assume that TS(s) is independent of bi, therefore seller cognition does
require costly buyer cognition as an input. This non-collaborative condition
is justifiable for many types of technology, whereby the cost of cognition
for buyer or seller is in the revelation of the ‘modality’ of the technology,
e.g. the revealing of source code or methods of forcing memory overflows
by exploitation of certain key vulnerabilities in common software. From the
viewpoint of the seller, in-the-main, this is a one sided cost as the buyer now
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has the information needed to replicate the sellers technology at near zero
cost.
The cognition mechanism
We now assume two update functions: First ρˆ(bi∈{1,2}), which is the private
ex-ante probability that the buyer knows if A is suitable. By construction
when bi = 1, ρˆ(bi∈{1,2}) = 0, that is Buyer i knows with certainty the suit-
ability of A. When bi = 0, ρˆ(bi∈{1,2}) = ρ, that is Buyer i is subject to the
unconditional probability ρ of A being incorrect. Second, when the seller
provides costly cognition to assist the buyer in the first sub-step and the
buyer then chooses their own costly cognition in the second step, we denote
this ρ¯(s, bi∈{1,2}). Following [119] Bayesian updating we find the following
functional forms:
ρˆ(bi∈{1,2}) =
ρ(1− bi)
1− ρbi
ρ¯(s, bi∈{1,2}) =
ρ(1− s)(1− bi)
1− ρs− ρbi(1− s) ≡
ρˆ(s)(1− bi)
1− ρˆ(s) , (6.7)
where, ρˆ(s) =
ρ(1− s)
1− ρs
When A is incorrect, the buyer suffers a variance of utility v > ∆ > 0 from
the endowment v, therefore the good now provides is v −∆ rather than ∆.
Let us consider a price p provided by the seller, in the event that the seller
provides some costly cognition to the buyer s > 0, then the buyers expected
payoff for any given bi is:
piBi = v − p− ρ¯(s, bi)∆− TBi, for i ∈ {1, 2}, (6.8)
where
TBi =
{
TB1(b1) = TB(b1), for i = 1
TB2(b2) = δTB(b2), for i = 2, and, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
(6.9)
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if the seller engages in no cognitive effort then this is denoted:
piBi = v − p− ρˆ(bi)∆− TBi, for i ∈ {1, 2} (6.10)
When 0 < δ < 1, the buyer in period 2, B2, has a cognitive advantage that
for any given probability b2, the cost of acquiring this ‘extra’ reduction in
likelihood that A is not the correct technology is cheaper than for the first
buyer. We justify this by presuming that the level of common-knowledge
about the technology, on the buyer side, may increase with use. This also
forms the basis of our initial hold-up problem, as it is obvious that the second
buyer will have a higher pay-off, in expectations for any given p. We shall
now demonstrate this effect.
The Price Setting Seller Assumption
We consider a seller S who is a price setter with bargaining power such that
he extracts all of the joint surplus of the Buyers. This assumption simplifies
the price setting problem such that the sellers optimal price is that which
maximises their surplus piS and has a boundary such that the buyers must
at least breaking even piBi∈{1,2} ≥ 0.12 The seller anticipates that for a given
buyer Bi∈{1,2}, the highest surplus maybe extracted by the buyer engaging
in cognition and reducing the likelihood of the buyer obtaining v−∆ rather
than ∆. This brings us to our first case when the seller suffers no penalty
for selling A when it is not suitable for a given buyer in one or both periods.
The Tight Margins assumption
Let 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 be the discount rate between period one and period two. Let
the seller incur deterministic cost c1 and c2 in each period for producing the
technology A, the cost c1 + c2 is assumed to be committed. We assume that
profit margins are tight therefore (1− ρ)p ≤ ci∈{1,2} and (1− ρ)p+ ρˆ(b∗)p >
12In the [119] set-up this is setting σ = 1 and hence β = 0.
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ci∈{1,2}, where b∗ is a degree of cognition on the equilibrium path. This
assumption is simply to push our model to a unique solution with both
buyers.
The Price Commitment assumption
Our fundamental assumption, in terms of cultural constraints, is that once
the price is announced by the seller she has to commit to this price across
both time periods. Our evidence from the market is that prices are extremely
sticky, in fact we have found no evidence of a single change in price without
a substantial change in the good on sale. The major reason for this is that
we can think of the product being simultaneously advertised to both B1 and
B2 and the time interval between purchases is effectively the time taken to
licence the technology and deploy the malware. This maybe measured in
a few days. Once B1 has deployed the malware ‘in-the-wild’ then the next
buyer B2 will now be able to view the modality of the technology by simple
observation of its performance for specific tasks on the internet and by the
reaction of security firms in attempting to mitigate its impact. The new
buyer knows their particular requirements and hence they can update their
position on the effectiveness of the malware or the supply of compromised
machines more cheaply than B1.
The need for the seller’s cognition effort
We here consider two cases: in the first the seller does not sustain any cogni-
tion cost. We will show that in this case the first buyer will always want to
go second, and therefore no trade would be initiated. In the second case, the
seller engages in costly cognition to alleviate the costs for buyer one, such
that the revenue buyer one can extract from the trade equals that of the
second buyer.
Our two cases are therefore defined in the following way:
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1. Seller engages in no cognitive effort with either buyer.
piS = (1− ρ)p+ ρˆ(b1)p− c1 + γ((1− ρ)p+ ρˆ(b2)p− c2) (6.11)
2. Seller engages in cognitive effort with first buyer.
piS = (1−ρ)p+ρ¯(s, b1)p−c1−TS(s)+γ((1−ρ)p+ρˆ(b2)p−c2)(6.12)
Proposition 1a: The buyer equality problem When 0 < δ < 1 the the seller
cannot set a unique price p in both periods such that the buyer surpluses
maybe equalized, i.e. piB1 = piB2, for the unique optimal choices of cognition
b1 and b2, denoted b†1 and b
†
2 respectively.
Proposition 1b: The price hold-up problem It follows that even when the
seller has complete bargaining power, when 0 < δ < 1, when the seller sets
when piB1 = 0, for an optimal choice of b1, denoted b
†
1, the surplus of the
second buyer, piB2 will be greater than zero, for the unique optimal choice of
b2, denoted b†2.
Following [119] we constrain ourselves to the cases where v−∆ > 0. The
seller is a price setter able to extract all of the joint surplus, therefore the
maximum available price is that which sets min(piBi(b∗i ) = 0) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
In our set-up the price does not affect the cognition choice, only the trade-off
between TBi(bi) and ρˆ(bi), this is evident as the seller’s statistical model of
the buyer solves separately pi′Bi = 0. For the case when the seller engages
in no cognition s = 0 for either buyer, this yields an optimal cognition of b†i
that satisfies:
T ′Bi(bi) = −
(ρ− 1)ρ
(biρ− 1)2∆, for, i ∈ {1, 2} (6.13)
by definition TB2(b2) = δTB1(b2), where 0 < δ < 1.
Let Ti(bi) = ρˆ(bi)∆+TBi(bi), be the cognition trade-off. The sub-problem
of each buyer is equivalent to b†i , arg minbi Ti(bi). Consider any b†i , i ∈ {1, 2}
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that solves the cognition for the first buyer, we know that by construction
δTB(b
†
1) < TB(b
†
1), hence B2 can always find a b
†
2 ≥ b†1 that provides an
identical or greater reduction in uncertainty for lower cost, as such T2(b†) <
T1(b†),∀0 < b† < 1. Is b†1 = b†2 = 0 cognition a viable optimal point in
equalizing the expected loss of utility to ρ∆ for both B1 and B2? No, as
again by construction of the cognition cost function T ′B(0) = 0, therefore by if
v > ∆ > 0 then it is always better to conduct at least a finite amount of non-
zero cognition, hence b†i > 0, i ∈ {1, 2} and the seller can still find a positive
price p > 0 such that min(piBi) ≥ 0. Therefore, by construction piB1 6= piB2
and T1(b†) < T2(b†) for b† = b†1 = b†2, the lower bound of B′2s optimal
cognition. Furthermore, for any given price p† that the seller optimally sets
for either B1 or B2, the pay-off piB2 will be greater than piB1 as the term
T2(b†2) will always be finite and smaller than T1(b†1)
Hence, from a buyer point of view it is always sub-optimal to be the first
buyer even if the seller sets a price on or above piB1 = 0 as a better payoff can
always be achieved by going second when 0 < δ < 1, similarly if the seller
sets a price to extract the surplus of B2, the surplus of B1 will be negative .
Whilst Proposition 1a and 1b trivially fall out of the model construction, it is
worth noting their implication. When prices are very sticky, it is sub-optimal
to enter into a contract for a good with a potentially random pay-off as a
first buyer. The advent of social learning and hence the ability to conduct
cheaper cognition as a buyer in the second phase results in a natural hold-up
that would not occur if the buyers had equal inter-temporal cognition costs.
Whilst trial period sales are usually a mechanism of reducing the impact of
deviation in consumption (measure by ∆ here) by the buyer at each step we
demonstrate a new mechanism, which is the dissemination of new information
and the ability to cheaply process this after the fact.
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How much surplus is gained by going second?
We have established that Seller Case 1 results in a hold-up as B1 will always
prefer to be B2 as B2 has greater bargaining power than B1 directly because
of the cognition channel. By setting a specific functional form to TB we can
exactly quantify the implicit cognition discount the second buyer receives.
This also provides insight on the trade-offs the seller must make to acquire
the best price given her explicit bargaining power.
Consider now the case whereby we choose p¯ such that piB2 = 0. The
seller’s statistical model of the buyer indicates that his cognition trade-off is
independent of v and p therefore we can set:
p¯ = v−T2(b†2) ≡ v−ρˆ(b†2)∆−TB(b†2), where b†2 , arg min
b2
T2(b2)(6.14)
We know that p¯ is the highest price the seller can charge before B2 drops
out and is therefore the upper boundary on the sellers price range. From
Proposition 2b we know that at p¯, B1 will now be below break-even as
T1(b†1) > T2(b†2).
In contrast the seller can set
¯
p as the lower boundary price under consid-
eration by the seller. By construction of the model this is set to be the price
when piB1 = 0. Because the difference in cognition costs is independent of
the price, the seller will need to compensate the first buyer by T1(b†1)−T2(b†2)
whatever the price of A. The optimal cost of doing this TS(s‡) will be at
least the same at
¯
p as any other price.
However, once the seller engages in cognition, the price cannot exceed p¯ as
this eliminates buyer 2. Is it possible for the seller to engage in cognition and
drive the price above p¯? Yes it is possible; if the seller has a relatively flat
cognition function, when 0 < s < 1 and the likelihood of A not being suitable
is relatively small then the seller can drive the first buyers ρ¯(s, b1) → 0
inexpensively (from the viewpoint of decreasing the revenue from ρ¯(s, b1)p
and increasing costs associated with TS(s)). Subsequently the buyers choice
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of cognition b1 will also tend to zero, limb1→0 TB(b1) = 0 and hence the break
even price the seller can charge and still leave B1 at break-even tends to v.
We eliminate this case by appealing to our ‘Tight-Margins’ assumption, that
is the seller must sell to both buyers, rather than using cheap cognition to
eliminate B2 and extract maximum revenue from B1.
The seller’s optimization problem now appears more complex. In the first
case the seller had no direct control over the first and second buyers cognition,
however this led to no single price equalising the surplus of both buyers and
hence a hold–up. Now that the seller chooses to engage in non-zero cognition
to equalise the first buyers costs, she now directly impacts her own surplus
by directly influencing the probability that the first buyer will not be in error
in choosing A, by increasing s, she pushes the term ρ¯(s, b†1)p towards zero
and hence she pushes her own profit towards her cost constraint c1 in period
1.
Let us assume that the seller engages in non-zero cognition and transfers
this to the buyer, then B1 will adjust their choice of cognition b1 to a new
optimum b‡1 by solving:
∂TB1(b1)
∂b1
= −∂ρ¯(b1)
∂b1
∆ ≡ − (ρ− 1)ρ(s− 1)
(bρ(s− 1)− ρs+ 1)2∆.
Recall that the seller does not influence ρˆ(b†2)p in this instance. Furthermore,
recall that as the seller pushes the term ρˆ(b†2)∆ lower she can now extract
more surplus from the buyer at cost TS(s) to herself. However, we can see
by simple inspection that the constraint:
T1(b†1)− T2(b†2) = ∆(ρˆ(b†1)− ρ¯(s‡, b‡1)) + TB(b‡1)− δTB(b†2) (6.15)
is required to solve for the required amount of cognition, regardless of price.
Whilst depending on the functional form of TB(b1), the optimal s‡ might
simplify, the strict ordering to ensure the seller creates maximum extractable
surplus for the buyer requires s‡ to be solved backwards from b‡. Recall that
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the seller has buying power, so the best s may not be the joint minimization
of T˜ 1(s, b1) = ρ¯(s, b1)∆ + TB(b1). To ensure that she chooses the smallest
viable s she rearranges the constraint in (6.15) to give b‡1 as a function of
s. The joint solution with (6.15) is the unique level of cognition needed to
provide B1 with the same cognition cost – error trade-off as B2, who benefits
from the global improvement in technology cognition through the factor δ.
Quantifying the trade-off
We will now investigate a case where the seller is will engage in cognition
in order to overcome the hold-up. We will then quantify the boundary at
which cognition is now too expensive for the seller to overcome the hold-up
and still at least break-even.
It is useful at this juncture to place a functional form on TB(·) and TS(·)
so that we can illustrate the trade-offs and simplify the discussion for our
approach to the re-contracting phase. An obvious choice for TB(·) isHz2/(1−
z2). To ensure analytical tractability, we specify:
Tj(z) =
{
Hjz
1−z 0 < z ≤ 1
Hjz
2
1−z2 z = 0
, j ∈ {B, S}, (6.16)
this enforces an interior solution on the problem, but permits a tractable
solution, where Hjj ∈ {B, S} is a scale parameter that we will refer to as
the “scale of costs”. In general we will focus on the b† > 0, therefore the
solutions to T ′B(b1) = −ρˆ′(b1)∆ are constrained to cases when
HB < −∆(ρ2 − ρ) (6.17)
similarly, when the seller engages cognition with the first buyer and sets
0 > s > 1, we restrict ourselves to analyzing the cases where
HB < −∆ρ
2 − ρ− ρ2s+ ρs
ρ2s2 − 2ρs+ 1 . (6.18)
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The constraints are needed to ensure that the TB(z) function forces a solution
within the 0 < bi < 1. The more general interpretation of this is that
if cognition is relatively expensive for 0 < bi < 0 then this ceases to be
the major issue for the contracting phase. Furthermore, for (6.18), we can
substitute for s the functional form for s‡, to compute the upper bound on
HB.
The optimal cognition bundle with and without seller cognition effort
It is helpful in the following discussion to specify the following pair of auxil-
iary functions that form components of the optimal solutions for bi∈{1,2}.
Hi =
√
−δi∆HB(ρ− 1)3ρ, (6.19)
where,
{
δi = 1, i = 1
δi = δ, i = 2
Dj = ρ(sj − 1)(∆(1− ρ) + δiHBρ(sj − 1)), (6.20)
where,
{
sj = 0, j = 0
sj = s, j = s
we can interpret Hi/Dj as the relative probabilistic advantage of choosing
a particular level of b relative to the costs (again in probability equivalents)
created by the uncertainty in the quality of A. When the seller engages in
no cognition, Seller Case 1 and the functional form of TB(z) is as specified
in (6.16) then the optimal choice of bi for each of the buyers is given by:
b†i =
1
D0 (∆(ρ− 1)ρ+ δiHBρ+H1), for, i ∈ {1, 2} (6.21)
where ∆ and HB are subjective to the conditions specified in (6.17). For
Seller Case 2 when s is non-zero the optimal choice of b1 is given by:
b‡1 =
1
Ds (ρ(s− 1)(∆(1− ρ) +HB(ρs− 1)) +H1) (6.22)
it is relatively trivial to show that b† is always greater than b‡ when 0 < δ < 1
and hence T1(b†) > T1(b‡). The optimal solution for B2 will be the same as
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B1 in both Seller Case 1 and Seller Case 2, which is the rearrangement of
the solution for b†1 with δH instead of H. To compute the optimal cognition
s that the seller should choose to ensure that B1 and B2 receive the same
pay-offs we replace the optimal solutions for b†1 and b
†
2 and b
‡
1 into (6.15) and
solve for s‡, this is our next proposition.
Proposition 2: The seller’s optimal level of cognition
When TB(z) is defined as in (6.16), the Sellers required cognition s‡ needed
to equalise the expected surplus of B1 and B2 is determined by
s‡ = ±
2
√
∆(ρ− 1)2ρ2 (∆(ρ− 1)2 − 12H1 −HB(ρ+ δ − 1)(ρ− 1))
HB(ρ− 1)ρ2
+
2∆(ρ− 1)
HBρ
− H1
2HB(ρ− 1)ρ −
δ − 1
ρ
(6.23)
Notice that both roots of (6.23) can provide a solution to s† in the 0 < s‡ < 1
domain, the seller would obviously choose the lower s.
We have not yet optimized the sellers pay-off explicitly. This is because
the highest available price p† can be already charged to buyer B2 and at this
stage the cognition is solely dependent on the first buyers relative cognitive
disadvantage to the second buyer. Furthermore, the optimal cognition choice
for the second buyer is, by construction, not affected by the price. Hence, for
the seller, if cognition is the only mechanism of discount then for any higher
price the seller violates the ‘tight margins’ constraint as B2 will drop out.
Furthermore, the hold-up discount needed by B1 is not connected to the price
at all, cognition apart, he is ex-ante identical to B2, so the only driver for the
degree of s needed by B1 in order to motivate him to transact in period one
is the relative cognition costs. As such s‡ is the required level of cognition
needed to ensure that buyers do not strictly prefer to go second. However,
the level of s‡ may not be consistent with the break-even requirement of the
seller. We shall now explore the implication and observe how a social planner
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can set a re-contracting penalty that increases the domain of solutions over
which pairs of two period buyers and sellers can enter into arrangements that
overcome cognition based hold-up problems.
The seller’s cost constraint
Following convention we assume that the seller only enters into a contract
when piS ≥ 0. It is trivial to show that by inspection there is a critical upper
level on HS, after which the seller finds the process of cognition too expensive
to equalize the pay-offs of both B1 and B2 hence overcoming the hold-up.
This upper bound denoted H¯S is given by
H¯S =
s‡ − 1
s‡
c1 − (s
‡ − 1)
∆(ρ− 1)4s‡ (∆ρ(ρ− 1)
2 +
+Hs(−(ρ− 1)(δHB − ρv + v)−H1),
where Hs =
√
∆HB(ρ− 1)3ρ(s‡ − 1)), therefore for any given configuration
of the structural parameters v, ρ, δ, c1,HB and ∆, seller cognition costs above
H¯S result in a systematic cognition hold-up that the seller cannot overcome
whilst still at least breaking even. We can interpret seller cognition costs
beyond this boundary as a market failure as systematically buyers will prefer
to delay going first and sellers cannot provide enough cognition to discount
B1.
The role of the board moderator
A simple case exists where the cost of cognition for the seller is high enough
that they cannot provide enough of a cognition discount to B1 to prevent
delay without violating the sellers expectation of at least breaking even. For
a criminal market any promise or requirement by a social planner is, of course,
incomplete. By their very nature a buyer within a criminal market cannot
enforce a re-contracting phase so that the seller provides and adjustment
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to compensate for the variance from v to v − ∆. Let us assume that re-
contracting costs for the seller to provide an adjustment are given by λ(a),
where a is a proportion of ∆ recouped by the Buyer if A is not suitable.
Alternatively, we can think of a as a promised transfer of surplus from the
seller to the buyer ex-post.
Let us consider a cognition cost coefficient H∗S > H¯S. Here the cost of
cognition for the seller needed to discount the initial buyers is too high. If B1
believes that the seller will provide appropriate adjustment or compensation
then the seller can reduce their costly cognition by promising an ex-post
correction upon discovery of whether A is suitable for the buyer. Given that
both the buyer and seller assumes that ex-post all contracts are incomplete
there is a commitment issue. If the seller provides a guarantee of offsetting
an a- priori agreed fraction after the buyer has taken possession of A then the
buyer will not trust that this off-set will be delivered as there is no mechanism
to enforce the contract. Similarly, if the seller provides collateral (for instance
a trial discount) then they have no guarantee that the buyer will pay for the
full value of the good, if A turns out to be suitable.
However, if the seller and buyer can provide guarantees the seller will be
able to find a solution to the H∗S > H¯S. Furthermore, the seller will, in all
likelihood, be able to rebalance the expected surplus of the buyer and seller
at a cheaper rate, even if H∗S is not greater than H¯S. However, at this stage it
is instructive to address the stage at which the seller must be able to provide
this guarantee in order to ensure an initial sale to B1. The sellers objective
is to finance (via cognition or compensation)
T1(b†1)− T2(b†2) =
1
(ρ− 1)2 (2(H1 −H2) +HB(δ + ρ− δρ− 1)) (6.24)
as cheaply as possible. This is achievable by compensating a∆ with proba-
bility ρ¯(s, b1) ex-post or by cognition ∆(ρˆ(b†1)− ρ¯(s, b1)) + TB(b†1)− TB(b∗1).
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Therefore the seller needs to discount the buyer by
ρˆ(b†)∆ + TB(b†)− ρ¯(b∗1, s∗)(∆− a∗∆)− TB(b∗1) = T1(b†1)− T2(b†2)(6.25)
In this case we have one constraint and two decision variables a and s chosen
by the seller and the anticipated b1 from the sellers statistical model of the
first buyer.
Proposition 3: Existence of the buyer’s optimal compensation and cognition
bundle
When the cognition function TB(z) is as defined in (6.16) if the seller can
provide a full commitment to B1, then from the sellers statistical model of
the buyer the optimal choice of cognition for the seller is given by:
b∗1(a
∗, s) =
1
Daρ(s− 1)((a
∗ − 1)∆(ρ− 1) + (6.26)
+HB(ρs− 1)) + 1√
δDa
√
(a∗ − 1)(s− 1)H1
where Da = ρ(s− 1)((a− 1)∆(ρ− 1) +HBρ) the seller’s optimal choice of
compensation, denoted a∗, for a given level of s by:
a∗(s) =
1
4∆(ρ− 1)2ρ(s− 1) × (6.27)
4(δ + ρs− 1)H1 +HB(ρ− 1)(δ + ρs− 1)2 +
−4∆ρ(ρ− 1)2(δ + s− 1)
Further substitution into the expression for the buyer profit function, denoted
piS(a
∗(s), b∗(a∗, s)), permits a one dimensional optimization with respect to
the optimal cognition s∗. The expression for s∗ can be derived analytically.
We provide its formulation in the internet Appendix.
Conclusion 4 By showing that a cognition bundle exists that solves the
model, we showed that the market is sustainable. We therefore accept Hy-
pothesis 2.
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Chapter 7
Risk-based Policies for Vulnerability
Management
The analyses proposed in the previous Chapter all strongly support the idea
that vulnerability exploitation and attacker preference can represent a signif-
icant factor to think of more efficient risk-based vulnerability management
practices as opposed to current criticality-based practices. We therefore pro-
ceed in testing our last running hypothesis:
Running Hypothesis Hypotheses Testing
Hyp. 3. It is possible to construct
risk-based policies that, levereging the
economic nature of the attacker, can
greatly improve over criticality-based
policies.
Corollary to Hyp. 3 Risk-based policies account-
ing for cybercrime markets are the most effective in
reducing risk for the final user.
Develop a case control study to evaluate the over-
all risk-reduction of risk based and criticality based
vulnerability management policies. A validating ex-
ample outlines the benefits of risk-based policies over
criticality based ones in terms of patching workloads
and effectiveness in foiling real attacks in the wild.
In the following we present our case control methodology to assess the
effectiveness of a vulnerability management policy, and show that risk-based
policies outperform by far current criticality-based ones in terms of patching
efficiency. In particular, we:
1. Introduce the ‘case-control study’ as a fully-replicable methodology to
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soundly analyze vulnerability and exploit data.
2. Check the suitability of the current use of the CVSS score as a risk
metric by comparing it against exploits recorded in the wild and by
performing a break-down analysis of its characteristics and values.
3. We use the case-control study methodology to show and measure how
the current criticality-based CVSS practice can be improved by consid-
ering additional risk factors defining a risk-based policy. To do this, we
provide a quantitative measure of the reduction in risk of exploitation
yield by the resulting policies.
7.1 Risk-based vs Criticality-based Policies
Following the analysis provided in Chapter 6 we conclude that cost of exploit
and existence of the exploit in the underground markets are significant factors
for likelihood of exploitation. In order to measure these factors, we account
for:
1. The existence of a proof-of- concept exploit that lowers the attacker’s
cost to deploy a working exploit (Section 6.1).
2. The existence of technology traded in the black markets that bundles
the exploit (Section 6.2.1-6.2).
This, in combination with a criticality measure, results in the definition
of a risk-based policy that accounts for both the likelihood of exploitation
and the criticality of the vulnerability. Table 7.1 reports the criticality-based
and risk-based policies we consider here. Whereas a criticality-based policy
relies solely on the CVSS score, a risk- based policy leverages the presence
of a risk factor as an indicator of likelihood of exploitation. This gives a risk
estimation of the vulnerability that corresponds more closely to the classic
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Table 7.1: Criticality-based and risk-based policies.
Policy type Policy name Likelihood measure Criticality measure
Criticality-based CVSS - CVSS score
Risk-based PoC Existence of a proof-
of-concept exploit
CVSS score
Risk-based BMar Presence of the exploit
in the black markets
CVSS Score
Risk = likelihood × impact definition of risk. To measure the risk factors
for BMar and PoC we use the information reported in the EKITS and EDB
datasets respectively.
7.2 Randomized Case-Control Study
Randomized Block Design Experiments (or Controlled Experiments) are com-
mon frameworks used to measure the effectiveness of a treatment over a sam-
ple of subjects. These designs aim at measuring a certain variable of interest
by isolating factors that may influence the outcome of the experiment, and
leave to randomization other factors of not primary importance. However, in
some cases practical and ethical concerns may make an experiment impossi-
ble to perform.
When an experiment is not applicable, an alternative solution is to per-
form a retrospective analysis in which the cases (people with a known illness)
are compared with a random population of controls clustered in ‘blocks’ (ran-
domly selected patients with the same characteristics). These retrospective
analyses are called randomized case-control studies and are in many respects
analogous to their experimental counterpart. A famous application of this
methodology is the 1950 study by [45], where the authors showed the corre-
lation between smoking habits and the presence or absence of cancer of the
lungs by performing a case-control study with data on hospitalization. We
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revisit this methodology to assess whether a vulnerability risk factor (like
the CVSS score) can be a good predictor for vulnerability exploitation, and
whether it can be improved by additional information.
We start by giving the reader some terminology:
• Cases. The cases of a control study are the subjects that present the
observed effect. For example, in the medical domain the cases could
be the patients whose status has been ascertained to be ‘sick’. In a
computer security scenario, a ‘case’ could be a vulnerability that has
been exploited in the wild. For us a case is therefore a vulnerability in
SYM.
• Explanatory variable or risk factor. A risk factor is an effect that can
explain the presence (or increase in likelihood) of the illness (or attack).
Considered risk factors for cancer may be smoking habits or pollution.
As reported in Table 7.1, for vulnerability exploitation we consider the
existence of a Proof-of-Concept exploit (vuln ∈ EDB) and the presence
of an exploit in the black markets (vuln ∈ EKITS).
• Confounding variables are other variables that, combined with a risk
factor, may be an alternative explanations for the effect, or correlate
with its observation. For example, patient age or sex may be confound-
ing factors for some types of cancer. In our case the existence of an
exploit in SYM may depend on factors such as type of vulnerability
impact, time of disclosure, and affected software.
• Control group. A control group is a group of subjects chosen at random
from a population with similar characteristics (e.g. age, social status,
location) to the cases. In the original design of a case-control study, the
control group was composed of healthy people only. However, with that
application of the case-control study we can only ascertain whether the
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risk factor of interest has a greater incidence for the cases than for the
controls. We relax this condition and leave open the (random) chance
that cases get included in the control group. This relaxation allows
us to perform additional computations on our samples (namely CVSS
sensitivity, specificity and risk reduction). This, however, introduces
(random) noise in the generated data. To address this issue, we perform
the analysis with bootstrapping.
• Bootstrapping. A classic statistical significance test allows the researcher
to relax certain conditions on the linear relationship between dependent
variables (our cases) and independent variables (our hypotheses, or risk
factors). However, the precision of these tests often depends on the un-
derlying data distribution, that need be known. In our case the real
data generation process (DGP) underlying our observations is however
unknown: we do not have a precise model of the engineering of an
exploit, its delivery in the wild, and of the probability distribution of
detection by Symantec. Bootstrapping is a statistical technique that
allows us to overcome this problem by re-sampling cases, with replace-
ment, from our distribution of exploits in the wild. The Fundamental
Theorem of Statistics guarantees, in fact, that with enough random and
independent extractions from a distribution, the ‘empirical distribution
function’ (EDF) that is obtained converges to the real one [43], as does
the statistic of interest (e.g. the mean, or a p-value). Therefore, by
bootstrapping our sample, we can compute our statistics over an EDF
that converges asymptotically with the real distribution of exploits in
the wild (that we can not observe). This improves the statistical effi-
ciency of our estimation, and therefore the precision of our conclusions.
Confounding variables Deciding which confounding factors to include in a
case-control study is usually left to the intuition and experience of the re-
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searcher [45]. Because SYM is the ‘critical point’ of our study (as it reports
our cases), we consulted with Symantec to decide which factors to consider
as confounding. While this list can not be considered an exhaustive one,
we believe that the identified variables capture the most important aspects
of the inclusion of a vulnerability in SYM. In the following we discuss the
confounding variables we choose and the enforcement of the respective con-
trolling procedure:
• Year. Symantec’s commitment in reporting exploited CVEs may change
with time. After a detailed conversation with Symantec it emerged that
the inclusion of a CVE in an attack signature is an effort on Symantec’s
side aimed at enhancing the usefulness of their datasets. Specifically,
Symantec recently opened a data sharing program called WINE whose
aim is to share attack data with security researchers [47]. The data
included in the WINE dataset spans from 2009 to the present date.
Given the explicit sharing nature of their WINE program, we consider
vulnerabilities disclosed after 2009 to be better represented in SYM. We
therefore consider only those in our study.
Enforcement: Unfortunately vulnerability time data in NVD is very
noisy due to how the vulnerability disclosure mechanism works [105, 81].
For this reason, an exact match for the disclosure date of the sampled
vulnerability svi and the SYM vulnerability vi is undesirable. In our case
a coarse time data granularity is enough, as we only need to cover the
years in which Symantec actively reported attacked CVEs. We therefore
enforce this control by first selecting for sampling only vulnerabilities
whose disclosure dates span from 2009 on, and then by performing an
exact match in the year of disclosure between svi and vi.
• Impact type. Our analysis (Section 5.1.1) showed that some CIA
types are more common in SYM than elsewhere (e.g. CIA=‘CCC’).
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An explanation for this may be that attackers contrasted by Symantec
may prefer to attack vulnerabilities that allow them to execute arbitrary
code rather than ones that enables them to get only a partial access on
the file system. We therefore also control for the CVSS Confidentiality,
Integrity and Availability assessments.
Enforcement: The CVSS framework provides a precise assessments of
the CIA impact. We therefore perform an exact match between the CIA
values of the sampled vulnerability svi and that of vi (in SYM).
In addition, we ‘sanitize’ the data by Software. Symantec is a security
market leader and provides a variety of security solutions but its largest
market share is in the consumer market. In particular, the data in SYM
is referenced to the malware and attack signatures included in commercial
products that are often installed on consumer machines. These are typically
Microsoft Windows machines running commodity software like Microsoft Of-
fice and internet plugins like Adobe Flash or Oracle Java1 [46]. Because of
this selection problem, SYM may represent only a subset of all the software
reported in NVD, EDB or EKITS.
Enforcement: Unfortunately no standardized way to report vulnerability
software names in NVD exists, and this makes it impossible to directly control
this confounding variable. For example, CVE-2009-0559 (in SYM) is reported
in NVD as a “Stack-based buffer overflow in Excel”, but the main affected
software reported is (Microsoft) Office. In contrast, CVE-2010-1248 (in SYM
as well) is a “Buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel” and is reported as an
Excel vulnerability. Thus, performing a perfect string match for the software
variable would exclude from the selection relevant vulnerabilities affecting
the same software but reporting different software names.
1Unix software is also included in SYM. However we do not consider this sample to be representative
of Unix exploited vulnerabilities.
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The problem with software names extends beyond this. Consider for ex-
ample a vulnerability in Webkit, an HTML engine used in many browsers
(e.g. Safari, Chrome, and Opera). Because Webkit is a component of other
software, a vulnerability in Apple Safari might also be a Webkit vulnerability
in Google Chrome.
For these reasons, to match the ‘software’ string when selecting svi would
introduce unknown error in the data. We can therefore only perform a ‘best
effort’ approach by checking that the software affected by svi is included in
the list of software for ∀vi ∈ SYM . In this work software is therefore used
as a ‘sanitation’ variable rather than a proper control.
7.2.1 Experiment run
We divide our experiment in two parts: sampling and execution. In the
former we generate the samples from NVD, EDB and EKITS. In the latter
we compute the relevant statistics on the samples. What follows is a textual
description of these processes.
Sampling To create the samples, we first select a vulnerability vi from SYM
and set the controls according to the values of the confounding variables
for vi. Then, for each of NVD, EDB and EKITS we randomly select, with
replacement, a sample vulnerability svi that satisfies the conditions defined
by vi. We then include svi in the list of selected vulnerabilities for that
dataset sample. We repeat this procedure for all vulnerabilities in SYM. The
sampling has been performed with the statistical tool R-CRAN [96]. Our R
script to replicate the analysis is available on our Lab’s webpage2.
Execution Once we collected our samples, we compute the frequency with
which each risk factor identifies a vulnerability in SYM. Our output is repre-
2https://securitylab.disi.unitn.it/doku.php?id=software
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Table 7.2: Output format of our experiment.
Risk Factor level v ∈ SYM v 6∈ SYM
Above Threshold a b
Below Threshold c d
Table 7.3: Sample thresholds
CVSS ≥ 6
CVSS ≥ 9
CVSS ≥ 9 & v ∈
EDB
CVSS ≥ 9 & v ∈
EKITS
sented in Table 7.2. Each risk factor is defined by a CVSS threshold level t in
combination with the existence of a proof-of-concept exploit (v ∈ EDB) or of
a black-marketed exploit (v ∈ EKITS). Examples of thresholds for different
risk factors are reported in Table 7.3. We run our experiment for all CVSS
thresholds ti with i ∈ [1..10]. For each risk factor we evaluate the number of
vulnerabilities in the sample that fall above and below the CVSS threshold,
and that are included (or not included) in SYM: the obtained table reports
the count of vulnerabilities that each risk factor correctly and incorrectly
identifies as ‘at high risk of exploit’ (∈ SYM) or ‘at low risk of exploit’ ( 6∈
SYM).
The computed values depend on the random sampling process. In an
extreme case we may therefore end up, just by chance, with a sample con-
taining only vulnerabilities in SYM and below the current threshold (i.e.
[a = 0; b = 0; c = 1277; d = 0]). Such an effect would be likely due to chance
alone. To mitigate this we repeat, for every risk factor, the whole experi-
ment run 400 times and keep the median of the results. We choose this limit
because we observed that around 300 repetitions the distribution of results
is already markedly Gaussian. Any statistic reported here to be intended as
the median of the generated distribution of values.
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7.2.2 Parameters of the analysis
Sensitivity and specificity In the medical domain, the sensitivity of a test is
the conditional probability of the test giving positive results when the illness
is present. The specificity of the test is the conditional probability of the test
giving negative result when there is no illness. Sensitivity and specificity are
also known as True Positive Rate (TPR) and True Negatives Rate (TNR)
respectively. High values for both TNR and TPR identify a good test3. In our
context, we want to assess to what degree a positive result from our current
test (the CVSS score) matches the illness (the vulnerability being actually
exploited in the wild and tracked in SYM). The sensitivity and specificity
measures are computed as:
Sensitivity = P (v’s Risk factor above t| v ∈ SYM) = a/(a+ c) (7.1)
Specificity = P (v’s Risk factor below t| v 6∈ SYM) = d/(b+ d) (7.2)
where t is the threshold. Sensitivity and specificity outline the performance
of the test in identifying exploits, but say little about its effectiveness in
terms of diminished risk.
Risk Reduction To understand the effectiveness of a policy we adopt an
approach similar to that used in [49] to estimate the effectiveness of seat
belts in preventing fatalities. In Evan’s case, the ‘effectiveness’ was given
by the difference in the probability of having a fatal car crash when wear-
ing a seatbelt and when not wearing it (Pr(Death & Seat belt on) −
Pr(Death & not Seat belt on)).
In our case, we measure the ability of a risk factor to predict the actual
3Some may prefer the False Positive Rate (FPR) to the TNR. Note that TNR=1-FPR (as in our case
d/(b + d) = 1 − b/(b + d)). We choose to report the TNR here because 1) it has the same direction of
the TPR (higher is better); 2) it facilitates the identification of the threshold with the best trade-off by
intersecting TPR.
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Figure 7.1: Sensitivity (solid line) and specificity (dotted line) levels for different CVSS
thresholds. The red line identifies the threshold for PCI DSS compliance (cvss = 4).
The green line identifies the threshold between LOW and MEDIUM+HIGH vulnerabilities
(cvss = 6). No CVSS configuration, regardless of the inclusion of additional risk factors,
achieves satisfactory levels of Specificity and Sensitivity simultaneously.
exploit in the wild. Formally, the risk reduction is calculated as:
RR = P (v ∈ SYM |v’s Risk factor above t)−P (v ∈ SYM |v’s Risk factor below t)(7.3)
therefore RR = a/(a+ b)− c/(c+ d). An high risk reduction identifies risk
factors that clearly discern between high-risk and low-risk vulnerabilities, and
are therefore good decision variables to act upon: the most effective strategy
is identified by the risk factor with the highest risk reduction.
7.2.3 Results
Sensitivity and specificity Figure 7.1 reports the sensitivity and specificity
levels respective to different CVSS thresholds. The solid line and the dotted
line report the Sensitivity and the Specificity respectively. The vertical red
line marks the CVSS threshold fixed by the PCI DSS standard (cvss = 4).
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Table 7.4: Risk Reduction and significance levels for our risk factors PoC and BMar.
Significance is indicated as follows: A **** indicates the Bonferroni-corrected equivalent
of p < 1E−4; *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; nothing is reported for other values.
Factor RR 95% RR conf. int. Significance
PoC 36% 35% ; 38% ****
BMar 46% 44% ; 48% ****
The green vertical line marks the threshold that separates LOW CVSS vul-
nerabilities from MEDIUM+HIGH CVSS vulnerabilities (cvss = 6). Unsurpris-
ingly, low CVSS scores show a very low specificity, as most non-exploited
vulnerabilities are above the threshold. With increasing CVSS thresholds,
the specificity measure gets better without sensibly affecting sensitivity. The
best trade-off obtainable with the sole CVSS score is achieved with a thresh-
old of eight, where specificity grows over 30% and sensitivity sets at around
80%. To further increase the threshold causes the sensitivity measure to
collapse. In EKITS, because most vulnerabilities in the black markets are
exploited and their CVSS scores are high, the specificity measure can not
significantly grow without collapsing sensitivity.
Risk reduction First, we analyse the significance of our risk factors alone,
i.e. the significance of PoC and BMar over the patching decision. Table
7.4 reports the RR results for our risk factors alone, without considering
the criticality level indicated by the CVSS score. This gives us a measure
of the significance of the risk factors in the vulnerability assessment. The
entailed RR is high in both cases, with BMar performing better than PoC.
We therefore can conclude that the Black Markets represent a significant
risk factor for vulnerability exploitation. Similarly, PoC-based policies can
achieve satisfactory Risk Reduction levels at a high significance. Yet, BMar
and PoC are only measures for ‘likelihood’ of exploitation and, considered by
themselves, are not yet qualified to be employed as risk metrics. To achieve
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Figure 7.2: Risk reduction (RR) entailed by different risk factors. The Black Markets
represent the most important risk factor with an entailed RR of up to 80%. The existence
of a proof-of-concept exploit is significant as well and is stable at a 40% level. The CVSS
score alone is never significant and its median RR lays in the whereabouts of 4%.
this, we couple our risk factors with the CVSS assessment on the vulnerability
criticality. We expect the RR levels to increase significantly.
In Figure 7.2 we report our results on risk reduction (RR) for each risk
factor coupled with all CVSS levels. The mere CVSS score (green squares),
irrespectively of its threshold level, always defines a poor patching policy with
very low risk reduction. The existence of a public proof-of-concept exploit
confirms its significance as a risk factor, yielding higher risk reduction levels
(40%). As expected, this is also an improvement over the sole use of PoC
without considering vulnerability criticality. The presence of an exploit in
the black markets is the most effective risk factor to consider; in the case
of BMar, the maximum risk reduction (80%) is achieved at CVSS levels
within the interval [5, 7]. Outside of these boundaries the risk factor becomes
insignificant; we can conclude that attackers do not trade vulnerabilities in
the black markets below a CVSS score of 5, and trade vulnerabilities above
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Table 7.5: Risk Reduction for a sample of thresholds. Risk Reduction of vulnerability
exploitation depending on policy and information at hand (CVSS, PoC, Markets). Sig-
nificance is reported by a Bonferroni-corrected Fisher Exact test (data is sparse) for three
comparison (CVSS vs CVSS+PoC vs CVSS+BMar) per experiment [29]. A **** indi-
cates the Bonferroni-corrected equivalent of p < 1E − 4; *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01;
* p < 0.05; nothing is reported for other values. Non-significant results indicate risk
factors that perform indistinguishably at marking ‘high risk’ vulnerabilities than random
selection.
Policy Type Policy RR 95% RR conf. int. Significance
Criticality-based
CVSS ≥4 1% -35% ; 19%
CVSS ≥6 4% -5% ; 12%
CVSS ≥9 8% 1% ; 15%
Risk-based
CVSS ≥4 + PoC 45% 42% ; 49%
CVSS ≥6 + PoC 42% 38% ; 48% ****
CVSS ≥9 + PoC 42% 36% ; 49% ****
CVSS ≥4 + BMar - -
CVSS ≥6 + Bmar 80% 80% ; 81% *
CVSS ≥9 + Bmar 24% 23% ; 29%
a CVSS of 7 irrespective of their actual CVSS level.
Table 7.5 reports the numerical Risk Reduction for a sample of thresholds.
A CVSS score of four, as indicated by PCI-DSS, entails a risk reduction that
is never significant, even when integrated with the PoC and BMar risk factors.
In the PoC case, we have a median RR of 45%, but no significance because
there is effectively no vulnerability with a PoC and below a CVSS threshold
of 4. The CVSS threshold becomes therefore insignificant with respect to the
distribution of exploits. This holds true also on the BMar case. We therefore
conclude that setting a CVSS threshold of 4 has no statistical value. On
the contrary, a CVSS score of six is more significant, but only when coupled
with our risk factors: CVSS≥6 alone entails a Risk Reduction of 4%; the
performance is slightly better, but still unsatisfactory, if the threshold is
raised to nine. Overall, CVSS’ Risk Reduction stays below 10% for most
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thresholds. Even by considering the 95% confidence interval, we can conclude
that CVSS-only based policies may be unsatisfactory from a risk-reduction
point of view. Unsurprisingly, the test with the CVSS score alone results in
very high p-values, that in this case testify that CVSS as a risk factor does
not mark high risk vulnerabilities any better than random selection would
do. We therefore conclude that criticality-based vulnerability mitigation is
ineffective in identifying vulnerabilities to patch with high priority.
The existence of a proof-of-concept exploit (PoC) improves greatly the
performance of the policy: with ‘CVSS ≥ 6 + PoC’ a RR of 42% can be
achieved with very high statistical significance. This result is comparable to
wearing a seat belt while driving, which entails a 43% reduction in risk [49].
The highest risk reduction (80%) is obtained by considering the existence of
an exploit in the black markets. The significance for BMar with a CVSS ≥
9 is below the threshold (p = 0.19).
7.3 Effectiveness of Risk-Based Policies
We now evaluate the effectiveness of risk-based policies by measuring the
reduction in workload and the number of foiled attacks they entail. We
will focus on the advantages in this terms entailed by risk-based policies as
opposed to criticality-based policies.
Policy workload. Each policy may require different levels of effort to
be implemented. For example, the same vulnerability could be present in
hundreds of machine or could reside in a server for which a 1 hour downtime
is already too much. This information is company dependent and therefore we
can not consider it here. We discuss in Chapter 8 how the whole framework
can be lifted to include this (and adjust the risk notion accordingly). We
consider here a simpler proxy for cost, that is the number of vulnerabilities
that should be considered by each policy (workload). The cost-effectiveness
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Table 7.6: No. of vulnerabilities to fix by policy.
Policy Workload
All 14380
CV SS ≥ 4 13715
CV SS ≥ 6 8341
CV SS ≥ 9 3081
PoC 3030
PoC + CV SS ≥ 4 3004
PoC + CV SS ≥ 6 2416
PoC + CV SS ≥ 9 550
BMar 58
BMar + CV SS ≥ 4 58
BMar + CV SS ≥ 6 54
BMar + CV SS ≥ 9 48
of a policy is then reflected in the relation between workload and the volume
of attacks in the wild the policy thwarts.
Workloads for our policies over a sample of vulnerabilities are reported in
Table 7.6. The full set comprises 14380 vulnerabilites, 3030 of which have
a PoC and 58 are in BMar. The workloads decrease with increasing CVSS
threshold as more vulnerabilities to ‘ignore’ fall below the CVSS level.
7.3.1 Potential of Attack (pA)
In order to better visualize and independently validate the effectiveness of
the selection of policies based on risk reduction we introduce a new notion
to capture the number of attacks that would be thwarted by deploying it.
In chemistry, the pH of a solution is a function of the concentration in
hydrogen ions [H+]. To be precise, it is an empirical measure of the capacity
of the hydrogen ions to be involved in chemical reactions (and therefore
determine the degree of acidity of a solution). Because the concentration of
these ions is typically low, pH is calculated as the logarithm of the inverse
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of [H+]. More formally, pH = log10 1[H+] .
We define pA as an empirical measure of the potential for attack of a
vulnerability. Specifically, we define pA as the base ten logarithm of the
volume of attacks in the wild received by 106 machines (i.e. those sampled
in the WINE dataset). We define
pA = log10(Av) (7.4)
where Av is the number of attacks observed in the wild for the vulnerability
v. The reason we choose a base 10 logarithm is that this allows us to make
a direct comparison of the volume of recorded attacks with the number of
machines in the wild potentially affected by it. Further, this gives a more
immediate intuition of the diverse order of magnitude of attacks (e.g. an
attack with pA = 6 is ten times more common than one with pA = 5).4
For example, a pA of 6 indicates that the attack has the potential to be
distributed to every machine included in the dataset. In WINE pA ranges in
[0..7.5]. Its distribution has two modes at pA = 1 and pA = 6. The median
pA is 1.6.
7.3.2 Quantification of patching workloads and pA reduction
Table 7.7 reports the fraction of patching workload entailed by the policy
and the reduction in pA. At first glance we see that most of the reported pA
columns have the same value across the rows. It should be noticed that the
actual values are not equal. pA is a logarithm in base 10 and it is truncated to
the first decimal. It offers a bird’s eye view on the attacks, eliminating most
of the noise. It shows that there is very little difference in the magnitude
of foiled attacks between ‘high-workload’ policies and ‘low-workload’ ones.
4Bases other than base ten could have been chosen for pA. For example, e is a base commonly
used in econometrics to define likelihood measures [43]. However, this does not allow, without further
transformations, for a direct comparison between different volume of attacks and attacked machines, and
does not give a direct intuition of the relative distances between attacks with different pA.
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Table 7.7: Workloads and reduction in pA for each policy. Risk-based policies allow for
an almost complete coverage of the attack potential in the wild with a fraction of the
effort entailed by a criticality-based policy.
Policy Type Policy Workload Foiled pA
Criticality-based
All 100% 6.8
CVSS ≥ 4 95% 6.8
CVSS ≥ 6 58% 6.7
CVSS ≥ 9 21% 6.7
Risk-based
PoC 21% 6.5
PoC+ CVSS ≥ 4 21% 6.5
PoC+ CVSS ≥ 6 17% 6.5
PoC+ CVSS ≥ 9 4% 6.5
BMar <1% 6.3
BMar+ CVSS ≥ 4 <1% 6.3
BMar+ CVSS ≥ 6 <1% 6.3
BMar+ CVSS ≥ 9 <1% 6.3
For example, the difference in decreased pA for a PoC-only policy and an
All policy is only 0.3 points, but the former achieves this by addressing 80%
vulnerabilities less than the latter: the workload is massively reduced with
an only negligible loss in attack coverage.
This same observation can be generalized to all risk-based policies as com-
pared to criticality-based ones. The case of BMar is particularly clear as with
less than 1% of the original workload almost all the pA is foiled. This re-
sult provides additional support to Hypotheses 1-2 whereby the underground
markets are to be considered a relevant source of risk for the final user.
From the results presented in this Chapter we conclude that risk-based
policies for vulnerability management are possible and can lead to substantial
improvements in terms of patching efficiency over current criticality-based
approaches.
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7.4 Discussion
In this Thesis we explored the idea of implementing risk-based policies for
vulnerability management. The resulting contribution adds to current scien-
tific literature in several ways.
1. We showed that current criticality-based vulnerability management poli-
cies are widely suboptimal in prioritising the vulnerability mitigation
process. Their shortcoming is that they lack of a proper characterisation
of exploitation likelihood, a fundamental part of any risk assessment.
2. We hypothesised that a significant factor for likelihood of exploitation
are exploit cost and availability in the underground markets for cyber-
crime. These two line of research led to the following conclusions:
(a) The attacker is rational and has incentives to re-use the same exploit
until the overall number of vulnerable users drops significantly. As
a consequence, the same exploit is used in subsequent attacks for
more than two years before being substituted at large with a new
one. Similarly, new attacks arrive quicker as the pace of software
updates increases.
(b) Contrary to present claims in the scientific literature, the under-
ground markets are mature and economically sound. Current un-
derground markets show strong internal regulation that incentivizes
fair trading, and indeed the traded technology works well and reli-
ably against software configurations spanning as many as 8 years.
We developed a two-stage model of the underground markets and
showed that the economic principles over which they are founded
are sound.
3. Building on these conclusions, we develop a methodology based on the
notion of case-control studies to measure the reduction in risk entailed by
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current criticality-based policies and two risk-based policies. On the one
hand, we show that criticality-based policies are statistically equivalent
to ‘randomly picking’ vulnerabilities to patch. On the other, we show
that the exploitation factors discussed above are indeed significant for
vulnerability management and can lead to risk reductions as high as
80% (as opposed to current practices’ 4%).
4. We showed how risk-based policies enable vulnerability management
practices that get rid of the almost totality of risk in the wild by address-
ing a few vulnerabilities only. Our methodology is therefore suitable to
guide the prioritisation of vulnerability mitigation actions.
Conclusion 5 The results of our case-control study and the validation ex-
ample confirm that risk-based policies significantly improve over criticality-
based ones. We therefore accept Hypothesis 3. As expected from the analysis
provided in Chapter 6, we find that risk-based policies based on cybercrime
black markets benefit from the multiplicative factor they enable. We therefore
also accept the Corollary to Hypothesis 3.
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Limitations and Future Work
Directions
In this Chapter we discuss some limitations of this work and how it could
be extended to account for additional considerations on the value and costs
associated to the vulnerable system. Further, we outline what we believe are
interesting venues for future research on these same lines, in particular from
a policy perspective.
8.1 Limitations and Extensions
The results on risk-based policies presented in this Thesis are not accounting
for additional variables such as the value of the vulnerable system, that has
a clear impact on the level of acceptable risk. In the current formalization
of risk reduction we do not consider the fact that a company has typically
many instances of software and therefore many instances of the software’s
vulnerabilities, and that different companies may effectively face different
costs according the their specific environment. Rather, because RR is a
measure conditional on the existence of at least one exploit, it provides an
“upper bound” of risk reduction.
It is however impossible for us to consider these costs explicitly in our case-
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control experiment for two reasons: 1) the estimation is necessarily bounded
to a particular case-study, which can only reproduce our results after a general
validation is available (i.e. the work presented here); 2) even in a case-study
scenario, a correct estimation of these costs may be very difficult to calculate.
Therefore, in our study we have simply considered cost to linearly increase
with the number of vulnerabilities, i.e. every vulnerability has a unit cost.
To tailor our results to a more case-oriented application, a more appro-
priate cost estimation should account for the occurrences of a vulnerability
v in nv systems:
Costmult =
∑
v∈Selected
nv (8.1)
In this case we should also revise the notion of risk reduction with multiple
occurrences, because we should consider also the number of occurrences of
each vulnerability v in the nv systems.
RRmult=
∑
v∈Attack∩Selected nv∑
v∈Selected nv
−
∑
v∈Attack∩Selected nv∑
v∈Selected nv
(8.2)
The value of RRmulti would therefore be company specific since it depends
on the number of instances of the installed software base.
Calculating the risk reduction with this formula is again an approximation.
It assumes that all instances of software where the vulnerability is present
will be affected by the patching policy and that they will all be equally
attacked. The former assumption is correct (if the policy is implemented
correctly), but the latter is an approximation. In practice only a subset
of the systems with the vulnerability will be attacked (albeit they are all
potentially attackable). This approximation is conservative from a security
perspective: it overestimates the risk reduction that can be obtained when
we decide to patch a vulnerability that is present in many systems but could
be attacked only in some of them.
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Another variable worth mentioning is “infrastructural impact” , i.e. the
cost of having a critical system impacted by an attack. A vulnerability could
affect a mission critical system at the core of the corporation or a computer in
an obscure subsidiary. Yet, by itself the vulnerability has no “infrastructural
impact”. It is the compromise of the system on which the vulnerability is
present that can lead to a more or less severe cost. “Infrastructural impact”
should not therefore be considered in the actual calculation of risk reduction,
but rather when deciding which is the appropriate risk level for the systems
under consideration. In this sense the RRmult can be normalized by a sys-
tem criticality estimation when limiting its evaluation on a particular set of
systems. A company could therefore decide that a risk reduction of 50%
is a good trade-off for the desktop of the subsidiary while a moderate 10%
reduction is worth the money for the mission critical system.
8.2 Future Research Venues
This work outlined on the one hand the importance of attacker economics in
the general threat scenario, and on the other how this could be exploited to
design better vulnerability management practices.
The main point behind this body of work is that attackers are rational.
Rationality and market activities have a dual effect in our context: first,
they enable the attacker in more proficient and focused attack capabilities.
Second, and more interestingly for us, it makes the attacker’s decisions pre-
dictable to a degree: if the attacker has to act rationally, economic theory
will point in the direction of the attacker’s next step. For example, an at-
tacker that has to decide which vulnerability to massively exploit next, will
necessarily choose the one providing the highest return on investment.
Similarly, the economic environments that empower the attacker are based,
as shown in this Thesis, on well-known economic principles that ultimately
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make it work. From this perspective, it is possible to leverage this knowl-
edge to drive future international policies in the direction of ‘discouraging’
the formation of these markets. The attempt of influencing the convenience
of criminal activities through policies is certainly not new in itself, but the
cybercrime markets represent a brand new and interesting field that is yet
unexplored.
The idea of designing ‘rational vulnerability management’ practices can
and should go beyond the mere ‘application of a patch’: an interesting direc-
tion would be to define policies to develop vulnerability patches, i.e. policies
to decide, on the vendor’s side, which vulnerabilities to address first. This is
a different issue from that of installing a new patch on an existent system:
the system administrator (may) know his source of threat, while for a de-
veloper shipping the software to hundred of thousands customers this is not
possible (as the threat is ultimately on the customer and not the developer).
In other words, there is a balance in positive and negative ‘externalities’ that
the patching decision can create. This certainly requires future research to
be carried in this direction.
Finally, in this work we have considered only the ‘general’ attacker that
aims at masses rather than on specific targets. Extending a ‘risk-based’ ap-
proach to the latter scenario may be, however, a pointless exercise: there is
an inherent asymmetry there between the attacker and the defender whereby
the attacker knows more about the affected system than the defender does.
For example, if the attacker exploits a 0-day vulnerability or a non-default
configuration that makes an otherwise harmless vulnerability reachable there
is nothing that the defender may really do. Unfortunately, software vulnera-
bilities are not going to disappear from code [89], and therefore this problem
is unlikely to be solved in the foreseeable future. A different approach may
instead be more sensible to apply. Rather than focussing on risk mitigation,
the defender may accept that something he cannot avoid, and be instead
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prepared to reacting quickly and efficiently to an attack. In the practitioner
community this is an often-acclaimed concept, but it is hardly formalised
and remained largely untouched in the scientific literature.
A particular type of ‘dedicated attacker’ is a ‘governmental attacker’, i.e.
an organisation or person working for a governmental agency that deploys a
certain attack for monitoring or surveillance purposes. Without discussing
here the ethical issues attached to this practice, it is clear that establishing
a sensible policy to govern and limit this capability is of central importance
for the future society. Establishing a field of research that aims at filling this
regulation gap requires a clear understanding of the technical, economic, and
governance aspects of the problem.
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Conclusion
The contribution of this Thesis is twofold. On the one hand, it provides a
previously unexplored perspective over the economic environment in which
attackers operate. In particular, by infiltrating and studying the HackMar-
ket.ru market and testing real attack tools in our MalwareLab we were able
to draw a picture of the resources available to the attacker that starts from
the economic infrastructure supporting him or her, to the technical quality
of the goods in his or her hands. Importantly, we showed that the model
underlying cybercrime market operations is sound form an economic per-
spective, and there is therefore no good reason to believe these markets will
stop operating anytime soon without an external intervention (e.g. by means
of international policies).
The economic rationality of the attacker is also at the core of the defi-
nition of a new attacker model, the ‘Work-Averse Attacker’ model, whereby
the attacker’s decision of massively deploying a new exploit depends on the
expected utility of the new exploit relative to the already present one.
We argued that these considerations on the economic nature of the at-
tacker are the key enablers for more efficient vulnerability management strate-
gies that account for the risk represented by a vulnerability rather than
merely its technical severity. We tested this hypothesis by running a case
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control study over vulnerabilities and exploits in the wild, and showed that
indeed a risk-based approach enables for much more efficient vulnerability
management. Further, we showed that this efficiency translates in vulner-
ability management strategies that address few vulnerabilities only and are
still able to address the overwhelming majority of risk in the wild. With
this methodology and taking in account our considerations, an organisation
may ultimately be able to design more sensible vulnerability management
strategies that are easy to communicate and effective to enforce.
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